Would NATO be ready to deal with the level of military might on display during Exercise Vostok (“East”) in September 2018, if Russia were to deploy a similar number of troops and equipment along its western borders? Does NATO have the military strength and mobility to match such a show of force? Could Allies provide the necessary infrastructure to support a military deployment on this scale? Does the Alliance have an adequate response for the hybrid tactics that Russia would be likely to employ?

Readiness has been at the top of NATO’s agenda since 2014. But a look back over the past seven decades of the history of the Alliance shows that many of the current issues surrounding readiness, successful deterrence and reassurance are not new.

According to Russia’s senior military leaders approximately 300,000 troops – as well as 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, 80 ships, and 36,000 tanks, armoured and other vehicles – participated in VOSTOK 2018, an exercise unprecedented in scale since the Cold War.

© Modern Diplomacy

The way it was

It is said that, for 40 years, NATO successfully did what it was established to do. It had a singular strategic aim: to deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The Allies had no doubt about the threat to their national security and that it had to be matched by the necessary forces, which would persuade Moscow the Alliance was credible.

But is our memory entirely accurate? Contrary to common belief, it is also important to note that NATO, from its outset, did not have a single purpose. In fact, the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, preventing the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe, and encouraging European political integration.

In the post-Second World War years, Western European nations faced a political and economic dilemma. Governments changed and had little interest in military spending – indeed, they were under considerable pressure from across the Atlantic to settle the debts that had arisen from the United States’ commitment to its European allies. Effectively, this was Peace Dividend Number One, and Allied troop numbers in Europe dropped from around 4.5 million in May 1945 to less than one million by the end of 1946.

The very establishment of the Alliance was such a strong reassurance measure that its member states were soon clamouring for further cuts to military forces, arguing that NATO provided such a strong political deterrent that a military presence in strength was not necessary. This was Peace Dividend Number Two! To some extent, the Korean War reversed that thinking because of fears that Moscow would take advantage of the deployment of large numbers of forces on the Korean peninsula to launch an attack against Western Europe. This led to the agreement of ambitious NATO force goals at the Lisbon meeting in 1952 but it soon became clear that these could not be met.

Somewhat ironically, as a consequence of the Soviet Union’s nuclear build up following its detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1949, NATO’s policy of “Massive Retaliation” was also quoted as a reason why a build-up of conventional forces was not necessary. Allies were simply not prepared to meet the costs involved and, as the Alliance approached its third birthday, it was already learning that political ambition was one thing – putting boots on the ground was something else.

NATO settled into its “New Look” policy throughout the 1950s, which aimed to give greater military effectiveness without having to spend more on defence. This, of course, demanded an absolute reliance on the nuclear capability of the United States and, with the slight exception of France and the United Kingdom, European Allies were more than content to live under the perceived security of the ‘Transatlantic Umbrella’.

Throughout the 1960s, NATO embraced détente as a political tool to enhance dialogue with Warsaw Pact countries. Despite the Cuban missile crisis, and tensions over Vietnam, a cautious dialogue was established with Moscow. “Massive Retaliation” gradually became “Flexible Response”, which put greater emphasis on the need for robust conventional forces.

A main battle tank (M60A3) of the 3rd Armored Division drives through the Fulda Gap – an area between the Hesse-Thuringian border and Frankfurt am Main that contains two corridors of lowlands through which tanks might have driven in a surprise attack effort by the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies to gain crossing of the Rhine River – 1985. © US Army

So, by the mid 1980s, NATO’s 16 member states could claim a military strength of over five million personnel. At the peak of the Cold War, just under three million personnel and 100 army Divisions were on the ground in Europe and committed to NATO. A further 30 Divisions and 1.7 million personnel were at high readiness. More than 400,000 US personnel were based on the European continent.¹ NATO was ready, but for only one scenario.

Conceptually speaking

Large international organisations are often resistant to change. However, in November 1991, six months after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO issued its new Strategic Concept as a public document for the first time. It set a new tone and the opening words of its conclusion are significant:

“This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance’s security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.”

This was a very clear message that NATO’s military footprint in Europe was about to reduce significantly (the best-known Peace Dividend) and signalled that the Allies intended to develop close ties with former adversaries.

Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in March 1991, foreign ministers and representatives of 16 NATO Allies and nine Central and Eastern European countries attend the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991. On the same day, developments in Moscow marked the effective end of the Soviet Union. © NATO

NATO’s next Strategic Concept was published in 1999, coincident with the 50th anniversary of the Alliance. Not surprisingly, it committed the Allies to common defence and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. Importantly, it identified new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, including terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. The strategy called for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance’s missions, from collective defence to peace-support and other crisis-response operations. NATO was, in effect, asking its members to do more, militarily, across a wider geographic footprint.

NATO’s current Strategic Concept, published in 2010, lays out the Allies’ vision for an evolving Alliance that will remain able to defend its members against modern threats. It commits NATO to become more agile, more capable and more effective, urging Allies to invest in key capabilities to meet emerging threats. It highlights the need for NATO to remain ready to play an active role in crisis-management operations, whenever it is called to act.

This is an ambitious global outlook which requires firm commitment and investment by member states. But at the same time, it was agreed during a period of significant austerity; it points to the need for NATO to remain cost-effective and makes continuous internal reform a key aspect of the way the Alliance will do business in the future.

NRF – Not Really Functional?

During the Cold War, NATO had the luxury of knowing where it would be fighting, should the need arise. It made sense to maintain high levels of in-place forces and allow them to train for battle on the very ground on which they would ultimately have to fight. More than three million troops were on the ground in Europe, but more than half that number again were at a high state of readiness away from the theatre of potential operations.

A consequence of the drawdown of US forces in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s was the commitment to reinforce in-place forces rapidly and robustly should the need arise. The term “REFORGER” (Return of Forces to Germany) is now becoming a distant memory but it really should have a more prominent place in military history than it currently enjoys. In 1988, 125,000 personnel deployed across the Atlantic within 10 days. But it is not just the ability of military forces to react quickly that makes REFORGER so impressive. A deployment of this scale requires the mobilisation of civilian strategic transport assets, and the infrastructure to receive and re-deploy those forces on arrival on European soil. It is not just about military preparedness; civil preparedness is equally important.

In 1988, 125,000 personnel deployed across the Atlantic within ten days under “REFORGER” (Return of Forces to Germany), the US commitment to reinforce in-place forces rapidly and robustly should the need arise. © NATO

In addition, the Allies recognised that NATO’s flanks were a weak point. The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force was established in 1960 as a multinational immediate reaction force that could be sent at very short notice to any part of Allied Command Europe under threat. Its mission was to demonstrate the solidarity of the Alliance, and its ability and determination to resist all forms of aggression against any Ally. The greatest strength of the Mobile Force was that it was formed from national units that were permanently earmarked for that purpose, selected to meet the requirements of a particular task, and exercised regularly in that role. The Force was dissolved in 2002 in the flawed belief that its capabilities would be incorporated into NATO’s new concept of graduated readiness forces.

Thus, in November 2002, at the Prague Summit, Allied leaders agreed to “create a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council.”

However, it was not an easy birth. The decision was taken at a time when a number of Allies were heavily engaged in coalition operations outside the traditional NATO theatre. The concept of the NRF was (and is) that nations declare their forces for a six-month period. This raises a number of issues.

The first issue is the problem of continuity. Units are not permanently earmarked for NRF duties, so it is not a focus of their routine national training.

Second, many of the “technologically advanced” capabilities are in high demand and often unavailable. Force generation of NRF capabilities has largely been disappointing. At times, only 60 per cent of the required capability has been made available by contributing nations – often the critical enabling capabilities are the most difficult to source.

Third, funding of NRF – in accordance with traditional NATO policy – was agreed on the basis that “costs would lie where they fall”. This principle was tested when it was agreed that the NRF should be deployed in support of earthquake-relief efforts in Pakistan in late 2005. The nominated lead nation for that NRF rotation refused to bear the costs and a lengthy political debate ensued. So, the first operational use of the concept failed the “high readiness” test, underlining the need for funding reform.

Valiant attempts have been made to keep the NRF relevant. Significantly, the 2014 Wales Summit saw an agreement to enhance its capabilities in an effort to adapt and respond to emerging security challenges posed by Russia, as well as risks emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. Subsequently, a decision was taken to establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force within the NRF structure and to increase the size of the NRF to 40,000.

NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force – a rapidly deployable, multinational force made up of air, land, maritime and Special Operations forces – was established following decisions to improve Allied readiness taken at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. © EU Today

However, successfully implementing these decisions requires that contributing nations step up their commitment to provide the necessary forces. To date, that level of commitment has not been forthcoming. This undermines NATO’s credibility and calls into question its ability to deter aggression.

Keeping up standards

One of NATO’s greatest strengths during the Cold War era was interoperability: “the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.”

The Alliance had for many years placed great emphasis on standardised doctrine, which was to become an essential element of command and staff training in all member countries. Tactics techniques and procedures were also standardised and units exercised frequently with their colleagues from other nations. Everything from ammunition, to fuel, to communications was compatible across all NATO assigned units. In fact, NATO standardisation was so successful that certain standards, such as aircraft refuelling connectors, were adopted by the Soviet military authorities.

NATO also had a strict programme of evaluation. Units declared available to NATO were subject to rigorous checks, often at no notice, to ensure that the standards set were maintained.

However, the 1990s saw the start of a gradual erosion of the very tight standards that had been employed until then. NATO-led operations in the western Balkans were based on the allocation of a particular geographical area to one lead nation with very little multinationalism within these areas. Similarly, at that time, little NATO doctrine was available that reflected Alliance policy for peacekeeping and post-conflict peace support, so individual nations tended to fall back on national policy and experiences.

This theme continued as NATO began its engagement in Afghanistan. The Allies adopted the concept of “Regional Leadership” whereby a “Lead Nation” pulled together a rather disparate group of nations, including operational partners that had never before been associated with a NATO operation. The Afghanistan theatre introduced additional complications. The specific requirements for operating in that theatre were such that many nations procured specialist equipment under urgent operational measures. These met national requirements but equipment and then tactics, techniques and procedures became less standardised across the theatre.

Map of Afghanistan showing the “Lead nations” of the Regional Commands of the International Security Assistance Force (7 April 2009). © NATO

Moreover, NATO-led missions and operations are increasingly being set up alongside coalition efforts. This causes confusion, both at the headquarters level and in the field, with personnel (and even theatre commanders) not sure whether they are working to national or NATO policy.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allied leaders stated that: “We will preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together.” One can argue that NATO is failing to live up to that pledge.

Lack of commitment

Readiness is not easy to define. To judge the readiness of NATO forces, one must take a comprehensive view that takes into account both the operational and the organisational, or strategic, perspectives. At the unit level, readiness is about equipment, manning, training and interoperability. At the organisational level, readiness can be simply defined as “the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.²”

Readiness comes down to one simple question: are we ready to win the next fight? But, to answer that question, it is necessary to know four things: what, when, where, and how.

In the Cold War era, this task was relatively easy. We might not have known when our military capabilities were required but we had a pretty good idea of what they would be required to do, and where and how they would do it. The unknown “when” was easily resolved by keeping the necessary forces on the ground in Western Europe at a high level of “readiness” and being prepared to reinforce those in-place units rapidly with equally “ready” forces.

Today, however, the uncertainty of the modern world (not to mention the pressure on national budgets) and the lack of an obvious and immediate threat to the territory of some of NATO’s member states, makes it difficult for them to make the necessary commitment. If Allies cannot commit to fund their defence forces properly, then it is unlikely that they will take the additional steps to prepare and commit them to NATO’s command and control.

This is why the present occupant of the White House, and his predecessor, have complained loudly about other Allies’ lack of commitment, and have attempted to define targets that might persuade their fellow heads of state and government to increase their level of commitment. Nevertheless, let us be absolutely clear on one point: the United States will not spend one cent of its defence budget unless it is in the interests of its own national priorities.

Again, though, this is not a new issue. In 1954, United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned that: “If the European Defence Community should not become effective <…>, there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of United States policy.”³

More recent, and better known, is the agreement on defence spending reached by Allied leaders at the Wales Summit, namely that the Allies will “aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade.” This is classic communiqué language. It leaves Allies with plenty of ‘wiggle room’ and presents an ambition that goes well beyond the attention span of most politicians.

More important perhaps but seldom quoted is the communiqué language that follows: “…. with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO’s capability shortfalls”. Because it does not set targets within the term of current governments, or even the next, it is simply passing the buck.

Stepping up readiness

At Wales, we also saw the launch of a Readiness Action Plan. The Summit Declaration states:

“In order to ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges, today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan. It provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defence. It also strengthens our crisis management capability. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.”

This is brave language. It requires an enormous commitment by Allies.

Events in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East have demonstrated that NATO can no longer restrict its interests to the traditional Euro-Atlantic area. However, Russia’s invasion of the Crimean peninsula and continued activity in eastern Ukraine as well as its provocative military activities near NATO’s borders have shown that deterrence and defence remain as important as ever. So, in a world of shrinking defence budgets and changing political priorities, NATO has now committed itself do to what it was established to do and much more besides.

NATO’s strength will always be strategic. But to be credible it must have the ability and the will to defend its territory collectively as a last resort. For that, its member nations must demonstrate the necessary resolve.

While that commitment has been slow to materialise, steps are being taken to strengthen the Alliance’s readiness to fulfil its full range of obligations, and an improvement in coherence is visible.

A British Army convoy crosses the Øresund Bridge, which connects Denmark and Sweden, during a 2,000-km journey from the Hook of Holland to Norway for NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2018. Demonstrating the ability to move Allied forces into and across Europe at speed, and sustain them, was an important part of the exercise. © NATO

Military mobility is now a key focus of cooperation with the European Union. Moving Allied forces into and across Europe at speed, and sustaining them, is a significant logistic challenge involving many stakeholders at national and multinational levels.

NATO defence ministers endorsed a new US readiness initiative, at the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels. Known as the “Four 30s”, it seeks to establish a “culture of readiness” to “provide forces <….> ready to fight at short notice, and <….> able to deploy swiftly through Europe.” The goal is to ensure that, by 2020, NATO has 30 mechanised battalions, 30 kinetic air squadrons and 30 naval combat vessels, able to be used within 30 days.

Unlike the vaguer aims for defence spending and capability targets agreed at Wales, this set of targets has a timescale that is within the term of most current NATO member governments – and therefore introduces a degree of accountability – and the targets are quantifiable.

But much more needs to be done. The Defence Planning Process should be more effective in terms of providing solid guarantees that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe will have the necessary forces and resources to do what is asked of him. This, in turn, drives the NATO force generation process that needs to be able to deliver the necessary forces quickly, without the political wrangle that has become so familiar in recent years.

Moreover, the Alliance needs to expand its relationship with member states and partner countries to develop a whole-of-government strategy to establish the relationships required to project stability successfully beyond its borders.

Finally, we might return once more to NATO’s beginnings. The following words were written in 1951. It was aimed at that time at Reserve Forces but might apply equally well to high-readiness forces in NATO’s current and future inventory:

“Reserve forces must be given refresher training annually. In this respect, it is essential that a man receives his refresher training in the actual unit in which he will be mobilized. It follows from this that all reserve formations and units must actually exist in peace and that the number of reserve formations and units to be created in totality on mobilization must be reduced to the minimum; as any system for reserve, forces which depends solely on units being formed only on mobilization is totally incapable of meeting European defence requirements.”

Painstaking progress towards these goals would help ensure that NATO will be ready to respond effectively to any threat, no matter what form it might take.

¹ “U.S. Military Presence in Europe (1945-2016)”, U.S. EUCOM Communication and Engagement Directorate, 26 May 2016

² “Defining readiness: Background and issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 14 June 2017

³ “The ‘Agonizing Reappraisal’: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community”, Brian R. Duchin, 1992

Jonathan Hill is a former British military officer who served until 2006 in a number of NATO appointments, including NATO’s International Military Staff. From 2006 until 2018 he was employed as a NATO civilian in the Operations Division of NATO’s International Staff, focused on NATO’s activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

What is published in NATO Review does not necessarily represent the official position or policy of member governments, or of NATO.

3. 

Pakistan Equips Military With Tactical Nuke-capable Missile

By Ayaz Gul January 24, 2019

Pakistan launched a short-range ballistic missile Thursday, formally equipping the military with a nuclear-capable rocket that officials say would deter a surprise conventional attack against the country by rival India.

“This training exercise involved launching of quad salvo for desired effects. NASR is a high-precision, shoot-and-scoot weapon system with the ability of in-flight maneuverability,” the military announced in a statement.

Experts explained the weapon system’s ability to launch several missiles at once would allow Pakistan’s military to hit many targets at the same time.

Islamabad recently enhanced the NASR missile’s “flight maneuverability” and extended its range to 70 kilometers (43 miles) from 60 (37 miles).

U.S. concerned

The development of Pakistani tactical battlefield nuclear weapons has been a source of concern to the United States because their smaller size and quick deployment increases the risk of a nuclear conflict with India, say non-proliferation experts.

The Pakistani military noted in its statement the weapon system has augmented “credible deterrence” against the “prevailing and evolving threat spectrum, more effectively including enemy’s ballistic missile defense and other air defense systems.”

Pakistani officials say that the nation’s short-range battlefield NASR missile would deter the bigger neighbor India from imposing a sudden, limited assault with its massive conventional military force under New Delhi’s so-called “Cold Start” doctrine.

India buys Russian air defense system

India’s decision to buy the Russian-made S-400 Triumph air defense system has also raised alarms in Pakistan, where officials have warned the deal will “further destabilize strategic stability” and lead to a “renewed” arms race in South Asia.

Pakistan and India have fought three wars since gaining independence from Britain in 1947. The two countries have since equipped their armies with nuclear weapons, raising fears that another conventional conflict could escalate into a nuclear exchange.

The territorial dispute over Kashmir, which has sparked two wars, continues to strain bilateral ties and prevents India and Pakistan from resuming long-stalled political talks. Intermittent military clashes across the de facto Kashmir border also have become routine, causing dozens of casualties on both sides.

4.

Israel deploys ‘Iron Dome’ after Syria warns of retaliatory strike on Ben Gurion airport

The Israeli military has deployed the so-called “Iron Dome” missile systems in Tel Aviv and other parts of the occupied territories after Syria warned of a retaliatory strike on the Ben Gurion airport if the UN fails to stop the regime’s aerial acts of aggression against the Arab country.

In a statement on Thursday, the Israeli military said it had set up an “Iron Dome” battery in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area and others were stationed in the southern parts of the Israeli-occupied territories near the blockaded Gaza Strip, where tensions have been running high with Palestinian protesters.

A number of reservists from the regime’s air force have also been called up to man the missile systems.

The announcement came after Syria’s UN Ambassador Bashar al-Ja’afari delivered a strong warning to the Israeli regime, which has recently stepped up its air strikes against Syrian soil.

One of the Israeli strikes targeted a civilian international airport near the Syrian capital, Damascus, earlier this week.

Speaking at the UN Security Council meeting on the Middle East on Tuesday, Ja’afari blasted the US, France and Britain — three of the council’s five permanent members — for providing “unlimited support” to their allies in Tel Aviv and thus emboldening them to act freely in Syria.

The senior Syrian diplomat warned that his country could use its right to respond in self defense to the recent Israeli air raids against the Damascus International Airport by striking Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion airport if the 15-nation council failed to shoulder its responsibilities and act against the regime’s aggression.

On Wednesday, Russia — which has been providing military support to Syria in its counter-terrorism operations — also urged Israeli to stop its “spontaneous” strikes against Syria under the pretext of attacking Iranian military advisers, who are also in Syria at the request of Damascus on a mission similar to that of Russia.

Damascus repeatedly writes to the UN and its Security Council to brief the world body over illegal military actions that Israel, the US and their allies take against Syria.

According to RT, the Russian Defense Ministry reported that Israeli jets endangered two civilian aircraft while engaging targets in Syria on Christmas Day. It said the regime’s F-16s flew in as civilian jets were landing at Beirut and Damascus airports.

In September 2018, a Russian aircraft was mistakenly shot down by Syrian air defense systems, which were responding to a wave of Israeli air raids. Fifteen Russian servicemen lost their lives in the incident, which Moscow blamed on Tel Aviv.

Israel’s frequent air raids against Syria are considered as an attempt to prop up the Takfiri terrorist groups that have been suffering heavy defeats at the hands of Syrian government forces.

In a recent interview with The New York Times, Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot, the Israeli army’s outgoing chief of staff, said that the regime had carried out “thousands” of aerial assaults in Syria in recent years.

In a rare acknowledgement during an interview with The Sunday Times, he also confirmed long-running reports of Israel’s collaboration with anti-Damascus militants, admitting that it had provided weapons to them.

Indian Navy Operationalises Third Airbase in Indian Ocean Region

Sputnik News

24.01.2019

INS Kohassa is the third naval air base in Andaman after INS Utkrosh at Port Blair and INS Baaz at Campbell Bay. The three airbases together will be of vital strategic advantage to the Indian Navy as they lie close to the Malacca Straits – the world’s busiest shipping route, fulfilling two-third of China’s energy requirements.

New Delhi (Sputnik): In a strategic move to enhance its surveillance capabilities against Chinese warships and submarines entering the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through the nearby Malacca Straits, the Indian Navy has operationalised a new naval base located at the northern-most tip of the archipelago that forms the Andaman and Nicobar territory of the Indian Union.

The naval air base that will initially be used to operate the Dornier, Mi-8, and Chetak aircraft would be able to host larger aircraft once it is fully expanded to 100 hectares.

“Present runway length is 1,000 meters, where only a few defence aircraft can land. As India’s Environment and Forest Department has already approved the acquisition of forest land of 100 hectares north of the strip, the runway length will be extended to 3,000 meters for the operation of wide-bodied defence and civil flights”, a military official told Sputnik.

The extension work of the airbase has been ongoing for the last one year. The airbase will not only consolidate the security and surveillance over the islands, but will also assist in the rapid development of civil infrastructure which will immensely benefit the local population.

“Located in the northernmost part of the islands, the airfield holds strategic importance not only for the security of the islands but also for its overall development. With the addition of this airfield, the Andaman and Nicobar Command’s (ANC) ability to operate independently from all the regions of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands will get a great boost”, an Indian Navy statement reads.

“Not only do they provide India with a commanding presence in the Bay of Bengal, but the Islands also serve as our window into East and South East Asia. India has progressively developed Port Blair as home to amphibious platforms, naval offshore patrol vessels and fast attack craft. One of the primary functions of INS Baaz is to provide information, based on ‘airborne maritime surveillance'”, Admiral Nirmal Verma, India’s former chief of the naval staff, said about INS Baaz.

Earlier this month, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Lanba observed that since 2008, at any given time, there are six to eight Chinese Navy ships in the northern part of the Indian Ocean, indicating the growing outreach of Chinese military in the region.

“Also, two years ago they commissioned their first overseas facility or base in Djibouti. The stated aim of this deployment is to protect their trade which is flowing through this area, from piracy. They have deployed submarines for anti-piracy operations which are the most unlikely platform to be used for this role”, Admiral Lanba had said.

© Sputnik

6. 

Treasury Designates Iran’s Foreign Fighter Militias in Syria along with a Civilian Airline Ferrying Weapons to Syria

January 24, 2019

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against two Syria-based, Iran-backed militias composed of foreign nationals, an Iranian airline linked to designated Iranian airline Mahan Air and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), and an Armenian general sales agent (GSA) providing services to Mahan Air.  The Fatemiyoun Division, composed of Afghan nationals, and the Zaynabiyoun Brigade, consisting of Pakistani nationals, are IRGC-QF-led, Syria-based militias whose fighters are recruited by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Basij militia mostly from Afghan and Pakistani refugees and migrants residing in Iran.  On October 16, 2018, OFAC designated the Basij militia, along with its vast network of 20 corporations and financial institutions, for recruiting fighters, including child soldiers, for the IRGC-QF’s operations in Syria.

The Fatemiyoun Division and Zaynabiyoun Brigade are being designated for providing material support to the IRGC-QF.  OFAC is designating Qeshm Fars Air for being owned or controlled by Mahan Air, and for providing material support to the IRGC-QF, and Armenia-based Flight Travel LLC for acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air.  Mahan Air plays an integral role supporting the IRGC-QF and its proxies in Syria by transporting personnel and weapons.

“The brutal Iranian regime exploits refugee communities in Iran, deprives them of access to basic services such as education, and uses them as human shields for the Syrian conflict,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.  “Treasury’s targeting of Iran-backed militias and other foreign proxies is part of our ongoing pressure campaign to shut down the illicit networks the regime uses to export terrorism and unrest across the globe.”

“This is a regime that preys on the most vulnerable – coercing children as young as 14 years old to fight in Syria under the direction of the IRGC-QF, and perpetuating widespread suffering and displacement,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal Mandelker.  “Iran continues to leverage Mahan Air and its commercial aviation sector to transport individuals and weapons needed to carry out this tragic campaign and to fuel sectarian conflict throughout the region.  We are aggressively targeting those who continue to provide commercial support to Mahan Air and other designated airlines, and any who fail to heed our warnings expose themselves to severe sanctions risk.”

The Fatemiyoun Division, Zaynabiyoun Brigade, Qeshm Fars Air, and Flight Travel LLC are being designated under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, a counter-terrorism authority.  Additionally, the IRGC-QF, the Fatemiyoun Division, and the Zaynabiyoun Brigade are also being designated under E.O. 13553, an authority that targets serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran.

Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun: IRGC-QF-led militias preying on Afghan and Pakistani refugees and migrants, including children

The Fatemiyoun Division is an IRGC-QF-led militia that preys on the millions of undocumented Afghan migrants and refugees in Iran, coercing them to fight in Syria under threat of arrest or deportation.  Several hundred Fatemiyoun Division fighters, including children as young as 14 years old, have died fighting Iran’s war in Syria, and the bodies of slain Afghan fighters have been flown back to Iran on board Mahan Air flights from Syria.

Many Afghans from Iran have joined the wave of refugees arriving in Europe, including a number who have fled the IRGC’s forced recruitment.  Former Fatemiyoun Division fighters have reported being arrested by Iranian security forces and offered a choice between prison, deportation, or “volunteering” to train and fight in Syria with the promise of legal residency.  Afghan recruits receive little training prior to deployment to Syria, where many are thrust into dangerous front-line combat roles, resulting in significant casualties.  The Zaynabiyoun Brigade is another Syria-based, IRGC-QF-led militia, composed of Pakistani fighters mainly recruited from among undocumented and impoverished Pakistani Shiite immigrants living in Iran.

The Fatemiyoun Division and Zaynabiyoun Brigade are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism.  OFAC is designating the Fatemiyoun Division and Zaynabiyoun Brigade for assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.  The IRGC-QF was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007.

As a part of today’s action, the IRGC-QF, the Fatemiyoun Division, and the Zaynabiyoun Brigade are also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553, which targets serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran.  The IRGC-QF is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, the IRGC, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 in 2011 for engaging in serious human rights abuses, including the violent crackdowns on protesters in Iran in 2009.  The Fatemiyoun Division and the Zaynabiyoun Brigade are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, materials, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.

Qeshm Fars Air: Another commercial Iranian airline providing airlift to the IRGC-QF

Since the onset of the Syrian civil war, Iran has routinely relied upon Iranian airlines such as Mahan Air to fly fighters and materiel to Syria to prop up the Assad regime.  Mahan Air has transported IRGC-QF operatives, weapons, equipment, and funds abroad in support of the IRGC-QF’s destabilizing regional operations.  Mahan Air has also transported IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani, who is sanctioned under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and therefore covered by a travel ban.

Qeshm Fars Air, which originally operated as a commercial airline between 2006 and 2013, restarted operations in 2017, and its fleet of two B747 aircraft have operated regular cargo flights to Damascus, delivering cargo, including weapons shipments, on behalf of the IRGC-QF.  Mahan Air employees fill Qeshm Fars Air management positions, and Mahan Air provides technical and operational support for Qeshm Fars Air, facilitating the airline’s illicit operations.  The delivery of lethal materiel by Qeshm Fars Air enables Iran’s military support for the Assad regime, prolonging the brutal conflict and the suffering of millions of Syrians, and has resulted in the displacement of millions across the region.

Qeshm Fars Air is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being owned or controlled by Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.

OFAC is also identifying two B747 aircraft as property in which Qeshm Fars Air has an interest:  EP-FAA and EP-FAB.  These identifications serve to warn those who provide support to these aircraft that they could be exposed to U.S. sanctions.

Flight Travel LLC: Armenia-based GSA generating revenue for Mahan Air

Flight Travel LLC, located in Yerevan, Armenia is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air by serving as a Mahan Air GSA in Armenia.  A GSA is a third party that provides services to an airline under the airline’s brand, including sales and marketing, administrative services, and financial services.  Flight Travel LLC has refused to heed warnings about the risk of sanctions exposure due to commercial support to Mahan Air, and it is now the third company sanctioned by Treasury for acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air as a GSA in the last seven months.  In July 2018, OFAC designated a Malaysia-based Mahan Air GSA, and in September 2018, OFAC designated a Thailand-based Mahan Air GSA.

The designation of Flight Travel LLC demonstrates the U.S. Government’s commitment to denying foreign support for Mahan Air and other designated Iranian airlines, and reinforces multiple warnings to the aviation community of the sanctions risk for individuals and entities maintaining commercial relationships with these airlines.  In addition to GSA services such as reservation and ticketing services, the civil aviation industry should conduct due diligence for other potentially sanctionable activities that may arise when conducted for or on behalf of a designated person.  Sanctionable activities may include marketing services, procurement of aircraft parts and equipment, maintenance contracts, airline ground services, catering, interline transfer and codeshare agreements, and refueling contracts.

Sanctions implications

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation.  Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the entities designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through sanctions.

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Identifying information on the entities designated today.

Russia Confirms ‘Private Security Companies’ Operating Amid Unrest In Sudan

By RFE/RL January 24, 2019

The Russian Foreign Ministry says private Russian companies are training the army in Sudan, confirming their presence in the African country being shaken by mass street demonstrations by opposition forces.

Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on January 23 said that “according to our information, representatives of Russian private security companies, who have nothing to do with Russian state bodies, are operating in Sudan.”

Zakharova’s comments followed a story in the British press alleged that Russian mercenaries were helping Sudanese authorities crack down on the protests.

Zakharova denied the press reports and said the “task” of the private security firms “is limited to training staff for the military and law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Sudan,” which is a close ally of Moscow.

Street protests have been carried out daily since December 19. The rallies were initially in protest against shortages of fuel and commodities, but they have turned into a call for an end to the 30-year rule of President Omar al-Bashir.

Britain’s The Guardian newspaper on January 23 reported that Bashir’s government was conducting an “alarming” crackdown on journalists covering the protests, with five reporters being held and dozens of others being detained before being released.

The unrest is one of the biggest challenges to Bashir’s rule since he took power in a coup in 1989.

Reuters news agency reported that official statistics from the Russian Federal Security Service show a substantial increase in the number of the Russian citizens who left for Sudan in late 2017.

According to the data, some 200 Russians traveled to Sudan in the final three months of last year, far surpassing the previous peak of 76 in any three-month period.

Sudan’s oil minister, Azhari Abdel Qader, said on January 23 that the country had received economic assistance from the United Arab Emirates and offers of support from Russia and Turkey during its economic crisis.

“We accepted it as a normal matter between friendly countries in light of the current circumstances that Sudan is going through,” he said of the aid, adding that there were offers of “fuel, wheat, and other items” from Turkey and Russia.

He did not confirm whether Sudan, a country of 41 million people, would accept the offers from Russia and Turkey.

Private Russian military contractors have been reported in other countries, including Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. Rights monitors said that dozens of them were killed in clashes with U.S.-led forces, although details remain scarce.

With reporting by Reuters, Tass, The Times, The Guardian, and Bloomberg

Source: https: // www.rferl.org/a/russia-confirms – private-security-forces-sudan- demonstrations /29727768.html

Copyright (c) 2019. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Israeli protesters display photos of victims of Palestinian terror. (Hadas Parush/Flash90)

Palestinian Authority Pays Terrorists Half a Billion Shekels Per Year

Jan 24, 2019

“Exclusive” research was carried by an Israeli NGO as a new Israeli law imposes sanctions on such payments.

By David Jablinowitz, United with Israel

The Palestinian Authority (PA)  spent at least NIS 502 million ($137 million)  in payments to terrorist prisoners in 2018, according to a report issued by Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), an Israel-based NGO.

PMW said that it carried out the research as Israel was preparing to implement a new law that imposes financial sanctions on the PA for its so-called “Pay for Slay” policy. The media monitor group said that it looked at the PA’s financial reports for 2018 which include its payments to the terrorists, both current and released prisoners.

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