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1.
Allies agree NATO’s 2025-2029 Common Funding Resource Plan
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., where Allies took decisions related to NATO Common Funding, 9-11 July 2024.
In approving this Plan, the Council agreed the 2025 ceilings for the common-funded Military and Civil Budgets, as well as for the NATO Security Investment Programme, allocating EUR 4.4 billion in funding. This funding is mainly aimed at strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence, providing core military capabilities, fulfilling responsibilities in Alliance operations and missions, and enabling NATO’s consultation, command and control processes. Along with decisions taken at the recent Washington Summit, the Plan includes funding for priority activities in support of Ukraine, such as NATO Security Assistance and Training to Ukraine (NSATU) and the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC).
Common funding is a powerful expression of equitable burden-sharing and resolve amongst Allies.
Read the public version of the CFRP 2025-2029.
The 2025-2029 Common Funding Resource Plan
Report by the Resource Policy and Planning Board
Introduction
1. The annual Common Funding Resource Plan (CFRP) reflects an overarching and comprehensive five-year resource plan for Council’s consideration and decision. The CFRP builds on the submission by the military Budget Holders to the Military Committee of Medium Term Resource Plan (MTRP) requirements (for the Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)), on the submission by Host Nations of the NSIP resource requirements, and on the International Staff submission of the Medium Term Financial Plan (MTFP) (for the Civil Budget). These inputs were then subject to the consideration and assessment by the Military Committee, the Investment and the Budget Committees, whose conclusions and recommendations informed this Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) report.
Aim
2. The purpose of the CFRP is to provide an overview of the common-funded resource demands over the next five years, and to assess the medium-term feasibility and affordability of previously endorsed and future common-funded programmes and requirements, including workforce. Recognising Allies’ commitment to the financial trajectory endorsed at the Madrid Summit, this CFRP recommends for Council approval the 2025 ceilings, and seeks Council notation of the planning figures for the four outer years (from 2026 to 2029) and of the indicative figures for 2030.
Strategic context
3. The gravely altered security environment has led NATO to reset the strategic direction of the Alliance, with an increased Level of Ambition and a new baseline for deterrence and defence, as approved by Heads of State and Government at the 2021 Brussels, 2022 Madrid and 2023 Vilnius Summits. These decisions have, in turn, direct resource implications for NATO common funding. The indispensable and distinctive role of common funding was reinforced in 2023 in providing capabilities benefitting the whole Alliance, and common funding remained a powerful expression of equitable burden sharing and resolve amongst Allies.
4. The Comprehensive Report on Deterrence and Defence, approved by Council and endorsed at the Vilnius Summit, addressed the steps being taken to adapt the Alliance towards a new era of collective defence. These steps are underpinned by Allies’ efforts to better align their national operational and defence planning processes with the Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), in accordance with the Political Guidance for Defence Planning 2023, as well as Allies’ commitments to Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and the Defence Investment Pledge. Common funding has and will continue to have an important role, complementary to national and multinational efforts, to support Deterrence and Defence.
5. The adequate funding of the Alliance’s resource requirements will continue to have a direct impact on NATO’s three core tasks (deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security), Allies’ political-military decisions, including in relation to the DDA Family of Plans and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC). In this regard, common funding continues to operate as a key enabler and force multiplier in meeting NATO’s Level of Ambition, supporting the three core tasks, the implementation of DDA and the NWCC. Most notably, the DDA Family of Plans and the associated force, Command and Control, readiness, interoperability as well as interchangeability and enablement requirements are the central drivers of NATO’s new baseline for deterrence and defence. They will form the basis to refine the specific and enduring requirements in future common funding resource planning cycles.
Overview of NATO common funding
6. The CFRP is a strategic tool that allows Council and senior decision makers in capitals to have a holistic view, from a NATO Enterprise perspective, on the requirements and main resource drivers for NATO common-funded budgets and programmes, and to allocate resources appropriately. The CFRP covers NATO’s three common funding sources: the NSIP, the Military Budget, and the Civil Budget. Together, they resource a wide range of capabilities, enabling the Alliance to Consult, Command and Control, Prepare, Inform, Engage, Project, Protect/Defend and Sustain.
7. The Common Funded Capabilities Framework enabled the Strategic Commands to develop a Strategic Capability Development Plan (SCDP), which aims to provide a comprehensive picture of current and future common-funded capabilities being implemented or under development, not only across the five years of the CFRP but out to a ten-year time horizon. The SCDP informed the development of this CFRP.
8. The implementation of the DDA Family of Plans will continue to evolve, requiring adequate human and financial resources to be provided by Allies and NATO over the planning period. Although various requirements are being addressed as part of ongoing capability development, not all DDA requirements are yet included in the current CFRP. As DDA implementation continues to progress, additional and new capability requirements will need to be brought forward, refined, prioritised and updated in future resource plans, in line with existing policies and procedures, to enable informed decisions on the use of available resources and to make full use of all available mechanisms to ensure timely implementation thereafter.
2025-2030 Common Funding Resource Requirements
NATO Security Investment Programme
9. The NSIP continues to contribute directly to deterrence, defence and security, by supporting capability development and delivery, particularly on air, land and naval facilities, bulk fuel pipeline systems and storage, reinforcement, sustainment and enablement capabilities, information and communications technology and networks (including deployable and satellite communications) as well as readiness initiatives.
10. In terms of the total approved programme (EUR 5,651 million from 2025 to 2030), the majority of the forecasted expenditure relates to Command and Control – Communications and Information Systems, followed by Basing/Facilities and Petrol, Oil and Lubricants. In terms of the future requirements identified by the Strategic Commands, the main forecasted expenditure relates to the Capability Programme Plans for the Nuclear Consultation, Command and Control, for Air Basing, and for Maritime Facilities. These are aligned with the Digital Backbone and Readiness Key Requirement Areas, which were defined as priority by the Military Committee.
Military Budget
11. The Military Budget contributes, inter alia, to strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, provide core military capabilities, fulfil responsibilities assumed by NATO in Alliance Operations and Missions, and to foster interoperability of Alliance forces and in Cooperative Security. NATO Military Authorities’ have planned over 600 military requirements alone in support of DDA and the NWCC, in addition to other ongoing requirements, and submitted prioritised military resource requirements at a total amount of EUR 2,459.2 million for 2025. The number and amount of the requirements are a reflection of the radically changed security environment and are built on the adaptation of the deterrence and defence posture, through DDA, and the NWCC (implemented through the Warfare Development Agenda) aimed at maintaining NATO’s decisive military advantage.
12. In its advice to Council on the 2025-2029 MTRP, the Military Committee has approved that the full military requirements outlined in the 2025-2029 MTRP submission are valid for achieving the DDA Family of Plans and the NWCC, acknowledging that the Budget Holders’ submitted adjusted requirements are above the figures corresponding to the Madrid Summit decision on common funding. The Military Committee considered strategic risk mitigation, including the acceptance of a EUR 7.7 million operational risk proposed by the Budget Holders with their submission, and if necessary, the possible extension to EUR 38.2 million as acceptable, following consideration of the Budget Holders’ assessment of the indicative high-level operational risks and impacts related to requirements. The full military requirements underscore the breadth of NATO’s operational ambition and strategic necessities. The Military Committee affirmed its dedication to upholding NATO’s operational effectiveness and strategic deterrence to ensure NATO is fully equipped, prepared, and strategically positioned to fulfil its mission of safeguarding the peace and security of the Euro-Atlantic Area.
13. Details per budget group are provided below.
13.1. The NATO Command Structure Entities and Programmes (NCSEP) Budget Group, comprising the most Tier 1 elements in the Capabilities Framework (‘Consultation, Command and Control’, ‘Prepare’, ‘Project’, ‘Protect/Defence’ and ‘Sustain’) enables the well-functioning of NATO’s military command structure and supports further progress in transforming SHAPE into a Strategic Warfighting Headquarters with streamlined processes and communication lines with the subordinate commands (including the integrations of the Joint Force Command Norfolk,the Joint Support and Enabling Command and the Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff into the NATO Command Structure. This Budget Group covers the operating and maintenance (O&M) costs of common-funded capabilities, and supports the sustainment of future operations and missions while enabling immediate responses in times of crisis (including humanitarian support).
13.2. The Alliance Operations and Missions (AOM) Budget Group, included in the Tier 1 Capability Framework ‘Engage’, covers the resource requirements for the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), the Balkans Operations, Operation Sea Guardian, and the NATO African Union Cooperation. Key resource drivers for NMI are the planned uplift in the total number of personnel in-theatre, the initial take-over of mission-specific enablers from the Coalition and an uplift in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) services. For Balkans Operations, the main increases are due to the O&M tails of the Urgent and Critical Requirements in the infrastructure and ICT areas planned for implementation in 2025, while uncertainties remain related to anticipated additional requirements, inter alia, for capabilities requiring skilled personnel with requisite qualifications and professional experience to fulfil specialist roles.
13.3. The NATO Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Force (NISRF) Budget Group, included in the Tier 1 Capability Framework ‘Inform’, covers the critical provision of Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) to military commanders. Noting that in 2025 the NISRF will continue its efforts to reach Full Operational Capability, key resource requirements for 2025 result from emerging operational requirements (increase in flying hours and operational duration while maintaining a high tempo of operations due to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine), emerging obsolescence issues (leading to several Engineering Change Proposals) and emerging technology and market opportunities (such as the Future Sustainment Requirements and NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) System Engineering Support). The NISRF financial profile assumes that multi-year In-Service Support contracts can be placed.
13.4. The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) Budget Group, included in the Tier 1 Capability Framework ‘Inform’, is also a fundamental JISR capability, critical for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in the current security environment. The operational demand on the NAEW&CF remains consistently high, and has required the NAEW&CF to operate at a level that exceeds the baseline tasking stipulated in SACEUR’s Concept of Operations for the NAEW&C Force. Key resource requirements for 2025 are the increases in training costs due to the upgrade of the Flight Management Software Suite on the Flight Training Devices, revised aviation fuel estimates and additional costs in the vehicle replacement plan, which are partially offset by reductions in maintenance events and completion of the Final Lifetime Extension Programme.
Civil Budget
14. At the core of the Alliance, the Civil Budget funds the functioning of the NATO Headquarters and the International Staff, enables NATO Nation’s consultation and decision making process, oversees policy development and contributes to the implementation of significant politico-military decisions and priorities, and the three core tasks.
15. Key Civil Budget resource requirements to ensure Collective Defence, against all threats from all directions, include accelerating interoperability and standardisation, additional investments into Data and Artificial Intelligence-related capabilities, advancing multinational and common-funded capability delivery and enablement, also covering cyber, counter-terrorism, hybrid, energy, data science, innovation and climate change domains. Crisis Prevention and Management will benefit from more training and preparedness, enhanced situational awareness, stabilisation and counter terrorism operations, supporting civilian crisis management and relief operations. Strengthening NATO’s role as a global stakeholder is paramount for Cooperative Security, as are the outreach activities to NATO partners in a 360-degree approach, including the Southern neighbourhood and the Indo Pacific, as well as enhanced work with other multilateral organisations such as the European Union at Staff-to-Staff level. Resource requirements include efforts to strengthen NATO’s footprint in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine, and other current and newly-created NATO satellite offices, as well as the continued development of existing Partnerships frameworks.
16. When comparing this MTFP with the figures corresponding to the Madrid Summit decision on common funding, the differences are primarily explained by the reinforcement of the NATO Representation in Ukraine (NRU). In addition, differences arise from 2027 onwards from the anticipated requirements for the NATO HQ Adaptation Programme, for which costs were not included in the 2024-2028 CFRP. These costs were possible to absorb in 2025, 2026 and 2029, but not for 2027 and only partially for 2028.
17. Recognising the urgent political priority that Allies have placed on expanding the NRU, the RPPB concurs with the Budget Committee recommended uplift of up to EUR 15.1 million above the figures corresponding to the Madrid Summit decision on common funding, since the magnitude of this requirement and its exceptional nature for the Alliance was not foreseen and thus not included in the 2024 2028 CFRP.
New Requirements not Costed in MTRP/MTFP Submissions
18. In addition to the aforementioned projected requirements identified and costed in the Budget Holders’ submissions, a number of new requirements are also addressed as part of this CRFP to ensure a holistic presentation to Council of all known requirements and to assess affordability for 2025. Some of these requirements result from political decisions that occurred after the submissions (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine, NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis Training and Education Centre, NATO Integrated Cyber Defence Centre, the establishment of an independent Programme Office to establish and run an enhanced Air Command and Control Capability), and could therefore not be anticipated by Budget Holders. Other requirements (NATO Mission Iraq Enabler Transition Planning, NCS workforce and civilianisation, Host Nation Support for Collective Defence) were anticipated by the Budget Holders and thus reflected as uncertainties in their submissions, as the exact nature of the requirements was unknown or costings were not sufficiently mature and therefore not included in the figures presented in the MTRP and MTFP inputs. In the meantime, initial resource estimates for these initiatives have become available and could therefore be assessed as part of this CFRP. In some cases, the RPPB provided specific resource advice to Council which has also been captured as part of this CFRP.
19. Overall, for 2025 these new requirements amount to potential additional resource requirements of EUR 122 million on NSIP, EUR 87.8 million on the Military Budget and EUR 0.5 million on the Civil Budget. Continuing resource requirements from 2026 onwards are not included in the planning or indicative figures for this CFRP and will be addressed as part of the next resource planning cycle. In line with standard processes, these requirements will be subject to further refinement, validation and prioritisation.
New Requirements with specific RPPB Resource Advice
20. NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) – The Council noted the RPPB’s position that the requirement for NSATU was not known nor taken into account at the time of the Madrid Summit decision on common funding and as such constitutes a new additional requirement. NSATU requirements for 2025 are estimated at EUR 39.8 million from the Military Budget. Council noted the RPPB agreement that they can be made affordable from agreed or planned allocations, through reprioritisation, or in the form of supplementary allocations, in line with the provisions of PO(2013)0056, to be used exclusively for NSATU. NSATU requirements from the NSIP for 2025 are estimated at EUR 50 million. The impact on NSIP can be considered affordable and manageable within existing and planned ceilings. Council approved these figures as the annual reference amounts noting that resource requirements and cost estimates are not exhaustive and would be further refined as part of extant operational and resource planning processes.
21. NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis Training and Education Centre (JATEC) – on 15 February 2024, the NATO-Ukraine Council Defence Ministers took the political decision to endorse the establishment of JATEC in Bydgoszcz, Poland. The RPPB’s initial resource advice, noted by Council, took into consideration the options regarding the final vehicle for JATEC. The estimated annual costs for JATEC (Initial Operational Capability) are at EUR 4 – 4.3 million plus EUR 3.5 – 7 million for one-off investment in Communications Information Systems (CIS) infrastructure. Council’s approval to use Option 2 (Joint civilian-military Centre under ACT) as the initial vehicle for JATEC to be launched in the autumn of 2024 means that JATEC would be eligible for common funding as soon as activated as a NATO Command Structure entity. As these initial estimates have not been included in the 2024 Budget nor in the Budget Holders’ MTRP submissions for the 2025-2029 CFRP, they constitute a new requirement. Council noted the RPPB agreement that these resource estimates can be made affordable through a combination of re-prioritisation efforts and the possible use of available lapses from previous years’ Military Budgets, whilst recognising Allies’ commitment to the financial trajectory endorsed at the Madrid Summit. Council also noted the RPPB agreement that the resources needed for the set-up of the permanent CIS infrastructure can also be made affordable. Additional resource advice will be provided to Council to capture potential changes, if any, to JATEC’s funding model. This will be complementary to future political-military assessments and evaluations of JATEC.
22. NATO Integrated Cyber Defence Centre – the NATO Integrated Cyber Defence Centre aims to facilitate civilian-military coordination and cooperation by bringing together NATO, Allied, and industry stakeholders at all times during peace, crisis and conflict. The Council noted the rough order of magnitude cost estimates for 2025 (NSIP EUR 10 million, Military Budget EUR 9.5 million, and Civil Budget EUR 0.5 million) and that the RPPB considered that the currently-defined Phase 1 requirement for the Centre (2024-2025) can be made affordable through a mix of the possible use in 2025 of available lapses from previous years’ Military Budgets and a reprioritisation of the requirements in support of the implementation of DDA and NWCC. As the actual scale of the Centre is to be determined by the February 2025 Defence Ministerial Meeting and the resource estimates to be refined by then, the RPPB will update its initial resource advice in time for that meeting.
New Requirements without specific RPPB Resource Advice
23. NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) Enabler Transition Planning – this is one of the uncertainties included in the Budget Holders’ input to the MTRP and is dependent on military political discussions and decisions that are expected later in 2024. Council has tasked the NATO Military Authorities to expedite planning for self sustainment, but military requirements for this transition are yet to be fully defined. If the need for anticipated self sustainment of NMI materialises, the potential financial impact on the Alliance Operations and Missions Budget for NMI for 2025 could be an increase of up to EUR 18.4 million beyond the currently estimated budget of EUR 28.5 million.
24. NATO Command Structure (NCS) workforce and civilianisation – this is also one of the uncertainties included in the Budget Holders’ input to the MTRP. Since the MTRP submission, the Military Committee has endorsed the uplift of the NCS Peacetime Establishment (PE) Ceiling for a total of up to 10,060 by 2027 (at annual cost of EUR 105.2 million when fully implemented in 2027) and agreed to an approximate civilianisation rate up to 17 percent for Allied Command Operations and 40 percent for Allied Command Transformation as a baseline for further development. The Council and Defence Ministers have approved these recommendations. While exact numbers are subject to further assessment tasked by the Military Committee, the potential financial impact on the Military Budget in 2025 is estimated at EUR 15.8 million, taking into account potential delays in recruitment and onboarding of personnel. The RPPB notes that the resource implications from the civilianisation will impact future budget submissions.
25. Host Nation Support Concept for Collective Defence – this is one of the uncertainties included in the Budget Holders’ input to the MTRP. Since the MTRP submission, the Military Committee has agreed the final concept and the Council and Defence Ministers have approved their recommendations. The projected potential financial impact in 2025 on the NSIP is estimated at EUR 52 million.
26. Enhanced Air Command and Control Capability (eAirC2) – The Council approved the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) recommendations for an open, transparent and rapid process on how to assess available technologies and to deliver an eAirC2 capability, based on an open architecture and the federation of multiple systems. Council approval of the eAirC2 capability, based on recommendations from the CNAD, was further accompanied by the recommendations from the RPPB, the CNAD and the Military Committee to establish a Complex Armaments Programme for this capability. The most recent information available indicates a potential impact of EUR 10 million per year from 2025, associated with the establishment and the running of an eAirC2 ‘independent Programme Office’ (iPO). The Board will provide resource advice before the end of 2024, based on the iPO incremental implementation plan (which is due by 30 October 2024).
27. NATO School Oberammergau Facilities – there is a need to replace the current facilities hosting the support staff due to infrastructure obsolescence, poor health and safety conditions and inadequate fire prevention systems. This requirement was not foreseen as part of the Investment Committee advice and no resource estimates have been made available at this stage pending the estimated submission of an Urgent Requirement, subject to RPPB confirmation of eligibility and a decision by the Investment Committee.
Evaluation of Affordability
28. Taking into account the advice from the Military Committee, the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee, as well as the resource implications from the new requirements, the RPPB has evaluated affordability for the Civil Budget, the NSIP and the Military Budget and recommends the 2025 ceilings and planning and indicative figures as outlined below. The Board stands ready to consider on a case-by-case basis any ceiling increases that may be necessary in 2025 on the basis of advice from the Investment Committee and the Budget Committee.
Civil Budget Evaluation of Affordability
29. The RPPB recommends a total Civil Budget contribution ceiling of EUR 462.5 million in 2025, noting the planning figure of EUR 518.2 million for 2026 and EUR 660.1 million for 2029, with an indicative figure of EUR 689.3 million for 2030 (planning and indicative figures will be refined in subsequent MTFPs).
NSIP Evaluation of Affordability
30. The RPPB recommends an NSIP ceiling of EUR 1,722.5 million in 2025 in line with the figures corresponding to the Madrid Summit decision on common funding, noting the planning figure of EUR 2,207.5 million for 2026 and EUR 4,580.0 million for 2029, with an indicative figure of EUR 5,838.2 million for 2030. The Board assesses that although the new NSIP resource requirements have not been included in the Host Nation and Budget Holder submissions, these can be accommodated within the recommended ceiling for 2025, recognising that requirements will be subject to further refinement, validation and prioritisation.
Military Budget Evaluation of Affordability
31. The RPPB recommends a Military Budget ceiling of EUR 2,317.7 million in 2025, in line with the figures corresponding to the Madrid Summit decision on common funding. The RPPB recommends that Council note the planning figure of EUR 2,773.5 million for 2026 and EUR 3,631.9 million for 2029, with an indicative figure of EUR 4,664.5 million for 2030 (planning and indicative figures will be refined in subsequent MTRPs).
32. The recommended ceilings for the Military and Civil Budgets will enable the preparation and detailed screening of the 2025 annual estimates, which will be submitted to Council for approval by the end of 2024.
Ensuring the effective use of common funding
33. Transparency, accountability, management performance and efficiency are the fundamental principles of good governance and will remain a focus of RPPB attention towards ensuring the effective use of common funding:
34. In March of this year, Council has noted the RPPB status update on the broader efforts taken towards implementation of additional measures for enhancing transparency, accountability, management performance, and long-term efficiencies in common funding. In response to a Vilnius Summit tasking, the RPPB is discussing an Accountability and Performance Framework and a Performance Management Approach. The Accountability and Performance Framework is based on five core principles driven from international best practices. The Performance Management Approach seeks to analyse and report on the delivery status and performance of military common-funded capabilities and activities and aims to improve visibility and transparency of military common funding resources used at NATO.
2.
Elimination of Arch-Terrorist Mohammed Deif Reportedly Confirmed
Deif had been targeted in an Israeli strike two weeks ago, but his death had not been confirmed with absolute certainty.
By Ben Rappaport, United with Israel
After years of Israeli attempts to eliminate the arch-terrorist Mohammed Deif, head of Hamas’ so-called military wing, it has reportedly been confirmed that Deif has, indeed, finally been eliminated, Israel’s Channel 14 said on Sunday.
Two weeks ago, Israel targeted two senior Hamas officials: Deif, and the “Head of the Khan Younis Brigade,” Rafa Salameh, considered Deif’s right-hand man.
While Hamas acknowledged that Salameh had been eliminated, the terror group claimed that Deif was still alive.
Indeed, while discussing the matter at press conferences, Prime Minister Netanyahu had emphasized that the elimination of Deif could not be confirmed with absolute certainty.
According to Channel 14, however, the IDF has confirmed that Deif was, indeed, eliminated in the Israeli strike, though the report did not elaborate on how the elimination was confirmed.
Over the years, Deif had survived many Israeli attempts on his life, including attempts in 2001, 2002, 2006, 2014, and 2021.
3.
After 200 attacks, Israel strikes back at Yemen causing massive explosions
By Vered Weiss, World Israel News
On Saturday, the Israeli air force struck strategic targets in Yemen to retaliate for the Iran-backed Houthis’ drone attack on Tel Aviv on Friday that killed one and injured 10.
This is the first time Israel has struck inside Yemen despite 200 missiles and drones the Houthis have fired at Israel since October 7th.
Israel’s air force struck a gas and oil depot and a power station used for military purposes at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah.
The Houthis control the port, which is a significant supply route through which it receives weapons from Iran.
Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, the Israeli military spokesman, said the operation was “one of the farthest and longest ever conducted by the Israeli air force.”
Nasruddin Amer, a Houthi spokesman, vowed to continue attacks against Israel, which he says were motivated by support for Palestinians during the war in Gaza.
“Yemen’s operations in support of Gaza will not stop,” he vowed. “The response to this aggression is inevitable.”
Israeli’s military said it was not tightening its emergency regulations following the attack in Yemen, which indicates that it doesn’t expect the strikes would escalate, as reported by The New York Times.
The US National Security Council said in a statement, “We fully recognize and acknowledge Israel’s right to self-defense.”
The strikes on gas and oil depots caused massive explosions and fires across the area.
“The fire burning in Hodeidah is seen across the Middle East, and the significance is clear,” Yoav Gallant, the Israeli defense minister, said after the attack.
“The Houthis attacked us over 200 times. The first time that they harmed an Israeli citizen, we struck them — and we will do this wherever it may be required,” he added.
On Friday, the Houthi’s drone attack occurred at 3:12 am on Ben Yehuda Street in Tel Aviv, close to the US embassy.
One man in his 50s was declared dead when Magen Dovid Adom arrived on the scene and ten others were treated for shrapnel wounds and burns.
4.
Israeli Security Thwarts ‘Significant Attack’ Planned by Hamas Operatives in Turkey
Security forces uncover terror plot involving students from Birzeit University in Samaria, acting on directives from Hamas leadership in Turkey.
By Israel Hayom via JNS
Security forces have foiled a significant terrorist plot orchestrated by Hamas operatives in Turkey and involving students from Birzeit University in Samaria.
The operation, a collaborative effort of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), IDF and a specialized police unit, led to the arrest of several suspects and the seizure of weapons and funds earmarked for the attack.
The cell, operating under the banner of “Kutla Islamiya,” was in the advanced stages of planning a major attack when it was uncovered. Intelligence gathered by the Shin Bet indicates that the suspects were acting on directives from Hamas leadership in Turkey, with the ultimate goal of establishing a foothold for Hamas operations against Israeli targets.
A resident of a village in the Binyamin region of Samaria is suspected of leading the cell. He allegedly recruited a “military” unit of activists from Birzeit University in Ramallah.
According to the investigation, the suspected leader used connections with another activist, a student from Ramallah studying at Al-Quds University, to establish communication channels with the Hamas command in Turkey. These connections were reportedly used to secure funding for weapons acquisition and to facilitate the planned attack.
As the investigation unfolded, all cell members involved in the attack planning were swiftly arrested by Israeli police. The security operation also led to the surrender of an M16 rifle and the confiscation of tens of thousands of dollars, which had been funneled from the Hamas command in Turkey to finance the plot.
The evidence collected during the investigation has been handed over to the military prosecution for review and possible indictment.
Earlier this year, Israeli authorities thwarted a large-scale suicide bombing attack planned by Hamas’s terrorist headquarters in Turkey, the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) revealed in June.
The agency said its forces captured Anas Shurman—a Palestinian originally from Tulkarem who lives in Jordan—during a March 15 raid in the central Samaria terrorist stronghold of Nablus (Shechem).
Interrogations revealed that three months earlier, Shurman was recruited to carry out a suicide bombing by Hamas terrorist Imad Abid, an operative living in Turkey who was born in Judea and Samaria.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long harbored members of Hamas. In 2022, the terrorist organization marked the 10th anniversary of the official establishment of its offices in Istanbul.
The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, in a 2021 report, said that Hamas’s headquarters in Istanbul has directed hundreds of terrorist attacks against Israelis and laundered millions of dollars.
In April, Ankara invited Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s “political” bureau, to stay in the country, praising him as a “leader of the Palestinian struggle.”
5.
The speech will mark the fourth time the Israeli premier has addressed the legislatures, a record for a foreign leader.
By JNS
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet with U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington on Tuesday afternoon, Jerusalem confirmed on Sunday.
The Prime Minister’s Office said that Netanyahu would therefore depart for the United States on Monday morning.
Concerns had been raised that Biden’s COVID-19 diagnosis might force the cancellation of the meeting, which reportedly was initially scheduled for Monday at the White House.
Netanyahu is set to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress on July 24.
The Washington meeting will be the first time Biden has hosted Netanyahu at the White House since the longtime Israeli leader returned to office following the Jewish state’s 2022 election.
The two men did meet in the U.S. in September, but Biden chose to hold the sit-down with Netanyahu on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly’s annual session in New York.
They also met in October, when Biden visited the Jewish state in the aftermath of Hamas’s massacre of 1,200 people in southern Israel.
Netanyahu will address a joint session of Congress on Wednesday, at the invitation of House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.), House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.), Senate Majority leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.).
The speech will mark the fourth time the Israeli premier has addressed the legislatures, a record for a foreign leader.
The invite “symbolizes the U.S. and Israel’s enduring relationship and will offer Prime Minister Netanyahu the opportunity to share the Israeli government’s vision for defending their democracy, combating terror, and establishing just and lasting peace in the region,” the four American lawmakers said.
6.
Η CIA και η MOSSAD ήρθαν στο πεδίο
- 04.07.2024
Όλα ξεκίνησαν όταν ο Πρόεδρος της Συρίας Μπασάρ Άσαντ είπε : «Η Συρία είναι θετική για την εξομάλυνση των σχέσεων με την Τουρκία, εάν αυτή η διαδικασία βασίζεται στον σεβασμό της κυριαρχίας της και στην επιθυμία να αποκατασταθεί η κυριαρχία του συριακού κράτους σε ολόκληρη την επικράτεια. η χώρα . “
Συνειδητοποιώντας ότι το Ιράν του είχε στήσει παγίδα και οι προτάσεις του Πούτιν για βελτίωση των σχέσεων με την Τουρκία λόγω των εξελίξεων που προέκυψαν από τη συγκυρία, φυσικά, ώθησαν τον Άσαντ σε αυτή τη δήλωση.
Οι δηλώσεις αυτές αποτυπώθηκαν γρήγορα στην Τουρκία, καθώς έδειχναν ξεκάθαρα ότι θα τηρηθούν οι κόκκινες γραμμές της Τουρκίας και ότι δεν θα επιτρεπόταν να δημιουργηθεί «Τρομοκράτης», όπως την αποκάλεσε ο Ερντογάν, στη βόρεια Συρία.
Πριν συνεχίσω το θέμα σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, θα ήθελα να τονίσω ότι η ένταση «Ιράν-Συρία» που επεσήμανα παραπάνω δεν είναι απλώς μια φήμη, γιατί τα νέα που έχω δώσει παρακάτω είναι από χθεσινή δήλωση πηγών κοντά στη συριακή διοίκηση. …
Η είδηση έχει ως εξής:
Ένταση μεταξύ του καθεστώτος Άσαντ και του Ιράν:
Οι ιρανικές πληροφορίες έκαναν έφοδο στο Προεδρικό Μέγαρο της Συρίας. Απήγαγε πολλούς υψηλόβαθμους Σύρους στρατιώτες.
️Ο Άσαντ εκτελέστηκε χτυπώντας το αυτοκίνητο της Λούνα Σιμπίλ, της ειδικής συμβούλου του Άσαντ και εκπροσώπου των μέσων ενημέρωσης, με θωρακισμένο όχημα. Η κατάστασή του είναι σοβαρή.
Η υπηρεσία πληροφοριών της Quds Force είχε συλλάβει τον αδελφό της Luna Şibil, ταξίαρχο Mulhem Şibil, μια εβδομάδα πριν από αυτό το περιστατικό.
Αυτή η πραγματικά ενδιαφέρουσα και σημαντική είδηση πρέπει να σημειωθεί και οι μετέπειτα εξελίξεις θα πρέπει να αξιολογηθούν υπό το πρίσμα αυτού του περιστατικού.
Πριν συνεχίσω το θέμα, θα ήθελα να παραθέσω εν συντομία ένα άρθρο που έγραψα για την εφημερίδα Diriliş Postası στις 9 Ιανουαρίου 2023.
Το σχετικό μέρος του άρθρου με τίτλο ‘Timed trap’ έχει ως εξής…
«Οι εξελίξεις δείχνουν ότι στο εγγύς μέλλον, ο Ερντογάν, ο Πούτιν και ο Άσαντ θα συναντηθούν.
Οι διαπραγματεύσεις, που ξεκίνησαν με ειδικό αίτημα του Πούτιν και προηγουμένως είχαν πραγματοποιηθεί στο κατώτερο επίπεδο, έφτασαν στο στάδιο της διυπουργικής συνάντησης. (…)
Η Αμερική είναι σθεναρά ενάντια σε αυτές τις εξελίξεις…
Όπως είναι φυσικό, θέλουν το πρόβλημα να παραμείνει άλυτο και το χάος να συνεχιστεί, γιατί το αδιέξοδο στη Συρία είναι το μόνο μέσο που θα εξασφαλίσει την επιβίωση του YPG (PKK), το οποίο χρησιμοποιούν ως «χερσαία δύναμη» τους…
Είναι σαφές ότι η συνεχιζόμενη ενίσχυση της ύπαρξης του YPG αποτελεί σοβαρή απειλή και κίνδυνο για την Τουρκία. Για το λόγο αυτό, είναι απολύτως κατανοητό ότι η Τουρκία έχει θετική προσέγγιση στις συνομιλίες.
Η συνάντηση του Ερντογάν με τον Άσαντ δεν θα αλλάξει το γεγονός ότι ο Άσαντ είναι ο δολοφόνος 500.000 αθώων.
Όπως ακριβώς η συνάντησή του με τον Μπάιντεν δεν αλλάζει το γεγονός ότι η Αμερική είναι ο δολοφόνος εκατομμυρίων ανθρώπων…
«Φυσικά, είναι τουλάχιστον εξίσου φυσιολογικό για τον Ερντογάν να συναντά τον Άσαντ με τις ίδιες σκέψεις όπως είναι να συναντά τον Μπάιντεν».
Ναι, το γεγονός που είχαμε προβλέψει πριν από ενάμιση χρόνο πρόκειται να συμβεί…
Μάλιστα, μετά τη δήλωση του Άσαντ που παραθέσαμε στην αρχή του άρθρου, ο κ. Πρόεδρος έκανε και μια παρόμοια δήλωση.
«Ακριβώς όπως έχουμε ενεργήσει μαζί στο παρελθόν για να βελτιώσουμε τις σχέσεις μας με τη Συρία, θα το κάνουμε ξανά. Ο συριακός λαός είναι μια κοινότητα στην οποία ζούμε ως αδέρφια. Όπως γνωρίζετε, κρατήσαμε ζωντανές τις σχέσεις μας με τη Συρία, είχαμε αυτές τις συναντήσεις με τον κ. Άσαντ, μπορούμε να ξανασυναντηθούμε αύριο. «Δεν έχουμε καμία πρόθεση να παρέμβουμε στις εσωτερικές υποθέσεις της Συρίας».
Αυτή η δήλωση του Ερντογάν ήταν μια εγγύηση για να αμβλυνθούν οι ανησυχίες του Άσαντ, αλλά έδειξε επίσης τη σημασία που δίνεται στη συνεργασία σε αυτό το θέμα.
Τα ‘όλα’ που χρησιμοποιήσαμε στην αρχή του άρθρου ξεκίνησαν μετά από αυτές τις εξελίξεις.
Ο λόγος για τον οποίο αναφέρθηκα σε ένα άρθρο παραπάνω είναι λόγω αυτού του «όλα», δυστυχώς…
Όπως είχαμε προβλέψει εκεί, μια τέτοια εξέλιξη θα ενοχλούσε σοβαρά τις ΗΠΑ (και φυσικά το Ισραήλ) και θα χρησιμοποιούσαν κάθε μέσο για να το σταματήσουν.
Στην πραγματικότητα, συνέβη.
Πρώτα, τραγικά γεγονότα συνέβησαν στην Καισέρι.
Συνεργατικά στρατεύματα που εργάζονταν για λογαριασμό της CIA και της MOSSAD μεταφέρθηκαν στη σκηνή με φορτηγά και δημιουργήθηκε ένα περιβάλλον χάους.
Στη συνέχεια, στη Συρία, στην Αμερική. Μπήκαν οι στρατιώτες που ονομάζονταν «μαύρος στρατός μας» και η τουρκική σημαία κατέβηκε, έγιναν προκλήσεις για τον τερματισμό των σχέσεων Τουρκίας-Συρίας πριν καν αρχίσουν.
Αυτοί οι ανίδεοι άνθρωποι που είναι πολύ τυφλοί για να δουν ότι η CIA και η MOSSAD είναι ανοιχτά στο πεδίο, γνωρίζουν πολύ καλά ότι δεν έχουν άλλο τρόπο από το να εκμεταλλευτούν τα ειλικρινή συναισθήματα του λαού.
Εφόσον γνώριζαν ότι η Τουρκία δεν μπορούσε να σταματήσει με κανέναν άλλο τρόπο εκτός από αυτό και παρόμοια περιστατικά, τροφοδότησαν τη φωτιά της διχόνοιας σε βάρος της εκτίμησής τους.
Φαίνεται ότι τα πράγματα είναι υπό έλεγχο, τουλάχιστον προς το παρόν.
Ωστόσο, αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι παρόμοιες εξεγερτικές επιχειρήσεις δεν θα πραγματοποιηθούν στο μέλλον.
Δεν μπορούμε ποτέ να υποτιμήσουμε αυτό το επίκεντρο της διχόνοιας που φέρνει κοντά μέλη του PKK και εθνικιστές/κεμαλιστές για τον ίδιο σκοπό!
Γι’ αυτό πρέπει να είμαστε όσο το δυνατόν πιο προσεκτικοί και σε εγρήγορση.
Πρέπει να υπενθυμίσουμε σε όλους ότι κανένας λόγος που μας δόθηκε δεν θα μας επιτρέψει να εισέλθουμε στη δικαιοδοσία και την κυριαρχία του κράτους.
Για το λόγο αυτό, θα ήθελα να υπενθυμίσω σε όσους εμπλέκονται στα γεγονότα για λόγους «εθνικισμού».
Πριν από το πραξικόπημα του 1980 (αν δεν κάνω λάθος ήταν το 1978), το MHP συνειδητοποίησε ότι τρομοκρατικά επεισόδια είχαν παραχθεί από κάποια κέντρα εξέγερσης και διέταξε όλες τις οργανώσεις του να χρησιμοποιούν συνεχώς το ακόλουθο σύνθημα…
«Αυτός που λέει πυροβολήστε είναι προδότης, προκλητικός πράκτορας!…»
Ναι, δεν υπάρχει αμφιβολία ότι σήμερα εξακολουθεί να είναι ένας προδότης, προκλητικός πράκτορας που λέει “πυροβολήστε!”
Nihat Nasır / Haber7
7. 03-07-2024
Ρωσία: Ο Ερντογάν δεν είναι πιθανός μεσολαβητής στην Ουκρανία
Ο εκπρόσωπος του Κρεμλίνου Πεσκόφ είπε ότι ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία συζητήθηκε επίσης κατά τη συνάντηση Ερντογάν-Πούτιν που πραγματοποιήθηκε στην Αστάνα τις προάλλες. Ο Πεσκόφ δήλωσε ότι ο Ερντογάν δεν είναι πιθανός διαμεσολαβητής στις συνομιλίες με την Ουκρανία.
8.
Τί μας είπε η κρίση στον κυβερνοχώρο;
H. AKIF KÜÇÜKAL
HABER7 ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΑΣ
20.07.2024
” Έχουμε βιώσει τη μεγαλύτερη διαταραχή στην τεχνολογία των πληροφοριών στην ιστορία του κόσμου .” Αυτή η δήλωση ανήκει στον επίσημο Troy Hunt της Microsoft.
Την Παρασκευή, γίναμε μάρτυρες μιας εξαιρετικής εξέλιξης που είχε τον αντίκτυπό της σε όλο τον κόσμο. Όπως είπε ο Hunt, συνέβη η μεγαλύτερη κρίση πληροφορικής στην ιστορία. Οι υπολογιστές έχουν κολλήσει στην οθόνη ανάκτησης που είναι γνωστή ως “μπλε οθόνη”. Η φόρτωση των Windows απέτυχε.
Το σφάλμα προκλήθηκε από τη νέα ενημέρωση αισθητήρα του συστήματος ασφάλειας στον κυβερνοχώρο που ονομάζεται CrowdStrike. Ωστόσο, το σφάλμα ήταν τόσο αποτελεσματικό που προκάλεσε κατάρρευση σε όλους σχεδόν τους τομείς, από τις μεταφορές μέχρι τα οικονομικά, από τα μέσα ενημέρωσης μέχρι την υγεία. Επειδή ο κόσμος ήταν πλέον εκτός σύνδεσης.
Το πιο προφανές πρόβλημα παρουσιάστηκε στα αεροδρόμια. Οι πτήσεις διακόπηκαν. Δεν ήταν δυνατός ο έλεγχος των εισιτηρίων. Στην Ινδία, οι κάρτες επιβίβασης παραδόθηκαν στους επιβάτες χειρόγραφες. Σε άλλα σημεία είδαμε πληροφορίες πτήσης γραμμένες σε μαυροπίνακες με μολύβια.
Στην Αμερική τα νοσοκομεία έκαναν μόνο επείγουσες χειρουργικές επεμβάσεις. Στην Αγγλία, οι γιατροί δεν μπορούσαν να έχουν πρόσβαση στα αρχεία ασθενών και οι ασθενείς δεν μπορούσαν να κλείσουν ραντεβού. Η οθόνη μαύρισε στη βρετανική και τη γαλλική τηλεόραση. Δεν υπήρχε εκπομπή για λίγες ώρες. Όταν έφτασε το βίντεο, είδαμε εκπομπές να πραγματοποιούνται με περιορισμένους πόρους.
Το Χρηματιστήριο του Λονδίνου δεν μπόρεσε να διαπραγματευτεί. Η Τράπεζα του Ισραήλ είναι εκτός δράσης. Τα ΑΤΜ δεν λειτουργούσαν και υπήρχε κρίση μετρητών και μεταφορών. Η κρίση έγινε αισθητή σε διάφορες γεωγραφίες του κόσμου όπως οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, η Ευρώπη, η Αυστραλία και η Ινδία.
Η ΡΩΣΙΑ ΚΑΙ Η ΚΙΝΑ ΕΛΑΒΑΝ ΠΡΟΦΥΛΑΞΕΙΣ!
Το πρόβλημα εντοπίστηκε μέσα σε λίγες ώρες και δόθηκε μια επιδιόρθωση. Ωστόσο, αυτό που συνέβη αποκάλυψε πόσο ο κόσμος μας που περιβάλλεται από δίκτυα στον κυβερνοχώρο χρειάζεται μονοπωλιακές εταιρείες λογισμικού.
Οι δύο χώρες με τις οποίες οι ΗΠΑ είναι σε παγκόσμιο ανταγωνισμό είναι η Ρωσία και η Κίνα και οι δύο έκαναν εγχώριες κινήσεις λογισμικού το 2019. Ο νόμος που υπέγραψε ο Ρώσος Πρόεδρος Πούτιν κατέστησε υποχρεωτική τη χρήση εγχώριου λογισμικού σε τεχνολογικές συσκευές. Εγκρίθηκε ο νόμος για την απαγόρευση της πώλησης smartphone και υπολογιστών που δεν διαθέτουν ρωσικό λογισμικό. Ο νόμος τέθηκε σε ισχύ την 1η Ιουλίου 2020.
Στην πραγματικότητα, το πρώτο σχόλιο από τη Ρωσία τις πρώτες ώρες του φιάσκου της Microsoft αφορούσε τη σημασία του εγχώριου λογισμικού. Το Υπουργείο Ψηφιακής Ανάπτυξης της Ρωσίας δήλωσε: «Οι εξελίξεις σχετικά με τη Microsoft δείχνουν τη σημασία της χρήσης εγχώριου λογισμικού αντί ξένου λογισμικού σε εγκαταστάσεις υποδομής ζωτικής σημασίας». Τονίστηκε ότι δεν υπήρξε αναστάτωση στα αεροδρόμια ή στις τραπεζικές δραστηριότητες.
Υπάρχει παρόμοια κατάσταση στην Κίνα. Το 2019, η χρήση ξένου τεχνολογικού υλικού και λογισμικού απαγορεύτηκε σε κυβερνητικούς και δημόσιους φορείς. Σε ιδρύματα και οργανισμούς παραχωρήθηκε το δικαίωμα για 3 χρόνια. Αυτή η εφαρμογή ήταν ένα σημαντικό πλήγμα για τις αμερικανικές πολυεθνικές εταιρείες όπως η Microsoft, η HP και η Dell. Αξίζει επίσης να θυμηθούμε ότι κατά τη διάρκεια της προεδρίας Τραμπ, ο εμπορικός πόλεμος μεταξύ ΗΠΑ και Κίνας κλιμακώθηκε, οι αμερικανικές εταιρείες απαγόρευσαν από τον Λευκό Οίκο να συναλλάσσονται με τον κινεζικό τεχνολογικό κολοσσό Huawei και επιβλήθηκαν σοβαρές κυρώσεις ακόμη και στην Huawei.
ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ ΠΙΘΑΝΟΤΗΤΑ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΘΕΣΗ;
Βρισκόμαστε στις μέρες που οι συζητήσεις για τον Γ’ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο εκφράζονται συχνά – αν και με ανησυχία. Στον 21ο αιώνα, ο κυβερνοπόλεμος είναι, φυσικά, μια από τις πιο αποτελεσματικές φάσεις αυτών των πολεμικών σεναρίων. Η μία μετά την άλλη, ήρθαν δηλώσεις τόσο από την Αμερική, το κύριο κέντρο της κρίσης, όσο και από άλλα μέρη του κόσμου, αναφέροντας ότι αυτό που συνέβη δεν ήταν μια επίθεση στον κυβερνοχώρο. Ωστόσο, υπάρχει η πιθανότητα, αν και χαμηλή, μια εταιρεία κολοσσός όπως η Microsoft να υποβληθεί σε κυβερνοεπίθεση. Επιπλέον, είναι χρήσιμο να υπενθυμίσουμε ότι τα καλώδια που μας συνδέουν με τη ζωή και μας μεταφέρουν στο Διαδίκτυο βρίσκονται σε κατάσταση επιρρεπή σε πρόκληση κάτω από τους ωκεανούς.
Ίσως θα ήταν υπερβολικό συνωμοσιολόγος να αξιολογήσει το περιστατικό που έλαβε χώρα αυτές τις μέρες με τον τίτλο «κυβερνοεπίθεση». Ωστόσο, υπάρχει μια ξεκάθαρη κατάσταση: σε περίπτωση πιθανού πολέμου μεταξύ ανατολής και δύσης αύριο, ο νικητής της μάχης στον κυβερνοχώρο θα είναι ο νικητής του πολέμου.
Η ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΚΙΝΗΣΗΣ ΕΘΝΙΚΗΣ ΤΕΧΝΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ
τρόπος επιβίωσης σε αυτό το σύστημα, όπου σχεδόν όλοι οι τομείς μπορούν να απενεργοποιηθούν με το πάτημα ενός κουμπιού, είναι αναμφίβολα μέσω τοπικού και εθνικού λογισμικού. Οι κυρώσεις κατά της Τουρκίας επέτρεψαν σημαντική πρόοδο στην αμυντική βιομηχανία. Τώρα οι κωδικοί που γράφονται είναι ισοδύναμοι με κουκκίδες. Η Türkiye μείωσε το ποσοστό ξένου λογισμικού, το οποίο ήταν 90 τοις εκατό τα τελευταία 10 χρόνια, στο 60 τοις εκατό. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, έχει διατυπωθεί βούληση και οι προσπάθειες εντοπισμού συνεχίζονται. Ωστόσο, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη το παράδειγμα της Microsoft, είναι απαραίτητο να επιταχυνθεί η εργασία και να προστεθεί εγχώριο λογισμικό μαζί με εγχώρια άμυνα στην πορεία προς την πλήρη ανεξαρτησία.
Akif Küçükal / Ειδήσεις 7
9.
“Καλή Επιτυχία” ευχόμαστε στον Ανχη (ΠΒ) Κον Θεοφάνη ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ, που ανέλαβε προσφάτως την 105 Α/Κ ΜΜΠ, της 3ης Μ/Κ ΤΑΞ! Πολύ δυνατό στέλεχος… Τουρκαλάδες!
10.
«Βάφτηκε ερυθρόλευκο» και το Ναύπλιο για τα ευρωπαϊκά τρόπαια του Θρύλου!
Η προσέλευση ήταν τεράστια, με τον κόσμο του Θρύλου να δημιουργεί φανταστική ατμόσφαιρα. Όλοι στα «ερυθρόλευκα», με πολλές σημαίες, μεταξύ άλλων, δεν σταμάτησαν να τραγουδούν για το μεγαλείο του Ολυμπιακού τόσο συνθήματα, όσο και τον ύμνο της ομάδας.
Στα εντυπωσιακότερα στιγμιότυπα η άφιξη δύο… νεόνυμφων στο Λιμάνι του Ναυπλίου, προκειμένου να φωτογραφηθούν με τις δύο ευρωκούπες!
Επόμενη στάση η Τρίπολη την Δευτέρα 22 Ιουλίου (Πλατεία Άρεως μπροστά από το άγαλμα του Κολοκοτρώνη, 19:30).
Απολαύστε παρακάτω το photostory της επίσκεψης των δύο βαρύτιμων τροπαίων στο Ναύπλιο:
“ΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΑΣ”
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