Άρθρα Για Τις Διακοπές Σας!..

1.  Kritik görüşmeden önce gizli diplomasi

(Τί σας γράφαμε εδώ τόσο καιρό);

ABD’nin 15 Temmuz darbe girişiminin arkasında olduğu netleşti. ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Kerry’nin kalkışma günü Moskova’da Lavrov ile görüşmesinde, Türkiye’deki gelişmeleri kastederek ‘mechanism launched’ (mekanizma harekete geçti) dediği ortaya çıktı

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Kritik görüşmeden önce gizli diplomasi

 
09 Ağustos 2016
Hikmet Çiçek

hikmetcicek@aydinlik.com.tr

Cumhurbaşkanı Tayyip Erdoğan ile Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin’in görüşmesi öncesinde bir dizi gizli diplomasi yürütüldü. Rus uçağının düşürülmesinden hemen sonra Vatan Partisi’nin girişimleriyle iki ülke arasındaki sorunların çözüm için gayrı resmi kanallar oluşturulmaya çalışıldı. Uçak krizinden bir ay sonra Vatan Partisi Genel Başkan Yardımcısı İsmail Hakkı Pekin başkanlığında parti heyeti Moskova’da görüşmeler yaptı. Ardından Rusya Devlet Başkanı Putin’in özel temsilcisi Alexander Dugin, Türkiye’ye gelerek iktidar partisi ve Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın yakın çevresiyle buluştu. Dugin, Erdoğan ile Putin arasındaki bugünkü görüşmeye kadar üç kez Türkiye’ye geldi.
Darbenin yaşandığı 15 Temmuz’da Putin’in özel temsilcisi Dugin, Kamu Güvenliği Müsteşarı ile birlikteydi. Dugin, aralarında MİT yetkililerinin de bulunduğu bir dizi görüşme yaptıktan sonra Türkiye’den ayrılmıştı. Dugin, Erdoğan-Putin görüşmesinden hemen önce bir kez daha Ankara’ya gelerek görüşmeler yaptı.

ÇIRAĞAN TOPLANTISI
Darbenin hemen ardından Putin’in yakın aile dostu Marat Kabaev, İstanbul’da Cumhurbaşkanlığı çevreleri, hükümet ve büyük şirketlerin temsilcileriyle bir araya geldi. Kırım Kalkınma Vakfı Başkanı Ünver Sel’in davetiyle 23 Temmuz’da İstanbul’a gelen Marat Kabaev, Rusya Uluslararası İslami İş Konseyi’nin de başkanlığını yürütüyor. Çırağan Sarayı’nda gerçekleştirilen toplantıda Türkiye ve Rusya arasındaki ticari ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi üzerinde ayrıntılı görüşmeler yapıldı. İnşaat, sağlık, turizm ve tarım sektörlerinde yatırım olanakları ele alındı. Kabaev ve ekibindeki Rus iş adamları, özellikle sağlık ve tarım sektörüyle altyapı alanında Rusya’nın eksiklerinin giderilmesi için Türk iş adamlarını Moskova’ya davet etti.

PUTİN’NİN TALİMATI
Rusya Uluslararası İslami İş Konseyi, bizzat Putin’in talimatıyla Kabaev tarafından kuruldu. Amacı Rusya’nın eski Müslüman Sovyet cumhuriyetleri ve Türkiye gibi Müslüman ülkelerle ticari ve finansal işbirliğini geliştirmek. Türkiye ile Rusya arasında iş çevrelerinin koordinasyonunu görevini de bundan böyle Rusya Uluslararası İslami İş Konseyi yürütecek.
Kabaev, Kremlin’in gölge adamlarından biri olarak gösteriliyor. Özbekistan doğumlu bir Müslüman olan Kabaev Rusya’da “Putin ailesinden biri” olarak kabul ediliyor. Kabaev aynı zamanda Rusya Milli Takımı’nda da oynamış olan eski bir futbolcu. Bu yüzden 28 Ağustos’ta ünlü Türk ve Rusları karşı karşıya getirecek ve Moskova’da yapılacak gösteri maçını da Kabaev organize ediyor. Türkiye ve Rusya karmalarını karşı karşıya getirecek maç iki ülke yakınlaşması çerçevesinde organize edilecek ve ünlü Luzhniki Stadyumu’nda oynanacak.

 

 2. 

2. Yeni dönemin ilk yasası çıktı

AA (Όλος ο νέος Νόμος)

Terör örgütleriyle mücadele kapsamında, bazı kanunlarda değişiklik içeren kanun teklifi TBMM Genel Kurulunda kabul edildi

Valiler, kamu düzeni veya güvenliğinin olağan hayatı durduracak veya kesintiye uğratacak şekilde bozulduğu ya da bozulacağına ilişkin ciddi belirtilerin bulunduğu hallerde, 15 günü geçmemek üzere ildeki belirli yerlere girişi ve çıkışı kamu düzeni ya da kamu güvenliğini bozabileceği şüphesi bulunan kişiler için sınırlayabilecek.

TBMM Genel Kurulunda, terörle mücadelede yeni düzenlemeler içeren, Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Teklifi kabul edilerek yasalaştı.

Buna göre valiler, kamu düzeni veya güvenliğinin olağan hayatı durduracak veya kesintiye uğratacak şekilde bozulduğu ya da bozulacağına ilişkin ciddi belirtilerin bulunduğu hallerde, 15 günü geçmemek üzere ildeki belirli yerlere girişi ve çıkışı kamu düzeni ya da kamu güvenliğini bozabileceği şüphesi bulunan kişiler için sınırlayabilecek.

Valiler, belli yerlerde veya saatlerde kişilerin dolaşmalarını, toplanmalarını, araçların seyirlerini düzenleyebilecek veya kısıtlayabilecek, ruhsatlı da olsa her çeşit silah ve merminin taşınması ve naklini yasaklayabilecek.

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet Kanunu’na “önleme araması” başlığıyla eklenen maddeye göre, tehlikenin ve suç işlenmesinin önlenmesi amacıyla usulüne göre verilmiş sulh ceza hakimi kararı veya bu sebeplere bağlı olarak gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan hallerde askeri birlik komutanının ya da askeri kurum amiri, hukuk hizmetleri başkanı ve birim amirinin yazılı emri üzerine, askeri mahallerde kişilerin üstü, araçları, özel kağıtları ve eşyası aranabilecek, gerekli tedbirler alınacak, suç delilleri koruma altına alınacak.

Arama talep yazısında, arama için makul sebeplerin oluştuğunun gerekçeleriyle birlikte gösterilmesi gerekecek. Arama kararında veya emrinde aramanın sebebi, konusu ve kapsamıyla yapılacağı yer, zaman ve geçerli olacağı süre belirtilecek. Aramanın sonucu, arama kararı veya emri veren merci ya da makama bir tutanakla bildirilecek. Konutta ve yerleşim yerinde ve eklentilerinde önleme araması yapılamayacak.

Asker kişiler dahil askeri mahallere girmek veya çıkmak isteyenler, duyarlı kapıdan geçmek zorunda olacak. Bu kişilerin üstleri duyarlı kapının ikaz vermesi halinde metal dedektörle kontrol edilecek, eşyaları teknik cihazlardan ve güvenlik sistemlerinden geçirilecek, aracı teknik cihazlarla gerektiğinde elle kontrol edilebilecek.

Şüphe halinde veya bu cihazların bulunmadığı yerlerde, herhangi bir emir veya karar olmasına bakılmaksızın kontrol elle yapılabilecek. Teknik cihazların ikazının sürmesi halinde, bu kişiler ancak elle kontrolü kabul ettikleri takdirde askeri mahallere girebilecek.

Teklifle 2017 yılında yapılan değişiklikle sıkıyönetim rejimi Anayasa’dan çıkarıldığından, bu düzenlemeye uyum için Sıkıyönetim Kanunu yürürlükten kaldırılıyor.

AİHM’in ihlal kararı dışında dostane çözüm ve tek taraflı deklarasyon gibi usullerle sonuçlandırılan başvuruları da “yargılamanın yenilenmesi” sebepleri arasına alınıyor. Böylece, dostane çözüm veya tek taraflı deklarasyonla sonuçlandırılan başvurularda, ihlal kararı verilen başvurularda olduğu gibi yeniden yargılama yoluna başvurulabilmesi mümkün hale getiriliyor, AİHM önündeki başvurularda ihlal kararı verilmesinin önüne geçilmesi amaçlanıyor.

– Erbaş ve erlerin üst ve eşya aramaları

Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı Kanunu’na “erbaş ve erlerin üst ve eşya aramaları” başlığıyla eklenen maddeye göre, tehlikenin veya suç işlenmesinin önlenmesi amacıyla usulüne göre verilen sulh ceza hakimi kararı veya bu sebeplere bağlı olarak gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan hallerde birlik komutanı ile kurum amirinin yazılı emri üzerine, sahil güvenlik hizmet binaları ve eklentileriyle yüzer unsurlarında, askerlik yükümlülüğünü yerine getiren erbaş ve erlerin üstü, özel kağıtları ve eşyası aranabilecek, gerekli tedbirler alınacak, suç delilleri koruma altına alınacak.

Arama talep yazısında, arama için makul sebeplerin oluştuğunun gerekçeleriyle gösterilmesi gerekecek. Arama kararında veya emrinde aramanın sebebi, konusu ve kapsamıyla yapılacağı yer, zaman ve geçerli olacağı süre belirtilecek.

Aramanın sonucu, arama kararı veya emri veren merci veya makama bir tutanakla bildirilecek.

Konutta ve yerleşim yerinde ve eklentilerinde önleme araması yapılamayacak.

– Jandarma erbaş ile erlerin üst ve eşya aramaları

Jandarma erbaş ve erlerin üst ve eşya aramaları da aynı esaslara bağlanıyor.

Jandarma Teşkilat, Görev ve Yetkileri Kanunu’nda yapılan değişikliğe göre, vardiya yatakhaneleri, gazinolar, sosyal tesisler, özel, yerel ve kış eğitim merkezlerinin sermayeleri, bu tesislerin gelirleriyle üye aidatlarına ilave olarak Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı bütçesine konulacak ödenekten oluşacak. Vardiya yatakhaneleri, gazinolar, sosyal tesisler, özel, yerel ve kış eğitim merkezlerinin merkezi yönetim bütçe kanunu ile belirlenen giderleri genel bütçeden karşılanabilecek.

– Toplantı ve gösteri yürüyüşlerine düzenleme

Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Kanunu’nda, Anayasa Mahkemesinin kararları doğrultusunda değişiklik yapılıyor. Buna göre, toplantı ile gösteri yürüyüşünün yer ve güzergahı, vatandaşların günlük yaşamını aşırı ve katlanılamaz derecede zorlaştırmayacak.

Açık yerlerdeki toplantılar ile yürüyüşler gece vaktinin başlamasıyla dağılacak şekilde, kapalı yerlerdeki toplantılar ise saat 24.00’e kadar yapılabilecek. Toplantı ve gösteri yürüyüşünün gece vaktinin başlamasından sonra devam edeceği konusunda geçerli neden bildirilmişse açık yerlerde yapılan toplantı ve gösteri yürüyüşlerinin dağılma saati mahallin en büyük mülki amirinin kararıyla en geç saat 24.00’e kadar uzatılabilecek.

Yasa ile Devlet İstihbarat Hizmetleri ve Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Kanunu’nun 30’uncu maddesine yeni fıkralar ekleniyor.

Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MİT) personelinin kimliğinin gizli tutulmasının zorunluluğu dikkate alınarak, MİT’in tarafı olduğu özel hukuk uyuşmazlıklarında dava şartı olarak öngörülen arabuluculuk dahil olmak üzere, arabuluculuk usulünün uygulanmaması amaçlanıyor. Böylece, MİT’in taraf olduğu özel hukuk uyuşmazlıklarında, arabuluculuğun dava şartı olarak öngörüldüğü İş Mahkemeleri Kanunu dahil, mevzuatta yer alan arabuluculuğa ilişkin tüm hükümler uygulanmayacak.

MİT, “Bilgi Edinme Hakkı Kanunu” kapsamı dışına çıkarılacak.

Yasayla, Seferberlik ve Savaş Hali Kanunu’nun 17’nci maddesinde atıfta bulunulan Sıkıyönetim Kanunu’nun yürürlükten kaldırılması nedeniyle söz konusu madde yeni hükümlere göre düzenleniyor.

Seferberlik ve savaş hallerinde, tespit ve ilan edilen bölgeler içinde kişiyi hürriyetinden yoksun kılma, haberleşmenin engellenmesi, yağma, nitelikli yağma, genel güvenliğin kasten tehlikeye sokulması, radyasyon yayma, trafik güvenliğini tehlikeye sokma, zehirli madde katma, uyuşturucu veya uyarıcı madde imal ve ticareti, uyuşturucu veya uyarıcı madde kullanılmasını kolaylaştırma, mühürde sahtecilik, halk arasında korku ve panik yaratmak amacıyla tehdit, kanunlara uymamaya tahrik, suç işlemek amacıyla örgüt kurma, ulaşım araçlarının kaçırılması veya alıkonulması, mal veya hizmet satımından kaçınma, Cumhurbaşkanına hakaret, devlet güvenliği ile ilgili belgeleri elinde bulundurma suçlarını işleyenler veya bu suçlara iştirak edenler, bölgede yetkili kılınan komutan tarafından gerekli görüldüğü takdirde askeri mahkemelerde yargılanacak.

– Komutanın kovuşturma yapabilmesi

Seferberlik ve Savaş Hali Kanunu’nda belirtilen suçlardan dolayı Cumhurbaşkanı yardımcıları ve bakanlar hakkında bölgede yetkili kılınan komutanın kovuşturma yapabilmesi Cumhurbaşkanının, milletvekilleri hakkında TBMM’nin, general ve amiraller hakkında Genelkurmay Başkanlığının, bakan yardımcıları hakkında ilgili bakanların iznine ve yargılama usulüne bağlı olacak.

Valiler ve kaymakamlar ile Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı ve Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığında görevli general ve amiraller hakkında İçişleri Bakanı; Anayasa Mahkemesi, Yargıtay, Danıştay, Hakimler ve Savcılar Kurulu, Sayıştay Başkan ve üyeleri, hakimler ve savcılar ve bu sınıftan sayılanlar hakkında ise özel kanunlarına göre yetkili kurul ve makamlar izin verecek.

Bu kişiler hakkında yetkili kurul ve makamlar tarafından, hakkında bölgede yetkili kılınan komutanca kovuşturma yapılmasına izin verilmediği durumda, özel kanunlarına göre işlem yapılacak.

Diplomatik dokunulmazlıkla ilgili düzenlemeler saklı olacak.

Anayasal düzene karşı işlenen suçlar ile terör suçlarından mahkum olanlar, MGK’ce devletin milli güvenliğine karşı faaliyette bulunduğuna karar verilen yapı, oluşum veya gruplara üyeliği, mensubiyeti ve iltisakı ya da bunlarla irtibatı nedeniyle kamu görevinden çıkarılanların silah ruhsatları iptal edilecek ve silahların mülkiyeti kamuya geçirilecek.

– TMK’ye geçici madde ekleniyor

Terörle Mücadele Kanunu’na (TMK) geçici madde ekleniyor.

Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu’nda yer alan gözaltı süreleri, bazı suçlarla ilgili olarak yeniden düzenleniyor ve ek gözaltı süreleri getiriliyor.

Buna göre, bu düzenlemenin yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren 3 yıl süreyle TCK’nin “devletin güvenliğine karşı suçlar, anayasal düzene ve bu düzenin işleyişine karşı suçlar, milli savunmaya karşı suçlar, devlet sırlarına karşı suçlar ve casusluk suçları” ile Terörle Mücadele Kanunu kapsamına giren suçlar veya örgüt faaliyeti çerçevesinde işlenen suçlar bakımından; gözaltı süresi, yakalama yerine en yakın hakim veya mahkemeye gönderilmesi için zorunlu süre hariç, yakalama anından itibaren 48 saati, toplu olarak işlenen suçlarda ise 4 günü geçemeyecek.

Delillerin toplanmasındaki güçlük veya dosyanın kapsamlı olması nedeniyle gözaltı süresi en fazla 2 defa uzatılabilecek. Gözaltı süresinin uzatılmasına ilişkin karar, cumhuriyet savcısının istemi üzerine yakalanan kişi dinlenilmek suretiyle hakim tarafından verilecek.

Şüphelinin aynı olayla ilgili olarak yeniden ifadesinin alınması ihtiyacı ortaya çıktığında bu işlem, cumhuriyet savcısı veya cumhuriyet savcısının yazılı emri üzerine kolluk güçleri tarafından yapılabilecek.

Tutukluluğa itiraz ve tahliye talepleri dosya üzerinden karara bağlanabilecek.

Tahliye talepleri, en geç 30’ar günlük sürelerle tutukluluğun incelenmesiyle birlikte dosya üzerinden karara bağlanabilecek.

Tutukluluğun incelenmesi en geç 30’ar günlük sürelerle dosya üzerinden, 90’ar günlük sürelerle kişi veya müdafi dinlenilmek suretiyle resen yapılacak.

Askeri mahallerdeki aramayı, savcının nezaretinde askeri makamların katılımıyla adli kolluk görevlileri yapacak.

TBMM Genel Kurulunda kabul edilen Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun ile “Devlet İstihbarat Hizmetleri ve Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Kanunu’nun 30’uncu maddesi”ne yeni fıkralar ekleniyor.

Askeri mahallerde yapılacak arama, cumhuriyet savcısının nezaretinde askeri makamların katılımıyla adli kolluk görevlileri tarafından yerine getirilecek. Gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan hallerde savcının yazılı emriyle de askeri makamların katılımıyla adli kolluk görevlilerince arama yapılabilecek.

Askeri mahallerde yapılacak el koyma işlemi, savcının nezaretinde askeri makamların katılımıyla adli kolluk görevlileri tarafından yerine getirilecek. Gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan hallerde savcının yazılı emriyle de askeri makamların katılımıyla adli kolluk görevlilerince el koyma işlemi yapılabilecek.

Bir suç dolayısıyla yapılan soruşturmada, somut delillere dayanan kuvvetli şüphe sebeplerinin varlığı ve başka surette delil elde etme imkanının bulunmaması halinde, hakim veya gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan hallerde savcı tarafından şüphelinin kullandığı bilgisayar ve bilgisayar programlarıyla, bilgisayar kütüklerinde arama yapılmasına, bilgisayar kayıtlarından kopya çıkarılmasına, bu kayıtların çözülerek metin haline getirilmesine karar verilecek.

Bilgisayar, bilgisayar programları ve bilgisayar kütüklerine şifrenin çözülememesinden dolayı girilememesi veya gizlenmiş bilgilere ulaşılamaması ya da işlemin uzun sürecek olması halinde, çözümün yapılabilmesi ve gerekli kopyaların alınabilmesi için bu araç ve gereçlere el konulabilecek.

Cumhuriyet savcısı tarafından verilen kararlar 24 saat içinde hakim onayına sunulacak. Hakim kararını en geç 24 saat içinde verecek. Sürenin dolması veya hakim tarafından aksine karar verilmesi halinde çıkarılan kopyalar ve çözümü yapılan metinler derhal imha edilecek.

Kovuşturmaya yer olmadığına dair kararın etkin soruşturma yapılmadan verildiğinin Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin kesinleşmiş kararıyla tespit edilmesi veya bu karar aleyhine Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesine yapılan başvuru hakkında dostane çözüm ya da tek taraflı deklarasyon sonucunda düşme kararı verilmesi üzerine, kararın kesinleşmesinden itibaren 3 ay içinde talep edilmesi halinde yeniden soruşturma açılacak.

Kamu görevinden çıkarılan asker kişilerin askeri rütbeleri, mahkeme kararı aranmaksızın karar tarihinden geçerli olmak üzere geri alınacak.

Yasayla, Avrupa İnsan Haklan Mahkemesine Yapılmış Bazı Başvuruların Tazminat Ödenmek Suretiyle Çözümüne Dair Kanun’a geçici madde eklendi.

Buna göre, maddenin yürürlüğe girdiği tarih itibarıyla Anayasa Mahkemesinde derdest olan bireysel başvurular, başvuru yollarının tüketilmemesi nedeniyle verilen kabul edilemezlik kararının tebliğinden itibaren üç ay içinde yapılacak müracaat üzerine Tazminat Komisyonu tarafından incelenecek.

Komisyona müracaat, müracaat edenin kimlik bilgileri ile Anayasa Mahkemesine başvuru tarihi ve numarasını içeren imzalı bir dilekçeyle yapılacak.

Dilekçeye, Anayasa Mahkemesine yapılan bireysel başvuruya ilişkin form, kabul edilemezlik kararı ve bu kararın tebliğine dair belge ile ihlal iddiasına ilişkin diğer bilgi ve belgeler eklenecek.

Müracaat evrakındaki eksikliğin giderilmesi için müracaat edene 30 günü geçmemek üzere süre verilecek. Bu süre içinde, geçerli bir mazeret olmaksızın eksikliğin tamamlanmaması halinde müracaat reddedilecek.

Bu madde uyarınca komisyona yapılan başvurular için karar verme süresi, 9 ay yerine 16 ay olarak uygulanacak.

Kamu görevinden çıkarılan ya da ilişiği kesilen subay, astsubay, uzman jandarmalar ile emniyet hizmetleri sınıfına tabi olanlardan mahkemelerce göreve iade kararı verilenler ile Olağanüstü Hal İşlemleri İnceleme Komisyonunca başvurunun kabulü kararı verilenlerden eski kadro, rütbe veya unvanına atanması uygun görülmeyenler, Milli Savunma ve İçişleri Bakanlığı bünyelerinde kurulan araştırma merkezlerinde istihdam edilecek.

TBMM Genel Kurulunda kabul edilen, Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapan Kanunla, OHAL döneminde doğrudan KHK ile ihraç edilip Olağanüstü Hal İşlemleri İnceleme Komisyonunca başvurusu kabul edilenler hakkında uygulanacak usul hükümlerinin bir kısmı yeniden belirleniyor.

Kamu görevinden, meslekten veya görev yapılan teşkilattan çıkarılan ya da ilişiği kesilenlere ilişkin başvurunun kabulü halinde karar Devlet Personel Başkanlığına bildirilirken yapılan düzenlemeyle karar, kadro veya pozisyonunun bulunduğu kuruma, yükseköğretim kurumlarında kamu görevinden çıkarılan öğretim elemanları için YÖK’e bildirilecek.

Kamu görevine iade edilecekler, eski kadro veya pozisyonuna atanacak. Ancak müdür yardımcısı veya daha üstü ile bunlara eşdeğer yöneticilik görevindeyken kamu görevinden çıkarılanların atamalarında, yöneticilik görevlerinden önce bulundukları kadro ve pozisyon unvanları dikkate alınacak.

Kanunla, YÖK’e bildirilenlerin atama tekliflerine ilişkin hükümde herhangi bir değişikliğe gidilmiyor.

– 30 gün içinde atama işlemlerini tamamlayacak

Kurumlar, bildirim veya atama teklif tarihini takip eden 30 gün içinde atama işlemlerini tamamlayacak. Bu kapsamda yer alan personele ilişkin kadro ve pozisyonlar, ilgililere ilişkin atama onaylarının alındığı tarih itibarıyla ihdas, tahsis ve vize edilmiş sayılacak.

Söz konusu kadro ve pozisyonlar, herhangi bir şekilde boşalırsa başka bir işleme gerek kalmadan iptal edilmiş olacak.

Atama emri, ilgili kamu kurum ve kuruluşunca Tebligat Kanunu hükümlerine göre ilgililere tebliğ edilecek. Tebliğ tarihini takip eden 10 gün içinde göreve başlamayanların bu maddeden doğan atanma hakkı ile mali hakları düşecek.

Kamu kurum ve kuruluşları, atama ve göreve başlatma işlemlerinin sonucunu, işlemlerin tamamlanmasını takip eden 15 gün içinde Devlet Personel Başkanlığına bildirecek.

İlgililerin kamu görevinden çıkarılmasına ilişkin KHK hükümleri, bu düzenlemede belirtilen kişiler bakımından tüm hüküm ve sonuçlarıyla birlikte ortadan kalkmış sayılacak.

Görevine iade edilenlere, kamu görevinden çıkarılma tarihlerini takip eden aybaşından göreve başladıkları tarihe kadar geçen süreye tekabül eden mali ve sosyal hakları ödenecek.

Bu kişiler, kamu görevinden çıkarılmalarından dolayı herhangi bir tazminat talebinde bulunamayacak.

– Araştırma merkezlerinde istihdam edilecek

Kanunla, Olağanüstü Hal İşlemleri İnceleme Komisyonu Kurulması Hakkında KHK’nin Değiştirilerek Kabul Edilmesine Dair Kanun’a, “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ile genel kolluk kuvvetleri personeli ve Dışişleri Bakanlığı diplomatik kariyer memurlarına ilişkin kararların uygulanması” başlığı ekleniyor.

Terör örgütlerine veya MGK’ca devletin milli güvenliğine karşı faaliyette bulunduğuna karar verilen yapı, oluşum veya gruplara üyeliği, mensubiyeti veya iltisakı yahut bunlarla irtibatı olduğu değerlendirilmesiyle kamu görevinden, meslekten, görevden çıkarılan ya da ilişiği kesilen subay, astsubay, uzman jandarmalar ile Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğünde emniyet hizmetleri sınıfına tabi olanlar ve Dışişleri Bakanlığı diplomatik kariyer memurlarından mahkemelerce göreve iade kararı verilenlerle OHAL Komisyonunca başvurunun kabulü kararı verilenlerden, eski kadro, rütbe veya unvanına atanması ilgili bakan onayı ile uygun görülmeyenler, ilgisine göre Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve İçişleri Bakanlığı bünyelerinde kurulan araştırma merkezlerinde istihdam edilecek.

Bu kapsamdaki binbaşı ve üstü rütbelerde olanlar ile emniyet hizmetleri sınıfında bulunan her sınıftaki emniyet müdürlerinin atamaları, araştırmacı kadrosuna, diğerlerinin atamaları ise İçişleri Bakanlığı, Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Milli Savunma Bakanlığınca tespit edilen araştırma merkezlerindeki diğer kadrolara 30 gün içinde ilgili bakan onayıyla yapılacak.

Tebliğ tarihini takip eden 10 gün içerisinde göreve başlamayanların atanma hakkı düşecek. İlgili bakanlık atama ve göreve başlatma işlemlerinin sonucunu, işlemlerin tamamlanmasını takip eden 15 gün içinde Devlet Personel Başkanlığına bildirecek.

Bu kişiler, kamu görevinden çıkarılmalarından dolayı herhangi bir tazminat talebinde bulunamayacak.

– Çalışma grupları da oluşturulabilecek

Bu düzenleme kapsamına giren personel, önceki statülerinden kaynaklanan rütbe, unvan, kimlik ve sosyal haklarını kullanamayacak, emniyet hizmetleri sınıfındakiler hariç olmak üzere muvazzaf askerlik hizmetini yerine getirmiş sayılacak, bunlara kanun kapsamında verilen silahları irat kaydedilecek. Talepte bulunanların Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu üyelikleri devam edecek.

Bakan onayı ile Ankara dışında araştırma merkezlerine bağlı çalışma grupları oluşturulabilecek.

Kanunla, OHAL döneminde KHK ile ihraç edilip, OHAL işlemlerini inceleme komisyonu kararıyla ihraç kararı kaldırılarak göreve iade edilenlerden Devlet Personel Başkanlığına bildirilenlerin atanmalarına ilişkin usul ve esaslarla bunların mali ve sosyal hakları düzenleniyor. Böylece bu kişilerin KHK’ler ile iade edilenlerle aynı haklara sahip olması amaçlanıyor.

Terör örgütlerine veya MGK’ce devletin milli güvenliğine karşı faaliyette bulunduğuna karar verilen yapı, oluşum veya gruplara üyeliği ya da bunlarla irtibatı olduğu değerlendirilen Anayasa Mahkemesi üyeleri, Yargıtay ile Danıştay daire başkanı ve üyeleri, hakim ve savcılar, askeri hakimler ve Sayıştay mensupları hakkında, kurumlarınca meslekten çıkarılmalarına karar verilecek.

TBMM Genel Kurulunda kabul edilen, Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanuna göre; il özel idareleri, belediyeler ile bağlı kuruluşları ve bunların üyesi olduğu mahalli idare birliklerinin personel çalıştırılmasına dayalı hizmetlerini karşılayan şirketlerin koruma ve güvenlik hizmeti alanındaki faaliyetlerinde Özel Güvenlik Hizmetlerine Dair Kanun hükümleri uygulanacak.

Bu şirketlerin faaliyet alanının münhasıran koruma ve güvenlik hizmeti olması zorunluluğu aranmayacak. Şirketler, bu kapsamdaki faaliyetlerini ayrı bir bölüm halinde yürütecek.

Şirketlerde özel güvenlik alanında istihdam edilen özel güvenlik görevlisi sayısının 10 kişiyi geçmemesi halinde en az lise mezunu olma ve özel güvenlik temel eğitim şartı sadece özel güvenlik bölümünde görevli yöneticiler için aranacak.

Bu şirketler, Özel Güvenlik Hizmetlerine Dair Kanun’da yer alan ruhsat harcından muaf olacak. Şirketler, kendi kurumları dışındaki özel ve kamu kurumlarına özel güvenlik hizmeti veremeyecek.

– İhraç, Resmi Gazete’de yayımlanınca tebliğ edilmiş sayılacak

Kanunla, düzenlemenin yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren üç yıl süreyle, terör örgütlerine veya MGK’ce devletin milli güvenliğine karşı faaliyette bulunduğuna karar verilen yapı, oluşum veya gruplara üyeliği, mensubiyeti veya iltisakı yahut bunlarla irtibatı olduğu değerlendirilen Anayasa Mahkemesi üyeleri hakkında Anayasa Mahkemesi Genel Kurulunun salt çoğunluğunca, Yargıtay daire başkanı ve üyeleri hakkında Yargıtay Birinci Başkanlık Kurulunca, Danıştay daire başkanı ve üyeleri hakkında Danıştay Başkanlık Kurulunca, hakim ve savcılar hakkında Hakimler ve Savcılar Kurulu Genel Kurulunca, askeri hakimler hakkında Milli Savunma Bakanı’nın başkanlığında oluşan komisyonca ve Sayıştay meslek mensupları hakkında Sayıştay Başkanı başkanlığında oluşan komisyonca meslekten çıkarılmalarına karar verilecek.

Kararlar, Resmi Gazete’de yayımlanacak ve yayımı tarihinde ilgililere tebliğ edilmiş sayılacak.

Meslekten çıkarılan kişiler hakkındaki kararlar 15 gün içinde Devlet Personel Başkanlığına bildirilecek.

– Lojmandan 15 gün içinde tahliye edilecek

Görevden uzaklaştırılanlar veya görevlerine son verilenlerin, silah ruhsatları ve pasaportları iptal edilecek ve bu kişiler oturdukları kamu konutlarından veya vakıf lojmanlarından 15 gün içinde tahliye edilecek. Görevden alınan kişiler, bağlı bulundukları ilgili kurum ve kuruluşlar tarafından kamu görevinden çıkarılacak. Ayrıca askeri hakimlerin askeri rütbeleri, mahkumiyet kararı aranmaksızın alınacak.

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı, Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı ve Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğünden çıkarılanların, mahkeme kararı aranmaksızın, karar tarihinden geçerli olmak üzere rütbe ve memuriyetleri geri alınacak. Bu kişiler yeniden kamu görevlerine kabul edilmeyecek ve 15 gün içinde Devlet Personel Başkanlığına bildirilecek.

Görevlerine son verilenlerin silah ruhsatları, gemi adamlığına ilişkin belgeleri ve pilot lisansları iptal edilecek ve bu kişiler oturdukları kamu konutlarından veya vakıf lojmanlarından 15 gün içinde tahliye edilecek. Bu kişiler özel güvenlik şirketlerinin kurucusu, ortağı ve çalışanı olamayacak.

– Görevine iade edilenler

Görevine iade edilenlere kamu görevinden çıkarıldıkları tarihten göreve başladıkları tarihe kadar geçen süreye tekabül eden mali ve sosyal hakları ödenecek.

Bu kişiler, kamu görevinden çıkarılmalarından dolayı herhangi bir tazminat talebinde bulunamayacak. Bu personelin görevlerine iadesi, kamu görevinden çıkarıldıkları tarihte bulundukları yöneticilik görevi dışında öğrenim durumları ve kazanılmış hak aylık derecelerine uygun kadro ve pozisyonlara atanmak suretiyle de yerine getirilebilecek.

Yasanın yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren üç yıl süreyle, haklarında bu yasa kapsamında idari işlem tesis edilenler ile aynı gerekçeyle haklarında suç soruşturması veya kovuşturması yürütülenler, işlemi yapan kurum ve kuruluşlarca ilgili pasaport birimine derhal bildirilecek ve pasaportları iptal edilebilecek. İlgili pasaport birimine isimleri bildirilen kişilerin eşlerine ait pasaportlar da genel güvenlik açısından mahzurlu görülmesi halinde aynı tarihte İçişleri Bakanlığınca iptal edilebilecek.

Yasanın yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren üç yıl süreyle, terör örgütlerine veya Milli Güvenlik Kurulunca devletin milli güvenliğine karşı faaliyette bulunduğuna karar verilen yapı, oluşum veya gruplara üyeliği, mensubiyeti veya iltisakı yahut bunlarla irtibatı nedeniyle hakkında inceleme ve soruşturma yürütülen kişiler ile bunların eş ve çocuklarına ilişkin olarak yetkili kurul, komisyon ve diğer mercilerce ihtiyaç duyulan, Bankacılık Kanunu uyarınca müşteri sırrı kapsamında kabul edilenler hariç, telekomünikasyon yoluyla iletişimin tespiti de dahil olmak üzere her türlü bilgi ve belge, kamu ve özel tüm kurum ve kuruluşlarca vakit geçirilmeksizin verilecek.

Düzenlemenin yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren üç yıl süreyle, kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının personeline ve bunların eş ve çocuklarına ait olup Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu’na devredilen ve faaliyet izni kaldırılan Asya Katılım Bankası AŞ’de veya bu bankayla ilgili olarak Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu’nda, Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumunda ya da Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu Başkanlığında bulunan her türlü bilgi, bu personelin çalıştığı kurum ve kuruluşlarca talepte bulunulması durumunda gecikmeksizin verilecek.

– Terörle ilişiği tespit edilenlerin rütbeleri alınacak

TSK, Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı, Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığından ve Emniyet Teşkilat Kanunu kapsamında bulunanlardan, terör örgütlerine veya Milli Güvenlik Kurulunca, devletin milli güvenliğine karşı faaliyette bulunduğuna karar verilen yapı, oluşum veya gruplara üyeliği, mensubiyeti veya iltisakı ya da bunlarla irtibatı olduğu değerlendirilenlerin rütbeleri ilgili bakanın onayıyla alınacak.

Aynı kapsamda haklarında işlem tesis edilenler, uhdelerinde taşımış oldukları büyükelçi, vali gibi unvanları ve yüksek mahkeme başkan ve üyeliği, müsteşar, hakim, savcı, kaymakam ve benzeri meslek adlarını ve sıfatlarını kullanamayacak ve bu unvan, sıfat ve meslek adlarına bağlı olarak sağlanan haklardan yararlanamayacak.

Emniyet Teşkilat Kanunu uyarınca resen emekliye sevk edilen, kendi isteğiyle emekli olan veya disiplin hükümlerine göre meslekten veya devlet memurluğundan çıkarılanlar ile müstafi sayılanlardan, terör örgütlerine veya Milli Güvenlik Kurulunca devletin milli güvenliğine karşı faaliyette bulunduğuna karar verilen yapı, oluşum veya gruplara üyeliği, mensubiyeti veya iltisakı yahut bunlarla irtibatı olduğu değerlendirilenlerin rütbeleri ilgili bakanın onayıyla alınacak.

Görevler yerine getirilirken görevin niteliğinden doğan veya görevle ilgili olmak şartıyla görevin ifası sırasında işlendiği iddia olunan suçlardan dolayı kamu görevlileri hakkında adli ve idari soruşturma ve kovuşturma yapılması, ilgisine göre ilgili bakan, Cumhurbaşkanı veya yetkilendireceği Cumhurbaşkanı yardımcısının iznine tabi olacak.

Terör örgütlerine veya Milli Güvenlik Kurulunca devletin milli güvenliğine karşı faaliyette bulunduğuna karar verilen yapı, oluşum veya gruplara üyeliği, mensubiyeti veya iltisakı yahut bunlarla irtibatı olduğu değerlendirildiği için görevden uzaklaştırılanlar veya açığa alınanlar hakkında, soruşturmaya başlama süresi uygulanmayacak, disiplin soruşturması sebebiyle görevden uzaklaştırma süreleri bir yıl uygulanacak ve bu süre bir yıla kadar daha uzatılabilecek.

Adli soruşturma ve kovuşturma sebebiyle görevden uzaklaştırma veya açığa alma işlemlerinde değerlendirme süreleri uygulanmayacak.

– 3 ay içinde gözden geçirilecek

Bu kapsamda, görevden uzaklaştırma veya açığa alınma işlemi tesis edilen ve ilgili mevzuatta yer alan süreleri dolan kamu görevlilerinin durumu, işlemi tesis eden makamca en geç 3 ay içinde gözden geçirilecek.

Düzenlemenin yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren terör örgütlerine aidiyet, iltisak veya irtibat nedeniyle TMSF’nin OHAL süresince kayyım atanmasına ilişkin hüküm, 3 yıl daha devam edecek.

Olağanüstü hal döneminde yürürlüğe konulan ve fon ile fonun ilişkili olduğu bakan ve fonun kayyımlık yetkisi kapsamında atananlar veya görevlendirilenlerin görev, hak, yetki ve sorumluluklarını, şirket ve mal varlığı değerlerine ilişkin, kefalet ve takip dahil tüm muafiyetleri düzenleyen kanun hükümleri, fonun kayyım atandığı dosyalar bakımından ceza soruşturması veya kovuşturması kesinleşinceye ya da satış veya tasfiye işlemleri tamamlanıncaya kadar uygulanacak.

Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu’nun, şirket yönetimi için kayyım tayiniyle ilgili maddesi uyarınca kayyım atanan şirketlerde ortaklık pay ve haklarına ilişkin olarak, soruşturmanın başladığı tarihten TMSF’nin kayyım olarak atandığı tarihe kadar şirket ortakları tarafından yapılmış olan devir ve temlik işlemleri muvazaalı kabul edilerek geçersiz sayılacak ve ticaret sicilinden resen terkin edilecek.

(AA)

Civil defense or civil protection is an effort to protect the citizens of a state (generally non-combatants) from military attack. It uses the principles of emergency operations: prevention, mitigation, preparation, response, or emergency evacuation, and recovery. Programmes of this sort were initially discussed at least as early as the 1920s and were implemented in many countries, but only became widespread in the USA after the threat of nuclear weapons was realised.

Since the end of the Cold War, the focus of civil defense has largely shifted from military attack to emergencies and disasters in general. The new concept is described by a number of terms, each of which has its own specific shade of meaning, such as crisis management, emergency management, emergency preparedness, contingency planning, emergency services, and civil protection.

In some countries, civil defense is seen as a key part of “total defense”. For example in Sweden, the Swedish word totalförsvar refers to the commitment of a wide range of resources of the nation to its defense – including to civil protection. (Source: Wikipedia)

4. Declassified Documents

Analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Crisis Management Experiences. Technical Report, 1 Oct 1978-28 Sep 1979[372 Pages, 14.9mb]

This report presents the first systematic analysis of the outcomes of U.S. and Soviet crises from 1966 through 1978. The analyses are designed to identify general trends and patterns in these data. The information developed has been deliberately structured so that it can be used as a tool by crisis planners and decision-makers. To this end, it is embodied in an executive aid for crisis decision-makers (CACI, 1979 report). This aid is a highly user- oriented database management system that allows planners to focus upon their own specific concerns. Moreover, the system is designed so that users can adapt it to incorporate additional outcomes data (developed from either open or classified sources) for use in their analyses. While a deliberate attempt has been made in the development of the database and its analysis to avoid drawing normative judgments concerning the ‘correctness’ of either U.S. or Soviet goals, the existence of the outcomes data provides a diagnostic base for evaluation of various goals’ achievement and thereby helps in the process of selecting and evaluating crisis action options.

Civil Defense Aspects of Bio, Chem, and Radio. Warfare against Crops, Animals and Man, 23 June 1952 [74 Pages, 19.5MB]

Civil Defense in Metropolitan America. Organization of Zonal Civil Defense Systems for Large Populated Areas, January 1972 [126 Pages, 5.3mb]

– The Institute of Public Administration since 1967 has been studying the organization of civil defense (that is, its nuclear threat components) in large population centers drawing on its background in administration, urban analysis, and metropolitanization. An earlier report submitted in 1969 to the U. S. Office of Civil Defense outlined several themes for making civil defense building and operating systems relevant to the requirements of the major metropolitan areas. IPA then was asked to continue its analysis, with particular reference to a zonal (or large area) concept of civil defense. The report helps define a potential organizational strategy for the zonal concept. The report is not a definitive design for implementing the zonal concept; rather, it probes the issue, describes and analyzes the universe within which a zonal system of civil defense inescapably would evolve, and applies a case study methodology– which is more an exercise in exposition than in organizational engineering.

Civil Defense Systems: Social Impact and Management Planning, April 1972 [197 Pages, 9.9mb]

– The bibliography — one in a series on Civil Defense Systems — contains a compilation of references on Social Impact and Management Planning. References contained in this volume pertain to psychological factors related to recovery from nuclear attack; public response to community shelter planning; fallout shelter management responsibilities; emergency operations training; attitudes toward civil defense; requirements for local planning to cover hazards of fallout; food processing and distribution; and the roles of the dentist and pharmacists in national disasters. Other bibliographies in this series are: Preattaack and Postattack (Nuclear Warfare), and Shelters. Corporate Author- Monitoring Agency, Subject, Title, Contract, and Report Number Indexes are included.

A Core Training Program for State Level Civil Defense Program Personnel [230 Pages, 8.9mb]

– The purpose of this study was to derive information required improving State level civil defense training and to apply this information to the development of required courses for achieving this purpose. In order to achieve this goal, research was first conducted to determine the training requirements for the governmental and auxiliary personnel that are needed to implement State civil defense operational plans. Second, training materials were developed to meet these requirements.

A Delphi Examination of Civil Defense: 1. Questions, Issues, and Arguments, May 1970 [104 Pages, 13.9MB]

– This Memorandum exposes opposing arguments about U.S. civil defense in the broad context of strategic issues, international factors, and domestic considerations. The information has gathered by the Delphi method of eliciting and refining group judgments. The exercise consists of several iterations of questions and responses, with carefully controlled feedback between rounds.

Federal Civil Defense Organization: The Rationale of its Development, Jan 1965 [104 Pages, 5.4mb] –

The present study examines the organizational concepts which have emerged during the modern history of civil defense. Since these have derived largely from polityoriented approaches, concepts of the role of civil defense in national security policy and machinery, of Federal, State, and local responsibilities, and of emergency powers are stressed. The issues underlying these polity problems are considered under three main headings: the mission and purpose of civil defense, the operational requirements for fulfilling the life- saving mission, and the policy constraints which limit the range of feasible ways to meet requirements. Cost/effectiveness analyses are suggested for initial comparisons of the alternative organizational systems for satisfying requirements for protective capabilities, emergency services, resource allocation, and communications systems. Broad organizational proposals which have been recommended are examined, and the principal reasons for which they have been rejected are indicated.

Final Report for the Office of Civil Defense Warning System Research Support Vol. I: Radio Warning System Studies, 31 January 1966 [274 Pages, 30.2MB]

– The report summarizes the results of the research effort in the area of civil defense warning system and comprises the final report required by the contract.

Final Report for the Office of Civil Defense Warning System Research Support Vol. II: Radio Warning System Studies, 31 January 1966 [274 Pages, 20.6MB]

– This report summarizes the results of the research effort in the area of civil defense warning system and comprises the final report required by the contract.

Final Report for the Office of Civil Defense Warning System Research Support Vol. III: Use of Damage Assessment Information for Warning, 31 January 1966 [67 Pages, 6.64mb]

– In April 1964, System Development Corporation (SDC) was awarded a contract (OCD-PS-64-183) by the Office of Civil Defense to continue activities in the area of civil defense warning system research support. The basic contract was modified and amended several times. This volume and two others, TM-L-1960/090/00 and TM-L-1960/091/00, are, together, the final report recognized by the contract. These volumes of the final report represent the results of the research effort.

Integration of Air and Sea Power in Regional Crisis Control, June 1992 [284 Pages, 11.1mb]

– Air power and sea power will be the most useful instruments of military force available to planners over the coming decade. Why? Because virtually all conflict during the next ten years will be regional in character. In the context of regional crisis, control of the vertical ladder of escalation will be the concern of the political leadership and, therefore, the most critical task facing the military commander and planners. Our strategists must develop a coherent and usable concept for the integrated use of air and sea power, involving U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force assets. The powerful synergism that can be achieved by truly integrating `air and sea power has yet to be realized, although we learned much about it in the Persian Gulf war. U.S. warfighters and strategists must assess and improve all aspects of military performance in this critical area — integration of air and sea power in regional crisis control — in order to face effectively the geostrategic environment over the next decade.

Local Governing Bodies: Their Relation to Civil Defense, Mar 1967 [169 Pages, 8.3mb]

– Local government officials are key decision-makers in the implementation of civil defense programs on the local level. As local officials are given new tasks in civil defense, they understand their roles to varying degrees. The report focuses on (1) the extent to which local officials understand their own civil defense roles, (2) the extent to which they understand the civil defense roles of other local officials, (3) the local officials’ evaluations of their own civil defense role performances, and (4) their evaluations of the civil defense role performances of other local officials. Findings are stated. Implications are drawn from the findings for change agents.

Organizing Minicipal Governments for Civil Defense, October 1963 [ 307 Pages, 18.3MB ]

– The study describes the civil defense responsibilities of municipal government as defined by present federal programs and policies, especially as they relate to the fallout shelter program. Six cities are then analyzed to determine the manner in which community resources have been organized to meet these responsibilities. The cities were selected to represent the several common forms of city government and to provide a wide geographic distribution and spectrum of population sizes from the very small city to the large metropolitan city. Each case study provides a profile of the city to establish its essential characteristics and identify any exceptional circumstances that may be peculiar to the city and affect its civil defense capabilities. The preparations made by the city for government operations in the event of nuclear or natural disaster are investigated, including continuity of government, emergency powers, and the civil defense agency, its financing, program, and facilities for emergency operations. The emergency operations or survival plans of each city are related to the assignment of its regular departments and agencies to emergency disaster functions. The utilization made of volunteers and non-governmental agencies, organizations, and institutions to augment and supplement city forces is described.

The Role of Civil Defense and the Scope of Its Mission in U. S. National Security Strategy, April 1992 [ 35 Pages, 1.5MB ]

– In our constantly changing world, and especially with the breakup of the Soviet Union, it seems timely to review the current status of the United States civil defense program with a primary focus being the future configuration of the program. Our current civil defense program evolved during a time when nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was the primary threat to national security. This threat is now greatly diminished, but our civil. defense program continues to emphasize attack-related emergencies with secondary emphasis on disaster-related emergencies. The National Security Strategy of -the United States published by The White House in August, 1991 states that, Our civil defense program is still needed to deal with the consequences of an attack, while also providing capabilities to respond to natural and man-made catastrophes. One might question whether we still need a civil defense program to deal with the consequences of attack. After all, who has the capability and will to attack the U.S.? On the other hand, natural and man-made catastrophes continue to affect our country. While these catastrophes may wreak havoc on a local area, it could be argued that they most likely would not directly impact our national security. Therefore, we must determine whether our civil defense program should continue to emphasize the consequences of an attack, or whether it is more appropriate to shift its emphasis to natural and man-made catastrophes.

POPPY is the code name given to a series of U.S. intelligence satellites operated by the National Reconnaissance Office. The POPPY satellites recorded ELINT data, targeting radar installations in the Soviet Union and Soviet naval ships at sea.

The POPPY program was a continuation within NRO’s Program C of the Naval Research Laboratory’s Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) ELINT program, also known as Tattletale. The National Security Agency was given the responsibility of collecting, interpreting, and reporting the signals intercepted.

The existence of the POPPY program was declassified by the NRO in September 2005, although most of the details about its capabilities and operation are still classified. The NRO revealed, though, that the POPPY satellites, like other US SIGINT systems, used the principle of signals time difference of arrival, which enables precise locating of an object.[1] All POPPY launches orbited multiple satellites. The first POPPY launch included two satellites, launch #2 and #3 three satellites each, and subsequent launches orbited four satellites each. The full configuration thus employed four vehicles in low Earth orbit.

There were seven launches of POPPY satellites from Vandenberg Air Force Base from 1962 until 1971, all of which were successful. The program continued until August 1977.

Declassified Documents

The Poppy Satellite – First Launch [100 Pages]

– All documents released from the National Reconnaissance Office, as of 14 August 2006.

The History of the Poppy Satellite System

Abstract: This report describes the history of the Poppy project from its concept in 1958 through its termination on 30 September 1977. This history was compiled at the request of the Director National Reconnaissance Office to the Director, Program C.

Included in this report are the significant events during the nineteen years of the Poppy project, including the development and refinement of POPPY satellites,
mission ground stations, ground readout equipment; analog analysis, and data processing. The impact of failures, problems and anomalies are evaluated. Successes of the Poppy project are measured against program objectives. Technical cost history, key contributions, a glossary of terms related to the POPPY project, and a bibliography are contained in annexes to the report.

Each of the chapters in the report is intended to be somewhat self-contained. Annex i contains a summary of mission characteristics and merges some information from the third throughout the seventh chapters in order to provide a chronological summary of the technological innovations in the order of the launches.

The History of the Poppy Satellite System, 2016 Release [98 Pages, 9.5MB]

– In October of 2016, I requested a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of this document. Previously, the last release of it was in 2012. I was successful in getting the NRO to release additional portions of the report, that have never been released before. I archived the 2012 version below, for reference.

The History of the Poppy Satellite System, 2012 Release [97 Pages, 2.5MB]

Raising the Periscope… GRAB and POPPY: America’s Early ELINT Satellites [27 Pages, 1.5MB]

– We offer in this publication a brief history of Grab and Poppy—two of the earliest U.S. satellite-based electronic intelligence (ELINT) programs. Our brief history represents the scope of programmatic details that former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet authorized the Director of National Reconnaissance to declassify.1 Our goal was to produce a consolidated summary of these programs on the occasion of DNRO Donald Kerr’s recognition of key contributors to the Poppy program.2 Although security constraints limit how much we can say about these programs, we present an overview and summary of Poppy’s early contributions to national security. Such information can provide current NRO program managers with an unclassified historical context for programmatic and policy decisions.

Excerpt from the Foreword of the book:

The challenges facing our Nation today in its war against terrorism are reminiscent of the security concerns in the days leading up to World War I. Newspaper headlines told of large explosions in major metropolitan areas, the presence of spy cells inside the country, and the capture of foreign saboteurs crossing our borders. These events would ultimately result in the establishment of a permanent corps of trained counterintelligence specialists within America’s Army.

During peacetime and war, counterintelligence has served to protect the Army’s most important secrets; its success or failure often spell the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefield. Highlights include the outstanding work performed by Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachments in support of our combat forces during World War I and World War II. Later in the Korean War, the Army turned to the CIC to establish and operate a very sophisticated, behind-the-lines network of intelligence collectors. However, counterintelligence’s greatest contribution may have occurred in the occupation period following World War II. In Germany and Austria, counterintelligence agents were responsible for the successful denazification program that gave democracy a chance. In Japan, they served as the ears and eyes of the occupation authorities to monitor the steps being taken towards a representative form of government. Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps were among the first to define and then confront the emerging threat posed by communism bent on derailing the progress toward free societies, and throughout the Cold War, counterintelligence would remain as the Army’s principal shield against hostile intelligence services.

The end of the Cold War did not lessen the need for counterintelligence—in fact, just the opposite occurred. The increased deployment of US warfighters in support of regional conflicts posed new challenges in the area of force protection. The coming of the Information Age meant that for the first time foreign intelligence and other hostile elements could assess, steal, and transport a large volume of sensitive material through cyberspace with little signature or latency. And in the war against global terrorism, counterintelligence professionals remain engaged 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Today, counterintelligence is an integral part of the Army’s all-source intelligence capabilities, helping to analyze huge amounts of raw data which can be funneled to commanders and law enforcement agencies in near real time. 

All facets of counterintelligence have been touched upon, but as a matter of readability, the book is weighted towards counterespionage. Regardless, it is still trusted that the reader will gain some appreciation of the total contribution that counterintelligence has made in support of the Nation and its Army for over 90 years. It is also a story of individual sacrifice and dedication by counterintelligence personnel that should continue to foster esprit de corps among future  generations of military intelligence professionals.

JOHN F. KIMMONS
Major General, USA
Commanding
US Army Intelligence and Security Command

Download the Document

In the Shadow of the Sphinx: A History of Army Counterintelligence, Published 2005 [178 Pages, 325.2MB]

– This is a very large .PDF file – which I recommend to download to your computer and open locally. This document was released to me via FOIA Case 3685F-10 filed with INSCOM.

7. NSA SURVEİLLANCE PROGRAM : PROMIS

PROMIS is believed by some to be the forefunner to the now infamous “Prism” program by the National Security Agency (NSA).  The “Prism” program was brought to light by leaker Edward Snowden, yet it is now coming to light, that a program has existed long before this new revelation.  It was known as PROMIS.

PROMIS is also the name for a Department of Justice computer software program.  In the mid-1970s, Inslaw, Inc., a small Washington D.C. software development company, created for the a highly efficient, people-tracking, computer program known as Prosecutor’s Management Information System (Promis). Inslaw’s principal owners, William Anthony Hamilton and his wife, Nancy Burke Hamilton, later sued the United States Government (acting as principal to the Department of Justice) for not complying with the terms of the Promis contract and for refusing to pay for an enhanced version of Promis once delivered. This allegation of software piracy led to three trials in separate federal courts and two congressional hearings.

The following article excerpt is used to best explain the program as connected to the NSA – while the FOIA documents follow below.

PRISM’s Controversial Forerunner

By Richard L. Fricker

Long before Edward Snowden’s claims or revelations that the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency were monitoring and tracking the Internet, cell phones, e-mails and any other electronic communication they could get their hands on using a program known as PRISM, there existed PROMIS [Prosecutors Management Information Systems].

PROMIS was designed in the late 1970s and ‘80s to bring Department of Justice criminal case management from the dark ages into the light of the computer age. In the spring of 1981, the Reagan Administration hailed PROMIS as one of law enforcements greatest assets. By 1983, PROMIS had morphed into the behemoth of intelligence gathering. It was not state of the art – it was the art.

Over the ensuing decades PROMIS is reported to have been used by the DOJ, CIA, NSA, and several foreign intelligence agencies including Israel’s Mossad. The ownership of PROMIS has been the subject of federal court hearings and a congressional investigation.

The capabilities of PROMIS as a data collection and tracking program have never been a secret. But the only discussion of PROMIS has been about theft and black-market sales. Neither the courts nor Congress have ever inquired as to privacy issues or the ethics of the program. There has been no rending of political robes as seen with the Snowden case. In fact, the function of PROMIS has been discussed in open court and various public arenas.

PROMIS is a tracking program with enhancements by Washington, DC-based Inslaw Inc., owned by Bill and Nancy Hamilton. PROMIS was developed under a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration [LEAA] grant. Bill Hamilton was employed by NSA for six years. He left the agency in 1966.

PROMIS was designed to track the vast amount of criminal cases piling up in DOJ offices across the country. Bill Hamilton, in an interview for this story, recounted, “It was always a tracking program. It was designed to keep track of cases in local U.S. Attorneys’ offices, which means street crimes, keep track of the scheduled events in court, what actually takes place, who’s there, witnesses, police officers, conclusions, convictions, acquittals, whatever.”

The FOIA Documents

Department of Justice (DOJ)

Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, and the 1994 DOJ Report on INSLAW/PROMIS matter, released by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Information Policy (OIP) [465 Pages, 11MB]

– Special thanks toGovernmentAttic.org for this record.

National Security Agency (NSA)

Letter regarding the NSA use of the PROMIS System [4 Pages, 1.1MB]

– The NSA did find a considerable amount of documents, however, they are requiring a payment of $440 for the release of the material. This is a bit too high for me to afford, but if you are interested in sponsoring the release of these documents, you can CONTACT The Black Vault and let me know!

Intellipedia is an online system for collaborative data sharing used by the United States Intelligence Community (IC).  It was established as a pilot project in late 2005 and formally announced in April 2006 and consists of three wikis running on JWICS, SIPRNet, and Intelink-U. The levels of classification allowed for information on the three wikis are Top Secret, Secret, and Sensitive But Unclassified/FOUO information, respectively. They are used by individuals with appropriate clearances from the 16 agencies of the IC and other national-security related organizations, including Combatant Commands and other federal departments. The wikis are not open to the public.

Intellipedia is a project of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Intelligence Community Enterprise Services (ICES) office headquartered in Fort Meade, Maryland. It includes information on the regions, people, and issues of interest to the communities using its host networks. Intellipedia uses MediaWiki, the same software used by the Wikipedia free-content encyclopedia project.  ODNI officials say that the project will change the culture of the U.S. intelligence community, widely blamed for failing to “connect the dots” before the September 11 attacks.

The Secret version connected to SIPRNet predominantly serves Department of Defense and the Department of State personnel, many of whom do not use the Top Secret JWICS network on a day-to-day basis. Users on unclassified networks can access Intellipedia from remote terminals outside their workspaces via a VPN, in addition to their normal workstations. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) users share information on the unclassified network.  (Source: Wikipedia)

Intellipedia Manual, 2007 Edition, Released in Full [17 Pages, 1.73MB]

– After appealing this 2009 request for a FULL denial, the document was sent to the Department of State, and finally released in full in October of 2013.

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9. Securing Cyberspace: Identifying Key Actors in Hacker Communities Victor Benjamin, Hsinchun Chen Department of Management Information Systems The University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721, USA vabenji@email.arizona.edu, hchen@eller.arizona.edu

Abstract

— As the computer becomes more ubiquitous throughout society, the security of networks and information technologies is a growing concern. Recent research has found hackers making use of social media platforms to form communities where sharing of knowledge and tools that enable cybercriminal activity is common. However, past studies often report only generalized community behaviors and do not scrutinize individual members; in particular, current research has yet to explore the mechanisms in which some hackers become key actors within their communities. Here we explore two major hacker communities from the United States and China in order to identify potential cues for determining key actors. The relationships between various hacker posting behaviors and reputation are observed through the use of ordinary least squares regression. Results suggest that the hackers who contribute to the cognitive advance of their community are generally considered the most reputable and trustworthy among their peers. Conversely, the tenure of hackers and their discussion quality were not significantly correlated with reputation. Results are consistent across both forums, indicating the presence of a common hacker culture that spans multiple geopolitical regions. Keywords – Cyber security, Cybercrime, Hacker, Hacker community, Social media, Reputation, Key actor I.

INTRODUCTION As the computer becomes more ubiquitous throughout society, the security of networks and information technologies is a growing concern. Critical infrastructures (e.g. power grids) are facing growing number of cyber-based threats that could result in service disruptions and physical damage. For example, the recent Stuxnet Worm was engineered to specifically target a country and destroy nuclear infrastructure. Further, keystroke logging software was found covertly spreading at the United States Drone Fleet Command. With growing security concerns, DARPA has emphasized that U.S. cyberspace is unsecure and more cyber security research is vital to national defense. Advancing technology enables hackers to commit cybercrime much more easily now than in the past. Accessibility to technologies and methods to commit cybercrime has grown. Even legitimate tools, such as search engines, can be used to promote cybercriminal activity [1]. Malicious software, hacking tutorials, and other resources intended to help conduct cybercrime can be commonly found within hacker communities, often available for free or traded within black markets [2]. As a result, security researchers have taken interest in exploring hacker communities. Some research has found that community participants pool together skills and assets to form groups, often in order to accomplish operations much more advanced than any one individual could perform alone [3]. In particular, less skillful hackers often seek help from more experienced individuals, creating a meritocratic hierarchy within hacking culture [4]. Such skilled individuals could thus be considered as key actors within their communities, as they are heavily relied upon by peers. However, many participants of such communities aggressively protect their anonymity in order to minimize criminal evidence [5]. Given the importance of key actors in the formation of cybercriminal groups, as well as their pursuit of total anonymity, they make ideal subjects for further research aiming to secure cyberspace

II. LITERATURE REVIEW To form the basis for this research, literature is reviewed from the following four areas:  Past studies on hacker communities and cybercrime  The significance of reputation within communities  Control theory and criminal group leadership  Previous literature on social media analytics A. Hacker communities, and cybercrime Hackers often congregate within underground communities, most commonly in the form of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) networks or online forums. Such communities are primarily used to share knowledge and resources [6]. Some communities evolve to include black markets where participants offer expertise, snippets of code, fully-developed applications, or stolen confidential data (e.g. credit card accounts) in exchange for other virtual goods or financial gain [2]. Due to the lucrative nature of cybercrime, some hackers use communities as a platform to organize into groups and launch sophisticated, financially-motivated cyber-attacks. Some past research has looked to develop methods for identifying collaboration between hackers, potentially revealing such groups [7]. Other research has studied group dynamics, revealing that peer approval and reputation are heavily integrated within cybercriminal group operations. This leads to a strong desire to increase reputation among hackers [8]. As the hierarchical chain of command within cybercriminal groups is heavily tied to member reputation, good reputation becomes an extremely valuable attribute hackers desire and pursue. B. The significance of reputation Reputation has a strong influence on the dynamics of social groups. Individuals with good reputations are more able to cooperate or receive help from others, as they are more trusted [9]. Their reputation can be affected by various factors in a group setting; for example, seniority or tenure within a social group can often amplify the effects of good reputation [10]. Within the context of criminal groups, trust and reputation between both members and leadership is necessary for a group to remain functional [11]. Establishing a good reputation within a community or group is also a vehicle to obtain leadership. Emergence of leaders is often considered the outcome of a self-organizing process involving reputation, as reputation constitutes a precursor to leadership and affects how much stakeholders trust a leader [12]. Leaders are considered among their social group to be experts and hold great tacit knowledge [13]. They also contribute to cognitive advance of a community, and individuals characterized by high levels of activity are often more reputable and able to obtain leadership positions [14]. Reputation appears to underlie many hacker activities, including the formation of group leadership. C. Control theory and criminal group leadership Control theory states that a system is controllable if it can be driven from its initial state to another final state given specific inputs over some amount of time [15]. The general objective of control theory is to calculate how a system’s inputs should be manipulated in order to achieve desired output, e.g. a car’s velocity can be controlled by how far one pushes a gas pedal. Two different factors are said to contribute towards a system’s controllability: the system’s overall structure and the rules by which the system’s components interact [16]. Thus, systems with different structures or component interactions are controlled in vastly different means. When control theory is applied to social networks, identification and manipulation of driver nodes, or nodes that are said to control a system, can be used to guide a network’s dynamics [17]. When considering cars, the steering wheel, gas pedal, brake pedal, and shifter are all considered driver nodes as they manipulate the remainder of their system. Unfortunately, driver nodes are generally unknown in real systems and methods to identify driver nodes need to be developed for each application context. However, past research has identified that criminal networks may have leaders that command and steer their entire group [18]. Criminal leaders exhibit characteristics that match the operational definition of driver nodes, and thus they may be considered as such. When attempting to identify the driver nodes or key actors of online social networks, such as hacker communities, it becomes necessary to develop a further understanding of methods used in social media analytics. D. Previous studies on social media analytics With the advent of Web 2.0, Internet users can publish content through a variety of means. Blogs, Wikis, and web forums are just a few mediums individuals can use to publish information. Each platform contains unique contents and offers opportunities for analyses. For example, in the context of eLearning forums, each student’s discussion quality was found to be related to the number of posts they created, the average length of their posts, and the average number of replies they made within a discussion started by a peer [19] In programming communities, user reputation has been found closely tied to the breadth and depth of knowledge an individual possesses; users that can produce thoughtful comments across a variety of topics have been considered as domain experts [20]. User reputation has also traditionally had a role in social media analytics. Reputation is crucial as a means of establishing trust, status, and for fostering social interactions [9]. It is subject to many factors of user behaviors, such as activity levels and discussion quality. For example, past work found that forum users who mostly contributed short messages were unable to successfully maintain communication with peers [21]. Other research has considered the effects of tenure, or length of membership within a community, as an influencer of reputation. Conclusions suggest tenure may amplify reputation [22]. Finally, content quality has been observed as an important contributor towards reputation. For example, attaching or linking to additional resources in a message can positively influence its perceived quality [23]. This is especially important in hacker communities, as reputation is regarded as extremely valuable and often influences social interactions [8].

III. RESEARCH GAPS AND QUESTIONS Researchers have been interested in exploring hacker communities and cybercriminal groups, but few inquiries have focused on identifying key actors, or hackers considered very reputable and have leadership potential or are already leaders. Law enforcement would benefit by focusing resources on apprehending key actors, as they may be the driver nodes of their respective networks and thus potentially responsible for directing cybercriminal activity. Additionally, there is a lack of work studying mechanisms which individuals to become key actors within hacker environments. Security researchers would benefit from knowledge of the processes hackers use to gain status, power, and leadership within their communities In this study, we analyze the relationships between aspects of hacker behavior and reputation. Analysis is performed across two diverse hacking communities from the United States and China. We pose the following research questions: 1. How does the behavior of an individual hacker affect how other hackers perceive them? 2. In what ways can one build Figure 1. Left: A member of Hackhound.org publishes the latest version of his hacking tool meant to help others steal cached passwords on victims’ computers Right: A hacker of the Chinese community Unpack.cn posts sample code for reverse engineerimg software written in the Microsoft .NET framework also for the growing relevance of cyber security in both countries. Other hacker communities suitable for this research could possess differing geopolitical origins, such as the Middle-East or Russia. Additionally, such communities may exist within entirely different mediums (e.g. IRC channels). However, web forums are particularly useful to study as they naturally provide access to data spanning multiple years into the past. Both communities we explored in this research also feature unique mechanisms allowing hackers to attach files or source code to their messages, promoting collaboration. We also perform analysis of hacker communities from differing geopolitical regions, as this allows for further observation of an expanding global phenomenon.

TABLE I. RESEARCH TESTBED Forum Name Language # of Messages # of Users Forum Start Date Hackhound.org English 77,061 5,794 October 9, 2008 Unpack.cn Chinese 646,494 22,743 October 12, 2004 Both communities allow for the unique feature for hackers to attach hacking tools and program source code to their messages for others to use (Figure 1). Additionally, both communities allow hackers to assign each other a reputation score in order to rate one another’s usefulness and trustworthiness. Communities were identified through keyword searches similar to past research [24] Keywords such as “malware detection avoidance” were searched on Google.com and Bing.com to find relevant communities. Automated spiders were used to collect the communities and text parsers were written to extract relevant content. Text parsers were written to extract messages and user information from both of the communities. Many previous studies have frequently used regression models to determine individuals’ reputations. For example, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to model leadership in business group settings [25]. The reputations and trustworthiness of online multiplayer gamers was modeled using a regression approach [26]. Additionally, to help find quality content on Yahoo! Answers, user reputations have been assessed through a series of regression models using message content features [27]. For this study, we borrow six features from past research and observe them within our hacker community dataset. As previous studies often aimed to observe user forum involvement and user discussion quality within virtual communities, we select related features. Two of our selected features aim to capture hacker discussion quality while the other four features are intended to model the extent of a hacker’s involvement in their community. To conduct analysis of what features are related to hacker reputation, we employ an OLS regression similar to previous work. Each forum allows for hackers to assign each other reputation scores through forum mechanisms, resulting in reputation as a method for peers to evaluate each other. We observe the relationships between all selected features and reputation in attempt to reveal why certain hackers emerge as most reputable and trustworthy among their peers. Such hackers often have leadership potential or are already commanding less skilled individuals, and thus can be considered as key actors. A. Discussion Quality Features Discussion quality features have been widely studied in past research to scrutinize the members of virtual communities. In particular, previous work has studied how user discussion quality can affect social behaviors and interactions. We observe two related features within this study: 1. Average_Message_Length – This feature is simply the average length of an individual hacker’s messages. Past research has used average message length to determine the amount of content a user generally contributes within a single post, with the assumption that longer posts are generally more valuable to the cognitive advance of a community [21]. 2. Number_Of_Replies_Per_Thread – The average number of replies a user posts within each discussion participated in. This feature has previously been used in research to measure the amount of dialogue a user contributes to a particular discussion. Users who contribute more dialogue to a discussion are thought to have a greater impact on the cognitive advance of a community [19]. B. Community Involvement Features Along with observing the styles in which users communicate, previous research has also investigated the implications that differing levels of community involvement have on user reputation. Specifically, the breadth of involvement and the type of involvement have typically been considered important features used for analysis in social media analytics. We observe four features related to community involvement in this study: 1. Number_Of_Threads_Involved – User expertise is closely related to reputation in online communities; expert users are often involved in many discussions and are able to discuss various concepts and topics [20]. Users who post in many different threads take the initiative to often express their opinions and share their knowledge. 2. Tenure – Previous investigation has found that member tenure can amplify their reputation and the trust that others place into them [10].We measure tenure by observing the date that each hacker posted their first message within their community, as it marks their initial participation. To be able to quantify tenure and compare hackers, we use days as our unit of measurement. 3. Sum_Of_Attachments – The number of times a hacker attaches a file or code example to their post, a measure of cognitive advancement towards a hacker’s community [14]. 4. Total_Messages – Total number of messages a hacker has posted, relevant as previously highlighted literature states reputation may be a result of higher levels of activity [14]. C. Regression Model Reputation = β1Average_Message_Length +β2Number_Of_Replies +β3Number_Of_Threads_Involved +β4Tenure +β5Sum_Of_Attachments +β6Total_Messages +ε Regression analysis was performed on both forums. Only users with at least 1 reputation point were included in analysis in order to reduce statistical skewness that would result from H1b: The number of replies a hacker posts will affect their reputation. Number of replies has previously been used in research to measure the amount of dialogue a user contributes to a particular discussion. Our second set of hypotheses is related to the relationship between a hacker’s community involvement and their reputation among peers. Community involvement encompasses a hacker’s activity level and their contributions to the cognitive advance of the community. Both have been previously found to influence user reputation within virtual communities: H2: Community involvement will be a significant contributor influencer of hacker reputation as it encompasses user activity levels and contributions towards the cognitive advancement of the community. H2a: The number of threads a hacker is involved in will impact their reputation; previous research has demonstrated that the ability to discuss a wide variety of topics and concepts is related to expertise. H2b: The seniority of a hacker will be a significant contributor of a hacker’s reputation, as previous literature states tenure generally amplifies an individual’s expertise and trustworthiness. H2c: The sum of attachments a hacker posts throughout their community activities will be an influencer of reputation as hackers are contributing to the cognitive advancement of their community. H2d: Total message volume will be a significant contributor towards hacker reputation, as activity level is a previously observed contributor towards reputation. Lastly, we expect to observe similar results in both hacking communities. Previous research exploring hacking communities and cybercriminal activity from the United States and China have unveiled similarities between hackers from both countries; for example, observations of hacker communities across multiple geopolitical regions has found black market trading to be universally popular [2,20]. H3: Results of the regression model will be consistent across both the English and Chinese forums, as both forums share aspects of hacker culture.

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION TABLE II. HACKHOUND.ORG RESULTS Feature Estimate Std. Error T Value Average_Message_Length -0.0083 0.0025 -0.968 Number_Of_Replies_Per_Thread 0.0188 0.0616 0.305 Number_Of_Threads_Involved 0.1689 0.0538 2.822*** Tenure 0.0041 0.0123 0.526 Sum_Of_Attachments 0.2786 0.1437 5.323*** Total_Messages 0.3396 0/0379 6.55 *** Adjusted R-squared: 83.14%; ***p ≤ 0.001 ** p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05) TABLE III. UNPACK.CN RESULTS Feature Estimate Std. Error T Value Average_Message_Length 0.0052 0.0027 0.125 Number_Of_Replies_Per_Thread 0.0372 0.0040 0.528 Number_Of_Threads_Involved 0.1403 0.0033 1.914* Tenure -0.0086 0.0135 -0.144 Sum_Of_Attachments 0.3805 0.1991 4.757*** Total_Messages 0.2838 0.0252 3.714** Adjusted R-squared: 57.38 %; ***p ≤ 0.001 ** p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05) Involvement in various threads, the sum of attachments, and total message volume all appear to be significant contributors of reputation, supporting H2a, H2c, and H2d. This demonstrates support for theories tying higher user reputations to individuals who are active and contribute to cognitive advancement of their communities. Correlations are stronger in Hackhound.org, perhaps due to forum age; as Hackhound.org is younger and has a much lighter total message volume than U npack.cn, each message on Hackhound.org holds more potential weight for contributing towards a user’s reputation. In hacker communities, knowledge appears to be power in the form of reputation and influence Average post length, number of replies per thread, and tenure do not appear to be significant contributors towards reputation, thus not supporting H1a, H1b, and H2b. Discussion quality and seniority seem to be mostly irrelevant when considering reputation in the context of hacker communities. Results suggest reputation may be more heavily influenced by the content and diversity or novelty of information posted, rather than how information is delivered or who presents it. Both communities share similar patterns in regards to how reputation is built by members, supporting H3. Despite obvious cultural differences between the English and Chinese forums, an overriding form of hacker culture appears to be experienced by both communities. A slight variation in R-squared is experienced when performing analyses on these two forums. The analysis of Hackhound.org has a higher R-squared than that of the Unpack.cn forum. Unpack.cn is a much older community and thus may have an accumulation of more variation among data over time. The differences in R-squared may also be related to cultural phenomena not yet identified.

VII. CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS As the computer becomes more ubiquitous within society, the security of networks and information technologies is a growing concern. Critical infrastructures and military interests are at an increasing risk. Tools to commit cybercrime are now more accessible and easy to use than any previous point in the Internet’s history. In particular, key actors responsible for leading hacker communities and cybercriminal groups are of interest. In this research, two major hacker communities from the United States and China are examined to identify the mechanisms in which key actors arise. These communities were selected due to unique characteristics of allowing the attachment of tools and code to messages, as well as a peer- evaluated reputation system. Relationships between message volume, message lengths, community seniority, the inclusion of tools or code in messages, and reputation were studied. Hackers that contributed to cognitive advance of their community or were considerably active had the highest reputations. Our experiment contributes to research in social media analytics, as results revealed correlations between user reputation and various user behaviors and social media features within web forums. Specifically, we confirm previous findings features reported to interact with increasing reputation. This study was unique from other social media research because it investigated the mechanisms built into hacker communities that allow users to share code and files as part of their message postings. Further, this research contributes to advancing our understanding of hacker communities. Security researchers would benefit from knowledge of the processes hackers use to gain status, power, and leadership within their communities. Law enforcement would benefit by more efficiently focusing resources on cybercriminal pursuits. If key actors contributing towards the cognitive advance of their communities or groups are apprehended, novice hackers relying on such individuals could not as easily develop malicious capabilities. Lastly, the results of this study can also be used to identify key actors in other hacker forums where reputation-ranking systems are not provided. This research can be expanded by additional investigation of hacker communities. Analytical tools developed from control theory can be used to provide additional scrutiny when attempting to identify driver nodes within communities of different types and sizes [17]. These tools are important when attempting to study hacker communities with unknown origins and context. Further, the perspectives of other social network theories can be used to extend current research on hacker communities, potentially revealing interesting phenomena. Deeper exploration is necessary to more fully understand hacker behaviors and methodologies.

REFERENCES [1] T. Moore and R. Clayton, “Evil searching: compromise and recompromise of Internet hosts for phishing,” in Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pp. 256-272, 2009. [2] J. Radianti and J.J. Gonzalez, “A preliminary model of the vulnerability black market,” Society, 2007. [3] R. McCusker, “Transnational organised cyber crime: distinguishing threat from reality,” in Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 46, no. 4-5, pp. 257-273, December 2006. [4] N. Kshetri, “The Simple Economics of Cybercrime,” in IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 4, no.1, pp. 33-39, January-February 2006. [5] T. Holz, M. Engelberth, and F. Freiling, “Learning more about the underground economy: a case study of keyloggers and dropzones,” in European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), 2009. [6] D. Wall, “Cybercrime: the transformation of crime in the information age,” Polity, September 2007. [7] C. J. Mielke and H. Chen, “Botnet and the cybercriminal underground,” in IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics 2008, pp. 206-211. June 2008. [8] S. Gosh and E. Turrini, “Cybercrimes: a multidisciplinary analysis,” Springer, October 2010. [9] D. Semmans, H. Krambeck, and M. Milinksi, “Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group,” in Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, vol.57, no. 6, April 2005. [10] R. Lines, M. Selart, B. Espedal, S. Johansen, and T. Svein, “The production of trust during organizational change,” in Journal of Change Management, vol. 5, no. 2, February 2005. [11] K. V. Lampe and P. O. Johansen, “Organized crime and trust: on the conceptualization and empirical relevance of trust in the context of criminal networks,” in Global Crime, vol. 6. no. 2, 2004. [12] A. T. Hall, F. R. Blass, G. R. Ferris, and R. Massengale, “Leader reputation and accountability in organizations: implications for dysfunctional leader behavior,” in The Leadership Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4, August, 2004. [13] S. J. Zaccaro, C. Kemp, and P. Bader, “Leader traits and attributes,” in The Nature of Leadership, pp. 101-123, 2004. [14] P. Muller, “Reputation, trust and the dynamics of leadership in communities of practice,” in Journal of Management and Governance. Vol. 10, no. 4, November, 2006. [15] R. E. Kalman, “Mathematical description of linear dynamical systems,” in Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1963. [16] D. G. Luenberger, “Introduction to dynamic systems: theory, models, & applications,” Wiley, May 1979. [17] Y.Y. Liu, J.J. Slotine, and A.L. Barabási, “Controllability of complex networks,” in Nature, no. 473, May 2011. [18] J. Xu, and H. Chen, “Criminal network analysis and visualization: a data mining perspective,” in Communications of the ACM, vol. 48, no. 6, 2005. [19] J. Kim, E. Shaw, D. Feng, C. Beal, and E. Hovy, “Modeling and assessing student activities in on-line discussions,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on Educational Data Mining, 2006. [20] J. Zhang, M. S. Ackerman, and L. A. Adamic, “Expertise networks in online communities: structure and algorithms,” in World Wide Web Conference., May 2007. [21] L. A. Adamic, J. Zhang, E. Bakshy, and M. S. Ackerman, “Knowledge sharing and Yahoo Answers: everyone knows something,” in World Wide Conference, April 2008. [22] O. Nov, M. Naaman, and C. Ye, “Motivational, structural and tenure factors that impact online community photo sharing,” in Proceedings of AAAI International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, May 2009. [23] K. Chai, C. Wu, V. Potdar, and P. Hayati, “Automatically measuring the quality of user generated content in forums,” in Proceedings of Australasian Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 51-60, 2011. [24] T. J. Holt, E. Lampke, “Exploring stolen data markets online: products and market forces,” in Criminal Justice Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, March 2010. [25] A. Mehra, A. L. Dixon, D. J. Brass, and B. Robertson, “The social network ties of group leaders; implications for group performance and leader reputation,” in Organization Science, vol. 17, no. 1, February 2006. [26] G.Y. Huang, S.Y. Hu, and J.R. Jiang, “Scalable reputation management with trustworthy user selection for P2P MMOGs,” in International Journal of Advanced Media and Communication, vol. 2, no. 4, 2008. [27] J. Bian, Y. Liu, D. Zhou, E. Agichtein, and H. Zha, “Learning to recognize reliable users and content in social media with coupled mutual reinforcement,” in World Wide Web Conference, May 2009

10. UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AFOSI SPECIAL PRODUCT 11 Feb 2013 Product #: CRIM-0006-13 (U) Cybersex Extortion Scams “Sextortion”

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _____________________ _______UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 (U) Cybersex Extortion Scams (U) INFORMATION CUTOFF DATE: 5 February 2013 (U) PREDICATION (U) This Special Product was produced in response to reports of Department of Defense (DoD) personnel becoming victims of internet-based extortion scams known as sextortion. Its purpose is to inform United States Air Force (USAF) personnel of this new online scam and offer mitigating steps that can reduce the chances of becoming a victim. (U)

INTRODUCTION (U) Cyber criminals are continually developing new online scams to take advantage of the unsuspecting public. One of the most recent is cyber sextortion. Cyber sextortion generally refers to an act of using sexual images (obtained either through enticement or malicious code) in order to extort money from unsuspecting victims. (U) Reporting across Military Services indicates that DoD personnel have been subjected mainly to webcam sextortion scams. DoD personnel were enticed to engage in online sexual activities which were secretly recorded; money was then extorted from the victims in order to prevent the release of compromising video material. Reported instances of sextortion involving DoD personnel suggests that many of the perpetrators originate from the Philippines. It is currently unclear whether perpetrators are specifically targeting US military members or whether DoD and USAF personnel are merely victims of a scam directed at the general public. Nonetheless, USAF personnel should be vigilant about protecting their personal information online and refrain from engaging in sexual activities through the internet that may potentially make them vulnerable to extortion. (U)

MECHANICS OF SEXTORTION SCAMS (U) Cyber criminals involved in sextortion scams generally pose as attractive females seeking friendly conversation. They approach potential victims in chat rooms, popular dating websites, and social networking sites by initiating written/text communication in an attempt to befriend them. To convince an unsuspecting individual the person they are about to befriend is real, the perpetrator posts fictitious information about themselves (usually age, location, and multiple photos of the same person) to help establish legitimacy. 1 (U) Once the victim has accepted the perpetrator’s friendship invitation, the “online relationship” commences and perpetrators quickly change the nature of the conversation from friendly to sexual. At this point victims are invited to participate in live video communication and are lured into cybersex activities. (U) In many cases perpetrators enact sexually explicit poses or engage in masturbation to entice the victim to reciprocate. Perpetrators then inform unsuspecting victims that their online sexual activities have been recorded. The perpetrator subsequently threatens to upload the contents on various websites (YouTube, _____________________ _______UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3 Facebook, heterosexual and homosexual porn sites, etc.) or distribute it to the victims’ family, friends, or coworkers unless financial payment is made. In some instances victims were forced to purchase a subscription to pornographic websites.2 Those websites provide financial incentives similar to “referral fees” for perpetrators who coerce victims to sign up for the service. (U) Monetary demands placed on the victims have averaged around several hundred dollars (US$) per person. In one case, however, law enforcement authorities in Singapore broke up a sextortion ring responsible for extorting upward of US$90,000 from a single victim over a 9-month time period. The authorities suspected the same group deprived another individual of nearly US$100,000 by threating to make victim’s cybersex activities public.

3 (U) SEXTORTION CASES INVOLVING DOD MEMBERS (U) Currently it is not known how many DoD personnel have been victimized by this type of online sextortion scam. In November 2012, Facebook’s security team—the world’s largest social networking site—identified a major sextortion ring operating out of Naga City, Philippines. The ring, involving 21 employees of the Philippine-based company MoneyMaker Portal Web Solutions, reportedly targeted hundreds of US Army and Navy members for a period over one year.4 It is unknown how many DoD members were actually victimized by this ring. Less dramatic examples of cyber criminals targeting DoD members through these types of scams have been observed by all Military Criminal Investigative Organizations. (U//FOUO) A recent Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) report focusing on this type of online scam identified four cases (two on Guam, one in Japan, and one in Bahrain) involving Navy members between August 2012 and November 2012. In all instances, Department of the Navy personnel were lured into online sexual activity that was secretly recorded, and were subsequently threatened with exposure if payment was not made. 5 The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) also reported a total of three cases from South Korea, Germany, and Texas, of Army members who were recently victimized. In all cases, victims engaged in consensual cybersex activities that were secretly recorded and subsequently used to extort money from them.6 AFOSI has also received multiple reports indicating that USAF personnel have been subjected to sextortion scams. Multiple incidents of sextortion involving USAF members were reported in Japan, South Korea and Alaska, one in Portugal, and one on Guam.

(U) PROFILE OF THE PERPETRATORS (U) Although it is currently difficult to ascertain the profile and origins of the perpetrators involved in these scams, many of appear to be connected to the Philippines. Some perpetrators have also been arrested in Singapore.7 (U) WHY DoD MEMBERS (U) The Department of Justice and the Department of State identified online dating and romance scams as a significant concern to all US citizens. 8 Currently it is not known if these types of scams specifically target military members; however, DoD members could pose a target for online criminals because they may be perceived as more vulnerable to blackmail and extortion. The expectation to maintain a professional _____________________ _______UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4 appearance, coupled with the strict requirements associated with maintaining a security clearance, could make DoD members valuable targets for online sextortion scammers. (U) MITIGATION (U) While cyber criminals will continue to plague social networking websites and look for unsuspecting victims, there are measures that can be taken to avoid becoming a victim to these types of scams. All DoD members should be vigilant in protecting their personal information and limit what information they divulge on social networking sites. Listed below are some steps DoD members can take to reduce their chances of becoming a victim of sextortion scams:  Ensure your computer is up-to-date. The operating system, antivirus and security software, and web browser plugins should be regularly checked for updates.  Protect your personal information, especially financial and personal data. (Such as credit card details, bank account numbers, home and work addresses, etc.)  Never send money or financial details to individuals without confirming their identity.  Know with whom you are communicating. (Confirm details that are not publically available or posted on social networking sites.)  Do not respond to unsolicited e-mails or chat requests; the best approach is to delete the e-mail or ignore chat requests. (When you send a message, even if it is a negative message, you are acknowledging that you read the message and that your e-mail address is valid. This can make you vulnerable to malicious software being directed at your e-mail address, or similar electronic accounts.)  A request to exchange provocative pictures or videos should be an immediate indicator of a potential scam (Report the message to the website administrator. The wording on every website will vary, but it is often similar to “Report this message” or “Flag this as a phishing attack”.)  Be aware of activities that are out of place for the people you know. (If your friend’s activities seem suspicious, you may want to contact them through alternative means such as a cellphone or government e-mail address.) (U) Additionally, AFOSI has previously produced products in regard to protecting personal information online. Please reference “Online Impersonations of DoD Personnel,” and “Guidance on Reducing USAF Members’ Internet Footprints and Protecting Online Information.” 9,10 (U) If individuals believe they may have fallen victim to this type of scam, they should immediately report it to the local AFOSI detachment and chain-of-command (or security officer as appropriate). Additionally, victims of these scams can file a complaint with the Internet Crime Complaint Center, a joint task force established between the FBI and the National White Collar Crime Center, at www.IC3.gov.

ADMINISTRATIVE (U) Author: Brenda Jones, AFOSI ICON/ICR, (571) 305-8543, Dejan Dedic, AFOSI ICON/ICR (571) 305-8796. (U) Coordinated with: The Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command. _____________________ _______UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11. 

February 11, 2014

Turkey’s Espionage Chief Wanted to Block the Mossad — Next Thing You Know, There’s a Story Smearing His Violation of Intelligence Etiquette

A Turkish newspaper, Yeni Safak,  has an intriguing report about the increasingly bitter relationship between Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad, and Turkey’s powerful chief of espionage and security, Hakan Fidan.

The newspaper says Fidan took steps to cancel the special arrangement which enabled Mossad case officers — Israelis who frequently visited Turkey — to avoid normal passport checks, immigration procedures, and Customs inspectors.  The Mossad men and women could slip invisibly in and out of Turkish territory.

The agreement between the Mossad, and Turkey’s MIT agency was made in the 1990s, before Fidan’s powerful patron, Recep Erdogan, was elected the country’s leader. It even permitted Mossad personnel to cross the border without showing a passport.

Fidan’s decision to scrub the special agreement — of great value for Israeli spies and their shadowy travels in the Middle East — could help explain why the director of the Mossad, Tamir Pardo, recently visited Fidan in the capital, Ankara.

It could also — as mentioned by the Yeni Safak article — explain why an article that painted Fidan as a coldhearted violator of intelligence etiquette appeared in the The Washington Post. Penned by columnist David Ignatius, who has cultivated sources in the world of espionage, the article said Turkish intelligence had provided Iran with a list of Iranians who had met in Turkey with Israeli spyhandlers.

Fidan, known to be very close to Prime Minister Tayep Erdogan, apparently was moving to fortify Turkey’s adamantly individualistic, stubbornly sovereign, and maddeningly mercurial shift away from predictably pro-American and pro-Israel lines.

The Wall Street Journal, for example, had this headline on Oct. 10:

  • October 24, 2013

Hear BBC World Service Spotlight the Significance of Mossad-Turkey Clash: Interview with Dan Raviv & ‘Spies Against Armageddon’

Dan Raviv

Heard on the radio (and podcasts) worldwide, the BBC’s “Newshour” considered the veracity — and the impact — of the revelation (by Washington Post columnist David Ignatius) that Turkey furnished Iran with the names of Iranians who were working for the Mossad.

“Newshour” interviewed Dan Raviv, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars — and of the previous best seller, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community.

Click here to hear the 4-minute interview:      Dan Raviv on BBC NewsHour on Mossad Turkey 18oct13

October 19, 2013

Israel Isn’t Denying Turkey Ratted Out Mossad Agents: Yossi Melman’s Take on “Betrayal”

Yossi Melman, co-author of “Spies Against Armageddon” (and the earlier best-seller “Every Spy a Prince”) analyzes the report that Turkey’s intelligence agency gave Iran a list of names of Iranians who spied on behalf of Israel’s Mossad.   This was first published in English by the Jerusalem Post.

If Turkey did blow cover of Israeli spy ring, it would violate an unwritten code of conduct between allied intelligence agencies.

In April 2012, Iran announced that it had uncovered a spy ring of 15 operatives working at the behest of Israel.

Yossi Melman

Iranian authorities identified the operatives as those responsible for the killings of nuclear scientists in recent years. Tehran had long suspected the Mossad as the mastermind of these operations.

In announcing the arrests, Iran touted the apprehension of “Zionist spies” and the revelations regarding “Zionist” intelligence activity in a neighboring country.

The announcement, which didn’t garner much attention at the time, took on added importance Thursday, when The Washington Post reported that Turkish intelligence had leaked the identities of 10 Iranian spies working for Israel, who would meet with their Mossad handlers on Turkish soil.

This information was revealed by the newspaper’s senior foreign affairs analyst, David Ignatius, a journalist known to maintain extensive contacts with both the American and the Israeli intelligence communities.

If the report is accurate – and it is difficult to doubt the credibility of Ignatius’s sources – then we are talking about an egregious, even unprecedented, act. In fact, this is the basest act of betrayal imaginable.

For over 50 years, Israel and Turkey were strategic allies. At the heart of this relationship were the extremely close ties between Israel’s Mossad and Military Intelligence with Turkey’s MIT and its military intelligence apparatus.

These ties were established in 1958, and they were an integral part of the “Trident” partnership that also included Iran’s intelligence services during the reign of the shah.

Only recently did Israeli intelligence chiefs permit archived, previously classified material about the nature of this special relationship to be released for public consumption.

This strategic alliance is manifest in the biannual meetings between the heads of Mossad and MIT and between intelligence analysts and experts on both sides. The two countries’ relationship is characterized by frequent exchanges of information about common enemies and adversaries in the region, including Iraq, Syria and post-Islamic Iran.

Even during the most tense periods in relations between the two countries, intelligence ties remained intact, even if they did cool somewhat. While intelligence work is often interest-driven and unsentimental by its nature, there are still unwritten rules of conduct that govern relationships.

If it is indeed guilty of blowing the cover off of the Israeli spy network, then Turkey blatantly violated these codes. Despite the deteriorating ties triggered by the violent Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, Israel and Turkey have never been – and are not today – enemies.

According to foreign media reports, Turkey has long been a base of operations for Mossad agents operating against Iran. Nonetheless, it was only recently reported that an Iranian-Belgian businessman who was arrested in Israel on charges of being a spy for the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force had created straw companies in Turkey to serve as a cover.

One may assume that Turkish intelligence was monitoring both Israeli and Iranian espionage activity taking place on its soil. Despite the caution and the efforts taken to maintain total secrecy even from close allies, it is possible that Turkish intelligence agencies discovered the Mossad apparatus and its ties with the Iranian network.

It was assumed that despite the bumpy road and tensions in relations, interests would trump all other considerations, and smooth relations between the intelligence agencies would continue. Earlier this year, there were reports that Mossad chief Tamir Pardo met with MIT director Hakan Fidan in Ankara.

According to Ignatius, Israeli officials wryly view Fidan as “Iran’s station chief in Ankara.”

Though this statement was made with tongue firmly planted in cheek, it was meant to convey the sense that Fidan is perceived as very close to Iran.

If the Israeli spy network was indeed unveiled, it was done so at the order of Fidan and with the full approval of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His obsessive animus toward Israel and anti-Semitic tendencies are known to all.

[The writer is co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars.]

October 17, 2013

Ex-Mossad Chief: “Turkey Drives the Americans Crazy — and Us, Too”

A former director of the Mossad, retired General Danny Yatom, reacts to David Ignatius’s column in The Washington Post (reporting that Turkey gave Iran the names of 10 Mossad-run Iranian spies) by saying the Turks committed a “despicable” and unprecedented violation of international intelligence etiquette — and that will leave Turkish intelligence with no friends at all.

Danny Yatom — speaking from Israel, in a telephone conference call arranged by The Israel Project — said: “Assuming what’s in the Ignatius column is accurate, then this was a despicable act by the Turks — by the head of the MIT, the intelligence organization which is equivalent to the CIA plus the FBI. The guy who heads MIT, Hakan Fidan, has very strong power in Turkey.

Former Mossad chief, Danny Yatom

“Assuming the column is true, this is something unheard of.  I don’t remember, during the many, many years I served in the Israeli intelligence apparatuses and as a close advisor to three prime ministers and in the Israel Defense Forces… I don’t recall this phenomenon when information was used by so-called friendly intelligence services [in this way].

“The Turks probably had this information [the name of Iranian contacts] from the Mossad. Because the modus operandi is — usually in such cases — when there are meetings between handlers and their agents — let’s say Israel doing it on Turkish soil — then usually the Israelis inform the Turkish MIT in order to avoid any misunderstandings. This is to avoid any Turkish claim that Israel is breaching the laws of Turkey.

“If this is true, then the fact that those 10 spies were burned by purposely informing the Iranians is not only a despicable act — this is an act that brings the Turkish intelligence organization to a position where I assume no one will trust it. Not only did they get the information from Israel … They breached all the rules of cooperation between intelligence organizations.

“If this is true, what was done by the head of the Turkish intelligence organization — no doubt with the knowledge of his prime minister [Recep] Erdogan — is something that I don’t recall from the many years of my experience.

“This is highly disturbing. We also receive information from friendly intelligence organizations. And no one here or in the U.S. or elsewhere would dare to use this information — received from, let’s say Israel — in order to harm Israel.

“Only one — the head of Turkey’s intelligence and the prime minister of Turkey. … Knowing the Turks and knowing the reporter, David Ignatius, I tend to believe him [and not any Turkish denials].

“About two years ago, it was published — when Hakan Fidan was nominated to head the MIT — that Ehud Barak’s view was that Fidan was very close to the Iranians and had transferred sensitive information to Iran.

“We never ever thought he would do something unprecedented by exposing Israeli agents to the Iranians — probably knowing them [the names] because he got the information from Israel.

“The relations between the two intelligence organizations [the Mossad and Turkey’s MIT], during my time as director of the Mossad [in 1996 to 1998] were excellent — and were excellent before and after that.  But what happened caused us to distrust the Turks, and this is the main reason why the relations are losing their intimacy and are deteriorating.”

Yatom said the Turks were, in a way, shooting themselves in the foot.  “They badly need cooperation with friendly intelligence apparatuses.  The Turks are highly worried about what’s going on in Syria. They are against the Iranian military nuclear program. Of course they need to cooperate with friendly [services] to fight terror in their own country — Turkey.

“Who now will trust them and cooperate with them? Who now will share sensitive information with them?

“We will see a deterioration in intelligence relations between Turkey’s MIT and all the parallel organizations in friendly countries to Turkey.  We will find the Turkish intelligence isolated from receiving any sensitive information, probably for the foreseeable future.”

Yatom also said: “We share a lot of information with the CIA, [Britain’s] MI6, [the German} BND and other friendly intelligence apparatuses — and we used to do it, until recently, with the Turks. Our nations shared the same goals and aims: to fight terror, and to prevent Iran from becoming a military nuclear state.

“If this is true, then what the intelligence apparatus of Turkey did was … to threaten the lives of those Iranians.  And I don’t what is their fate.  Maybe they were executed or will be executed.

“This is not only transferring the names to a democratic regime, but it is transferering the names to a regime with no mercy. No doubt in my mind. If this is true, they either have been executed or they will be executed.”

When asked whether the Syrian civil war has brought Turkey and Israel closer together — out of shared worries and interests, considering that Syria is sandwiched between them — Yatom said: “Unfortunately it has not happened.”

Yatom added, “Erdogan is even annoying the United States by purchasing ground-to-air missiles from a company in China which is blamed [by the U.S.] for breaking an embargo by assisting Iran with its missile and nuclear projects.  I don’t think this is the first time Erdogan makes the Americans crazy… And the same with us, so what can we do?”

For mutual benefits, Yatom suggested, efforts to get past the Israeli-Turkish problems are worth pursuing.

October 17, 2013

Washington Post Columnist David Ignatius Cites ‘Spies Against Armageddon,’ As He Unveils a Double-Cross Against the Mossad

The Washington Post columnist and accomplished spy novelist David Ignatius breaks some news about what intelligence officials would call “a mean double-cross” by Turkish intelligence against the Mossad.

He writes that the Turkish government furnished Iran with the identities of Iranian citizens who had meetings in Turkey with case officers (spy handlers) from the Mossad.

Ignatius’s latest column mentions the possibility that Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s motive was the breakdown of relations — when Israeli naval commandoes carried out a sloppy raid on a Turkish protest ship headed for Gaza in 2010 — and the Israelis killed 9 Turkish civilians.

Ignatius also mentions our book, to give his readers some background to the clandestine relationship that for decades was positive and mutually fruitful:

The Israeli-Turkish intelligence alliance was launched in a secret meeting in August 1958 in Ankara between David Ben-Gurion, then Israel’s prime minister, and Adnan Menderes, then Turkey’s prime minister. “The concrete result was a formal but top-secret agreement for comprehensive cooperation” between the Mossad and Turkish intelligence, wrote Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman in their 2012 book, “Spies Against Armageddon.”

The groundwork had been laid secretly by Reuven Shiloah, the founding director of the Mossad, as part of what he called a “peripheral alliance strategy.” Through that partnership, Israelis provided training in espionage to the Turks and, ironically, also to Iranians under the shah’s government, which was toppled in 1979.

Israel’s Official Intelligence Projection — Many Dangers, No Major War on the Horizon

by Yossi Melman [written first for The Jerusalem Report]

Is the glass half empty or is it half full? That is the question one is left asking, after hearing about the contents of Israel’s NIE — the National Intelligence Estimate for 2016.  Depending on one’s point of view, or even bias, Israel’s situation can be viewed in different ways. Objective analysis shows there are risks out there, but also opportunities.

The NIE was drafted by the research department of Aman (the large Military Intelligence agency) with input from the research departments of Mossad (the external espionage agency) and the Israel Security Agency (the domestic service – known as Shin Bet). The Estimate is not published, but the major points were described by senior military officers in strictly limited briefings.

Emblem of Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence)

The most important part of the new report is the assessment that the probability of war this year is low. Senior military sources tell The Jerusalem Report that this applies on all fronts: from Gaza in the South to Lebanon and Syria in the North. Neither Hezbollah nor Hamas have plans or any interest to initiate a war against Israel.

Hezbollah is bleeding in the killing fields of Syria.  Five years from the outbreak of the civil war there, the Lebanese Shi’ites of Hezbollah become ever more deeply embroiled in the conflict — with a permanent contingent of as many as 7,000 fighters, nearly half its conscripts, fighting alongside Iran to defend the regime of Bashar Assad.  The Russian air force has provided significant air support.

These Shi’ites from the neighboring nation also have 15,000 reservists who are called to duty for training or field missions for up to 40 days a year – similar to the IDF reserve system. So far, Hezbollah has lost nearly 1,500 soldiers, killed in action–many of whom belonged to its elite units– and more than 6,000 have been wounded.

Hezbollah’s losses are a heavy blow to its military capabilities and have dented its morale to go to war with Israel. That, of course, is good for Israel.

Furthermore, Hezbollah is suffering from a serious economic crisis. Its annual budget is estimated at around $1 billion, 70 percent of which comes from Iran and the rest from taxes and trade, mainly in drugs and contrabands of cigarettes and electronic appliances. Due to the sanctions imposed on Iran (most soon to be lifted), Tehran in recent years has had difficulties providing much financial aid to its Lebanese proxy.

In the South, Hamas has not yet recovered from the war in the Summer of 2014, which inflicted heavy casualties on its military forces and capabilities and, even more importantly, caused severe damage to the civilian population.

Since the end of that conflict, two dozen rockets have been fired from Gaza into southern Israel. But they all landed in open areas and caused no casualties or damage. None of them was launched by Hamas. All were fired by small renegade groups, either inspired by or identifying with the Islamic State (ISIS), which oppose the Hamas regime and try to provoke Israel into attacking Hamas.

In other words, deterrence is working both vis-à-vis Hezbollah, since the 2006 war in Lebanon, and Hamas, following Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Yet, senior military sources say there is a clear understanding that “deterrence is not forever” and that it is an elusive concept.

Indeed, the NIE takes into account the potential for escalation deriving from a minor incident along the border with either Hamas or Hezbollah that could get out of hand and escalate into a major confrontation.

These scenarios take into consideration,for example, that a rocket fired from Gaza might kill several Israeli citizens. Israel then would retaliate forcefully against Hamas, which it holds responsible for the situation in Gaza. Hamas can’t stand idly by and responds; and the vicious cycle of rockets and Israel Air Force bombings rolls into another major war.

A similar scenario could apply along the northern border if Israel takes advantage of the war in Syria – as it reportedly has done on several occasions – and bombs another convoy of weapons being delivered to Hezbollah or kills another of its commanders near the Golan Heights; and Hezbollah then might retaliate with a salvo of rockets.

Both Hamas and Hezbollah are preparing for these scenarios.

Despite its financial and military troubles, Hezbollah has continued its preparation for a war against Israel, amassing an impressive arsenal of nearly 100,000 rockets and missiles capable of reaching every strategic and military site in the country.

But it’s more the quality — rather than the quantity — that is a major concern for Israel. Hezbollah, with the help of Iranian experts, is working hard to improve the accuracy of its missiles.

Israeli war planners estimate that, if war breaks out, Hezbollah will try, for the first time, to dig tunnels into Israel, to shift the battle to Israeli territory and try to conquer settlements near the border.

Thus, Hezbollah is considered the main military threat against Israel. The organization is therefore the prime target for intelligence efforts to gather information about its capabilities and intentions.

“The next war will be different from the wars we’ve seen in the past 20-30 years. The conflict will be very complex,” a senior military source told The Report. “It may last many, many weeks. Hezbollah has turned the majority of its Shi’ite villages in southern Lebanon into massive strongholds.”

The sources, however, warn that in case of war, Israel will take a different approach and strike, with all its force, against all Hezbollah positions including inside the villages. That, the source said, “will create a huge refugee problem in Lebanon.”

Though Hamas doesn’t want to be dragged into a new round with Israel and is not ready for it, that Gaza-based group also continues with efforts to improve its preparedness. Hamas is manufacturing rockets and prioritizing efforts to increase their range and accuracy. (In Operation Protective Edge, Hamas hit Tel Aviv and fired unsuccessfully in the direction of the northern port city of Haifa).

Though caught between Israeli and Egyptian blockades and close security and intelligence cooperation, Hamas has never given up its efforts to smuggle weapons, explosives, and rockets via tunnels between Sinai and Gaza — though that has become much more difficult. Hamas is also continuing to dig tunnels and the IDF estimates that some– probably more than 10 – are very close to the Israeli border and may penetrate inside Israel.

The NIE also notes, though in very vague words, that the changes and turmoil in the Middle East have improved Israel’s strategic posture.

Though they occasionally mention Israel in propaganda bulletins, the Islamic State movement — even the branch in Egypt’s Sinai — as well as al-Qaeda in Syria, known as Jabhat al Nusra — have no interest or intention to turn their weapons against Israel. They have other priorities and more immediate enemies.

The Middle East is characterized by the growing schism between Shi’ites and Sunnis, between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and rifts inside the Sunni world between zealots and terrorists such as Islamic State.

The Iran nuclear deal is also seen by the IDF as an opportunity of sorts, in blatant contrast to the perception and rhetoric of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

“There are advantages to the nuclear deal,” an IDF source said. “True, a better deal could’ve been reached, and there’s a bit of frustration because the deal doesn’t take care of the Iranian involvement and efforts to increase its hegemonic aspirations in the region. But the fact is that the amount of enriched uranium has been significantly reduced, as has the number of centrifuges, and Iran’s capability to produce plutonium at its nuclear reactor in Arak has also been dismantled. These are dramatic developments with which you can’t argue.”

The intelligence estimate sees February as a critical time for Iran’s future. Elections for the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, as well as the Assembly of Experts – a small but important body that is in charge of electing or removing the Supreme Leader – will be taking place. Twelve thousand candidates registered, but the election committee disqualified 40 percent of them, eventually leaving just 30 moderate candidates.

The constant rifts and battles between the conservatives and reformists that have taken place in Iran since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, nearly 30 years ago, are reaching a peak. The elections will determine the direction Iran will take in the coming years with serious consequences not only for its own people but also for the rest of the Middle East, Israel included.

“It’s clear,” an Israeli military source said, “that the majority of the Iranian people want more freedom and openness to the West and less religiosity, but will the conservatives in the judiciary, in the religious circles and in the Revolutionary Guards allow it to happen?”

In addition, the IDF estimates that Iran is set to receive tens of billions of dollars from its frozen bank accounts abroad and from the lifting of sanctions. Most of the money will be invested in improving the economy. Some will be used to cover past debts. Nevertheless, oil prices have dramatically dropped from more than$100 per barrel to under $30, endangering Iran’s hopes for quick economic recovery

Yet, Iran hasn’t given up the dream of regional hegemony. It will use some of its bonanza to fund Hamas and attempt to gain a foothold in the West Bank. It is also guiding and paying for terrorist infrastructures in the Syrian Golan Heights.

Military Intelligence and Mossad will continue to monitor Iran to follow its expansionist aspirations and to make sure it doesn’t violate its commitments under the nuclear deal.

Regarding the Palestinians,the NIE is also not fully in sync with the government led by Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon.

The estimate talks about a high potential for escalation in the West Bank if the peace process is not resumed. The IDF hopes that the government will at least continue with its current policy of economic incentives by allowing 120,000 Palestinians to work in Israel and in Jewish settlements — and that the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas will continue to permit the cooperation of its security agencies with Shin Bet and the IDF.

Whether all of the above should be seen as cause for optimism or pessimism is a test of one’s worldview.

12. TSK’dan ‘hacker’ atağı

Türkiye’ye yönelik sık sık siber saldırılar yapılırken, HAVELSAN da hacker yetiştirmek için düğmeye basıyor.

30.05.2016

Hava Elektronik Sanayi (HAVELSAN), Türkiye’nin yaklaşık 20 bin siber güvenlik uzmanı açığını kapatmaya yönelik çabalara kısa dönemde katkıda bulunmak için kolları sıvadı. Şirket, siber güvenlik alanında Türkiye’nin güvenliğine yaptığı katkının yanı sıra bu alandaki insan kaynağı yetiştirilmesinde de sorumluluk üstlenecek.

YAZA OKULU AÇILIYOR

Bu ihtiyaçtan yola çıkarak savunma, bilişim, siber güvenlik gibi birçok yeni teknoloji alanındaki uzmanlığını gençlere aktarmaya hazırlanan HAVELSAN, güvenlik ve yazılım konusunda ilk kez yaz okulları açmayı planlıyor. Yaz okullarından ilerleyen dönemlerde birçok alanda öğrenciler yararlanabilir.

Plana göre; Genç mühendis adaylarının bilişim sektöründe doğru bir kariyer başlangıcı yapmaları için HAVELSAN Akademi Yazılım Mühendisliği ve Siber Güvenlik Yaz Okulları faaliyete geçirilecek. Bu okullarla öğrencilere gördükleri teorik bilginin sektördeki yansımalarıyla tanışma fırsatı sunulacak.

KAYNAK GÜNEŞ

13. 

TRUMP PUTS THE DEEP STATE ON NOTICE

The President mulls lifting security clearances of key Obama cronies — and has a strong case.

President Trump will consider revoking the security clearances of former CIA boss John Brennan along with the clearances of former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former National Security Adviser Susan Rice, and former CIA Director Michael Hayden.

These officials, White House press secretary Sarah Sanders said Monday, “politicized and in some cases actually monetized their public service and their security clearances in making baseless accusations of improper contact with Russia.”  Retention of their clearances, Sanders said, gave “inappropriate legitimacy to accusations with zero evidence.”

“John Brennan leaked information that almost cost the life of a double agent,” Sen. Rand Paul, told Fox News on Monday. “But now he’s a talking head on the outside, saying that basically President Trump should be executed – that’s what we do for treason. And so, yeah, I’m very concerned about him having privileges because of his past history.”

Earlier Monday Paul tweeted “Is John Brennan making millions of dollars divulging secrets to the mainstream media with his attacks on @realDonaldTrump?” The senator, a supporter of the president’s Helsinki summit, also told Fox News he would support removal of top-secret security clearances from all retired CIA agents and officers.

The reality that former CIA bosses retained their clearance came as a surprise to some pundits, and the rules that allowed this retention remained unclear. Even so, targets of the proposed removal were quick to speak out.

“This is retribution for speaking out against the president,” former DNI James Clapper told his current employer, CNN.  In 2010 Clapper was unaware of a major anti-terrorist operation and is on record that the Muslim Brotherhood is secular and peaceful. In 2013 he testified that the NSA doesn’t “wittingly” gather information from millions of Americans.

Adam Schiff, the Democrats’ lead mouthpiece on Russian collusion, called the revocation “a cowardly action of someone who is afraid of criticism.” For House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, “This is so extraordinary. The last thing you want in intelligence is partisanship, and we were able to avoid that for such a long time.”

In 2009, when POTUS 44 scrapped a missile defense system that troubled the Russians, Pelosi called it a “brilliant” move. In 2001, Pelosi wrote in the Congressional Record that “Harry Bridges was arguably the most significant labor leader of the twentieth century.” Bridges was actually a Communist and high-level Soviet agent. His Stalinist lawyer Vincent Hallinan was the presidential candidate of the Communist-front Progressive Party in 1952.

The first to speak out on behalf of John Brennan was former CIA staff boss Nick Shapiro. “John Brennan hasn’t made one penny off of his security clearance,” claimed Shapiro. “This is a political attack on career national security officials who have honorably served their country for decades” and an “effort to distract” from Robert Mueller’s investigation.

As Rand Paul told Fox News on Monday, Brennan “should not get anywhere within 10,000 yards of the government. He should have a restraining order.” A stronger case could be made that he never should have been allowed anywhere near the CIA in the first place.

In 1976 John Brennan voted for Gus Hall, presidential candidate of the Communist Party, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Communist Russia. Instead of Jimmy Carter or Gerald Ford, Brennan wanted an old-line Stalinist to be president. That came 20 years after Nikita Khrushchev denounced the crimes of Stalin, and during a time when the Russian Communists were on the march around the world and ramping up repression in their captive nations.

Clinton National Security Adviser Anthony Lake failed to become CIA director partly because he thought Alger Hiss might be innocent. Brennan touted his vote for Gus Hall and as Ron Radosh noted, “in a sane world, he would have been turned down.” For POTUS 44, whose beloved “Frank,” in Dreams from My Father was the Communist and Soviet agent Frank Marshall Davis, Brennan was the ideal man for the job.

Last March, Brennan told MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” that “the Russians may have something on him [Trump] personally,” and that the Russians “have had long experience of Mr. Trump, and may have things they could expose.” Coming from a career intelligence officer, as Jonathan Tobin observed, left the impression that “this had to be more than a baseless conjecture.”

The president has a strong case to lift the security clearance of a partisan incompetent who never should have had one. Professional prevaricator Susan Rice, who retailed the Benghazi lies on television, is another strong candidate for clearance removal. So is former UN representative Samantha Powers, who warns that it’s “not a good idea to piss off John Brennan.”  Comey and McCabe’s clearances supposedly disappeared when they were fired from the FBI, but somebody might want to check.

In recent testimony before Congress, the FBI’s Peter Strzok told Rep. Doug Collins, “I have a top secret clearance with some SCI compartments.” SCI means Sensitive Compartmented Information, so the president might look into that. As FBI counterintelligence boss, Strzok cleared Hillary Clinton, set out to “stop” Donald Trump from becoming president, and played a major role in the collusion probe, the famous “insurance policy.”

Peter Strzok still has his job, his badge, his gun and his top-secret security clearance. He said the recent hearing was “just another victory notch in Putin’s belt,” and the FBI would not let him answer key questions. The FBI also slaps a gag on his girlfriend Lisa Page. So not out of the question that many more security clearances should be lifted as the president strives to lift the veil on deep-state intrigue.

14. Is Turkey’s Military Becoming Overstretched?

Dorian Jones

November 17, 2016

The Turkish army is engaged in a two-front war, fighting both in Turkey and Syria against PKK Kurdish rebels. With a third front possibly looming, questions are being raised about how sustainable such operations are, given the military is still reeling from massive purges within its ranks following July’s failed coup in Turkey.

Since the collapse of last year’s cease-fire with the PKK, the military has launched unparalleled numbers of counterinsurgency operations across Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast. The operations have turned many towns and cities into rubble in vicious street warfare with the rebels. Further demands on the army came with an ongoing military incursion into Syria, targeting both Islamic State, and Syrian Kurdish forces of the YPG that Ankara accuses of being the affiliate of the PKK. Turkey considers the PKK a terrorist organization.

Now Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dispatched soldiers and armor to the Iraqi border to deter what he says are threats to Iraq’s Sunni minority. The prospect of an unprecedented third front is a front too many. “No army including the American army can deal with so many conflicts or fronts at the same time,” warns Retired Brigadier Haldun Solmazturk, head of the Ankara-based research group “21st Century Institute.

“There will be two outcomes – one, the slowing of the operational tempo and the other is the increase in the causality rates. And in Syria, both are happening and I don’t see any reason that an intervention in Iraq would end up any different. And the situation is less than favorable for the army because army has been suffering from various blows, I mean purges, for the last 10 to 15 years.” Solmazturk has firsthand experience fighting the PKK throughout much of the 1990s and involved in cross-border operations into Iraq.

The Turkish military has admitted its operations in Syria have slowed, but blames a recent ban by Damascus on Turkish airstrikes on its territory, a ban that Ankara says has at least in part, now been lifted.

Since July’s failed coup, the military has been hit by a succession of major purges within its ranks. Nearly half its senior commanders have been arrested or dismissed, while its army special forces and air force have been hit especially hard. Over 300 of its 600 combat pilots have been arrested or dismissed.

Specter of growing demands

Demands on the beleaguered military could increase further. Current Syrian operations have been confined to non-Kurdish regions of Syria. That could change, “If there would be a terror attack from the Syrian Kurdish region, on Turkey. Then that would be a justified reason to intervene,” warns Muhammad Akar, head of the ruling AK Party in Diyarbakir, the main city in the predominantly Kurdish southeast of Turkey. “In that case, everyone in Turkey would consider this intervention as a legitimate act of self-defense, but, as yet, there is no such planning of Turkey at the moment.”

Ankara has made little secret of the fact that it views the Syrian Kurdish region on its border as a threat to its national security. It accuses the ruling PYD as being linked to the PKK.

For now, analysts say the army appears to be coping with the growing demands; but, with the ongoing operations showing little signs of ending, rotation could prove an increasing problem, “As the Turkish army is deploying troops, armor from the central region, Ankara, it means that they don’t have much left behind,” observes General Solmazturk. “So the replacement would be a problem, and very difficult to solve and eventually this would have a detrimental effect on the operational tempo.”

The Turkish army is set to face a new demand. Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu has warned that there will be no let up in anti-PKK operations during winter, traditionally a quiet time due to severe weather conditions. There have been no reports of dissent within the military or at the growing numbers of funerals. Media coverage remains strictly controlled.

Maintaining morale could be the next challenge facing the country’s commanders and political leaders, in the face of the ongoing purges both within the army and wider society. General Solmazturk, warns of an approaching perfect storm.

“The recent government decisions to close military schools, to close army academies, to close army hospitals, and the general political situation in the country. Army people are individuals; they are in uniform, but they are Turkish citizens, they are human beings. They are happening as I am, with the media situation in turkey, with the suppression of rights, with the suppression of freedoms, coming together are having a detrimental effect on morale and operational capability of the Turkish army.”

Ankara dismisses such warnings, pointing to recent opinion polls showing strong support for the military crackdown on the PKK both in Turkey and Syria. Those polls, analysts say, will likely color deliberations by President Erdogan and his government with a referendum expected early next year to extend his presidential powers.

15. Μιά… “φωτο” της… παλιάς Τουρκίας και 2 τ/ε/φ! (25-07-2018)

 

stop-lambasi-yerine-kopek-kafasi-9425432_o

Αχαχαχαχαχαχαχαχα

yeni-safak

ΜΙΣΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΡΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΩΝ ΓΙΑ ΤΟ ΙΣΡΑΗΛ!

ortadogu

ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ: ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ ΜΕ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ! ΤΙ ΔΙΑΒΑΖΑΤΕ ΕΔΩ ΤΟΣΟ ΚΑΙΡΟ ΤΩΡΑ;

16. 

ΑΥΤΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ Η ΔΙΗΓΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΓΕΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΜΩΡΙΑ ΠΟΥ ΔΕΝ ΜΠΗΚΕ ΠΟΤΕ ΣΤΑ ΣΧΟΛΙΚΑ ΒΙΒΛΙΑ: «ΕΦΤΙΑΣΕ ΠΥΡΓΟ ΜΕ ΤΑ ΚΕΦΑΛΙΑ ΤΟΥΣ»!.. ΠΩΣ Ο ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΚΟΛΟΚΟΤΡΩΝΗ ΑΔΕΙΑΣΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΕΛΟΠOΝΝΗΣΟ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΛΒΑΝΟΥΣ…!!
–  Με αφορμή την μεθαυριανή 196η Επέτειο της 25ης Μαρτίου, ο «Στόχος» παρουσιάζει σήμερα την μαρτυρία του Θεόδωρου Κολοκοτρώνη για τους Αλβανούς, που κατέσφαξε ο πατέρας του Κωνσταντής Κολοκοτρώνης το 1779, ξεβρομίζοντας την Πελοπόννησο από αυτούς τους γεννημένους κατσαπλιάδες.

– Είναι συγκλονιστική η περιγραφή που κάνει ο ίδιος ο Θοδωρής Κολοκοτρώνης στα απομνημονεύματά του, που κατέγραψε ο Τερτσέτης, υπό τον τίτλο «Διήγησις Συμβάντων της Ελληνικής Φυλής» (1846).

– Για την ιστορία, οι 12.000 χιλιάδες Τουρκαλβανοί εισέβαλαν στην Πελοπόννησο το 1770 με προτροπή των Τούρκων, για να καταπνίξουν την εξέγερση των Ελλήνων στα Ορλωφικά (1769-70). Αφού την κατέπνιξαν, άρχισαν να λεηλατούν την Πελοπόννησο και να ρημάζουν τον Μοριά, για δέκα περίπου χρόνια.

–  Τότε οι Τούρκοι ζήτησαν τη βοήθεια των κλεφτών και του Κωσταντή Κολοκοτρώνη για να εκδιώξουν τους Αλβανούς.

–  Ο Κωσταντής συμφώνησε με τον Χασάν Μπέη και σε μάχη με τον τρομερό αρχηγό των Αλβανών Γιουσούφ Αράπη στη Νεμέα, σκότωσε ο ίδιος ο Κωσταντής τον Γιουσούφ, εξαλείψας τα λείψανα του άλλοτε πανίσχυρου σώματος των Αλβανών.

–   «Οι Τουρκαλαβανοί, λέει ο Θ. Κολοκοτρώνης «τον είχαν τόσο τρομάξει που έκαναν όρκο: «Να μην γλιτώσω από του Κολοκοτρώνη το σπαθί»!.. Σε μάχη που έγινε στου Μαντζαγρά, κοντά στην Τρίπολη, ο Κωσταντής κατατρόπωσε τους Αλβανούς και με τα 4.000 κεφάλια των σκοτωμένων Αλβανών έφτιαξε πυραμίδα έξω από την Τριπολιτσά, που είδε και κατέγραψε ο Γάλλος περιηγητής Πουκεβίλ, το 1799!..

–   Λέει σχετικά ο «Γέρος του Μοριά», στα απομνημονεύματά του: «Όταν τους επολέμησε ο πατέρας μου, του έλεγαν:

–    «Κολοκοτρώνη, δεν κάμεις νισάφι»;

–   «Τί νισάφι να σας κάμω οπού ήλθετε κι’ εχαλάσατε την πατρίδα μου, μας πήρατε σκλάβους και μάς εκάματε τόσα κακά…»;

«ΤΑ ΚΕΦΑΛΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΒΑΝΩΝ ΕΦΤΙΑΣΑΝ ΠΥΡΓΟΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΤΡΙΠΟΛΙΤΖΑ», διηγείται, επί λέξει, ο Θεόδωρος Κολοκοτρώνης στα απομνημονεύματά του και η φράσις αυτή δεν έχει μπει ποτέ στα σχολικά βιβλία, για να μη μισήσουν τους Αλβανούς τα Ελληνόπουλα και φουντώσει ο… ρατσισμός!..

Η ΔΙΗΓΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ Θ. ΚΟΛΟΚΟΤΡΩΝΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΣΦΑΓΗ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΒΑΝΩΝ ΠΟΥ ΔΕΝ ΜΠΗΚΕ ΠΟΤΕ ΣΤΑ ΣΧΟΛΙΚΑ ΒΙΒΛΙΑ

– Μεταφέρουμε «επί λέξει», πώς εξιστορεί τα γεγονότα ο ίδιος ο Θοδωρής Κολοκοτρώνης στην αρχή της «Διηγήσεως Συμβάντων της Ελληνικής Φυλής»…

ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ ΚΟΛΟΚΟΤΡΩΝΗΣ
: «Εγεννήθηκα εις τα 1770 Απριλίου 3, την Δευτέραν της Λαμπρής. Η άποστασία τής Πελοποννήσου έγινε εις τα 1769. Έγεννήθηκα εις ένα βουνό, εις ένα δένδρο από κάτω, εις την παλαιάν Μεσσηνίαν, όνομαζόμενον Ραμαβούνι. Ο πατέρας μου ήτον αρχηγός των αρματωλών εις τήν Κόρινθον:

– Κάθεται εκεί 4 χρόνους, αναχωρεί από την Κόρινθον δια την Μάνην, έβγαινεν άπό τήν Μάνην καί έκυνηγούσε τους Τούρκους. Εις τούς 79 (σ.σ.: 1779) ήλθεν ο Καπετάν Μπέης μέ τόν Μαυρογένην, και ερχόμενος έρριξεν εις τούς Μύλους και Ανάπλιν. Έστειλεν εις όλην τήν Πελοπόννησον μπουγιουρντί (σ.σ.: προσκυνοχάρτι) και επήγαν και επροσκύνησαν τον Καπετάν Μπέη εις τούς Μύλους. Εις τόν πατέρα μου έστειλε χωριστό μπουγιουρντί, να ελθήτε να βγάλουμε τούς “Αρβανίτας καί νά ευρή ο ραγιάς τό δίκιο του. Ο πατέρας μου εκίνησε με χίλιους στρατιώτας, και έπιασε τα Τρίκορφα, εις την Τριπολιτσάν, δεν επήγεν εις τον Καπετάν Μπέη, διότι εφοβείτο. “Ο Καπετάν Μπέης εσηκώθηκεν άπό τούς Μύλους, επήρεν 6.000 ταγκαλάκια, και τούς κλέφτες 3.000 και επήγεν εις τα Δολιανά, Τριπολιτσά, και έρριξεν το ορδί. Ο πατέρας μου σαν ήτον στα Τρίκορφα, του έστειλεν ό Καπετάν Μπέης να πάγη σε δαύτονε δια να τον προσκυνήση.

– “Ο πατέρας μου αποκρίθηκε δεν είναι καιρός να έλθω να προσκυνήσω· οι Αρβανίτες είναι εις την Τριπολιτσά, ημπορούν να πιάσουν τον άγριον τόπον, και να σκορπίσουν τότε μέσα εις την Πελοπόννησον, νάχουν τόν τόπον. Τότε του έστειλεν 20 μπινίσια (σ.σ.: Παλτό που εκτεινόταν μέχρι τον αστράγαλο) για τούς Καπεταναίους κι’ ένα καπότο, δια τον εαυτόν του. Τον καιρόν που εζύγωσε το στράτευμα το τούρκικο εις την Τριπολιτσάν κι’ επολιορκούσε τούς Αρβανίτας, εχώρισαν 4.000 Τούρκοι – Αρβανίτες να τον εβγάλουν από τα ταμπούρια, και αυτός αντεστάθηκε και τους εκυνηγούσε και εμβήκαν πίσω. “Ήλθαν τα στρατεύματα τα τούρκικα του Καπετάν Μπέη, έως τον άγιον Σώστην, πάλι βγαίνουν 6.000 δια να πάνε εις τον πατέρα μου, και αυτός πάλι τους αντέκρουσε.

–  Είδανε ότι δεν ημπορούν να βαστάξουν οι Αρβανίτες μέσα εις Τριπολιτσά, διατί δεν ήτον τότε τειχογυρισμένη. Εσυνάχθηκαν όλοι και πάνε εις τον πατέρα μου, και αυτός τους εστάθηκε με ορμήν, καί τους εγύρισε κατά τόν κάμπον, ενώθηκαν και άλλοι καπεταναίοι εμβήκαν εις τα χωράφια, εις τον κάμπον, τούς εσκότωσεν η καβάλα ως οι θεριστάδες, έπεσεν η καβαλαριά (σ.σ.: Το ιππικό) μέσα και τους εθέρισαν από τήν μιαν μεράν η καβαλαριά, από το άλλο μέρος ο πατέρας μου. Από 12.000, επτακόσιοι απέρασαν εις το Διαδί. Όταν τους επολέμησε ο πατέρας μου, τού έλεγαν.:

–   «Κολοκοτρώνη δεν κάμεις νισάφι;»

–  «Τί νισάφι να σας κάμω οπού ήλθετε κι’ εχαλάσατε την πατρίδα μου, μας πήρατε σκλάβους και μας εκάματε τόσα κακά;»

–  Του άπεκρίθησαν: «Εφέτο δικό μας, τού χρόνου δικό σου»… «Τα κεφάλια των Αλβανών έφτιασαν πύργον εις την Τριπολιτζά. Ησύχασεν η Πελοπόννησος…», λέει «επί λέξει» ο Κολοκοτρώνης στα απομνημονεύματά του…
ΚΑΙ ΚΑΠΟΙΟΙ ΠΑΝΕ ΝΑ ΒΓΑΛΟΥΝΕ ΤΟΝ ΚΟΛΟΚΟΤΡΩΝΗ… ΑΛΒΑΝΟ!

Με τα κεφάλια των 4.000 σκοτωμένων Αλβανών, ο Κωνσταντής Κολοκοτρώνης και οι άλλοι καπεταναίοι ύψωσαν μια πυραμίδα έξω από την Τριπολιτσά. Τα 4.000 αλβανικά κεφάλια ήταν κτισμένα με άμμο και ασβέστη!.. Το τρόπαιο αυτό διατηρήθηκε για πολλά χρόνια. Ο θρυλικός Γάλλος περιηγητής Πουκεβίλ που πέρασε από εκεί το 1799, είδε και περιγράφει το «κτίσμα», που είχε αρχίσει να καταρρέει λόγω της αποκολλήσεως μερικών κρανίων. Ο Πουκεβίλ ονομάζει το κτίσμα «πυραμίδα». Η «πυραμίδα» διατηρήθηκε μέχρι το 1806-1807!..

ΠΑΡ’ ΟΛΑ ΑΥΤΑ, κάποιοι πασίγνωστοι ανθέλληνες «ιστορικοί» επιμένουν να λένε πως ο Θεόδωρος Κολοκοτρώνης ήταν αλβανικής καταγωγής, ονομαζόταν «Μπιθεγκούρας» και άλλα τέτοια παλαβά, που έχουν κατά καιρούς υποστηρίξει ο μακαρίτης διευθυντής της «Ελευθεροτυπίας» Σεραφείμ Φυντανίδης και οι γνωστοί «αναθεωρητές» ιστορικοί της κλίκας Ρεπούση – Λιάκου. Όμως, για την σφαγή των 10.000 Αλβανών το 1779 από τον πατέρα του Γέρου του Μωριά, Κωνσταντή Κολοκοτρώνη, και για τον τρόμο που σκορπούσε το όνομα «Κολοκοτρώνης» στους Αλβανούς, μετά το στήσιμο της πυραμίδας με τα κεφάλια τους στην Τριπολιτζά, δεν έχουν ποτέ βγάλει άχνα οι ξεφτιλισμένοι

 

Εβδομαδιαία Ε/Φ “Στόχος

(23-03-2017)

17. Από το “site” του “ΜΑΚΕΛΕΙΟ” (25-07-2018

«Δείτε το αυτοκόλλητο από “φέϊγ-βολάν” που βρέθηκαν σε κάδους στο Αιγάλεω, στην πλατεία Εσταυρωμένου,  μια ημέρα πριν από την πυρκαγιά…..»

AN ΔΕΝ ΕΜΦΑΝΙΖΕΤΑΙ Η “ΕΙΚΟΝΑ” ΤΟΤΕ ΣΑΣ ΕΝΗΜΕΡΩΝΩ ΠΩΣ ΕΓΡΑΦΕ ΤΟ “φέϊγ-βολάν” ΝΑ ΚΑΟΥΝ ΟΛΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ ΟΙ ΕΛΛΑΔΕΣ!

ΜΠΟΡΕΙΤΕ ΟΜΩΣ ΝΑ ΜΠΕΙΤΕ ΣΤΟ ΣΑΪΤ ΤΟΥ Κου ΧΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΤΟ ΔΕΙΤΕ!..

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