The Zionist Plan for the Middle East

Translated and edited by

Israel Shahak

The Israel of Theodore Herzl (1904) and of Rabbi Fischmann (1947)

In his Complete Diaries, Vol. II. p. 711, Theodore Herzl, the founder of Zionism, says that the area of the Jewish State stretches: “From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.”

Rabbi Fischmann, member of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared in his testimony to the U.N. Special Committee of Enquiry on 9 July 1947: “The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”

from

Oded Yinon’s

“A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties“

Published by the

Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.

Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982

Special Document No. 1

(ISBN 0-937694-56-8)

Table of Contents

Publisher’s Note

1

The Association of Arab-American University Graduates finds it compelling to inaugurate its new publication series, Special Documents, with Oded Yinon’s article which appeared in Kivunim (Directions), the journal of the Department of Information of the World Zionist Organization. Oded Yinon is an Israeli journalist and was formerly attached to the Foreign Ministry of Israel. To our knowledge, this document is the most explicit, detailed and unambiguous statement to date of the Zionist strategy in the Middle East. Furthermore, it stands as an accurate representation of the “vision” for the entire Middle East of the presently ruling Zionist regime of Begin, Sharon and Eitan. Its importance, hence, lies not in its historical value but in the nightmare which it presents.

2

The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must 1) become an imperial regional power, and 2) must effect the division of the whole area into small states by the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state. Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its source of moral legitimation.

3

This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller units has been a recurrent theme. This theme has been documented on a very modest scale in the AAUG publication, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism (1980), by Livia Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former Prime Minister of Israel, Rokach’s study documents, in convincing detail, the Zionist plan as it applies to Lebanon and as it was prepared in the mid-fifties.

4

The first massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore this plan out to the minutest detail. The second and more barbaric and encompassing Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, aims to effect certain parts of this plan which hopes to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well, in fragments. This ought to make mockery of Israeli public claims regarding their desire for a strong and independent Lebanese central government. More accurately, they want a Lebanese central government that sanctions their regional imperialist designs by signing a peace treaty with them. They also seek acquiescence in their designs by the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and other Arab governments as well as by the Palestinian people. What they want and what they are planning for is not an Arab world, but a world of Arab fragments that is ready to succumb to Israeli hegemony. Hence, Oded Yinon in his essay, “A Strategy for Israel in the 1980’s,” talks about “far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967” that are created by the “very stormy situation [that] surrounds Israel.”

5

The Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from Palestine is very much an active policy, but is pursued more forcefully in times of contlict, such as in the 1947-1948 war and in the 1967 war. An appendix entitled “Israel Talks of a New Exodus” is included in this publication to demonstrate past Zionist dispersals of Palestinians from their homeland and to show, besides the main Zionist document we present, other Zionist planning for the de-Palestinization of Palestine.

6

It is clear from the Kivunim document, published in February, 1982, that the “far-reaching opportunities” of which Zionist strategists have been thinking are the same “opportunities” of which they are trying to convince the world and which they claim were generated by their June, 1982 invasion. It is also clear that the Palestinians were never the sole target of Zionist plans, but the priority target since their viable and independent presence as a people negates the essence of the Zionist state. Every Arab state, however, especially those with cohesive and clear nationalist directions, is a real target sooner or later.

7

Contrasted with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist strategy elucidated in this document, Arab and Palestinian strategy, unfortunately, suffers from ambiguity and incoherence. There is no indication that Arab strategists have internalized the Zionist plan in its full ramifications. Instead, they react with incredulity and shock whenever a new stage of it unfolds. This is apparent in Arab reaction, albeit muted, to the Israeli siege of Beirut. The sad fact is that as long as the Zionist strategy for the Middle East is not taken seriously Arab reaction to any future siege of other Arab capitals will be the same.

Khalil Nakhleh July 23, 1982

Foreward

1

The following essay represents, in my opinion, the accurate and detailed plan of the present Zionist regime (of Sharon and Eitan) for the Middle East which is based on the division of the whole area into small states, and the dissolution of all the existing Arab states. I will comment on the military aspect of this plan in a concluding note. Here I want to draw the attention of the readers to several important points:

2

1. The idea that all the Arab states should be broken down, by Israel, into small units, occurs again and again in Israeli strategic thinking. For example, Ze’ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha’aretz (and probably the most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the “best” that can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq: “The dissolution of Iraq into a Shi’ite state, a Sunni state and the separation of the Kurdish part” (Ha’aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect of the plan is very old.

3

2. The strong connection with Neo-Conservative thought in the USA is very prominent, especially in the author’s notes. But, while lip service is paid to the idea of the “defense of the West” from Soviet power, the real aim of the author, and of the present Israeli establishment is clear: To make an Imperial Israel into a world power. In other words, the aim of Sharon is to deceive the Americans after he has deceived all the rest.

4

3. It is obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the notes and in the text, is garbled or omitted, such as the financial help of the U.S. to Israel. Much of it is pure fantasy. But, the plan is not to be regarded as not influential, or as not capable of realization for a short time. The plan follows faithfully the geopolitical ideas current in Germany of 1890-1933, which were swallowed whole by Hitler and the Nazi movement, and determined their aims for East Europe. Those aims, especially the division of the existing states, were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on the global scale prevented their consolidation for a period of time.

5

The notes by the author follow the text. To avoid confusion, I did not add any notes of my own, but have put the substance of them into this foreward and the conclusion at the end. I have, however, emphasized some portions of the text.

Israel Shahak June 13, 1982

A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties

by Oded Yinon

This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM (Directions), A Journal for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No, 14–Winter, 5742, February 1982, Editor: Yoram Beck. Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari, Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid. Published by the Department of Publicity/The World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem.

1

At the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in need of a new perspective as to its place, its aims and national targets, at home and abroad. This need has become even more vital due to a number of central processes which the country, the region and the world are undergoing. We are living today in the early stages of a new epoch in human history which is not at all similar to its predecessor, and its characteristics are totally different from what we have hitherto known. That is why we need an understanding of the central processes which typify this historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other hand we need a world outlook and an operational strategy in accordance with the new conditions. The existence, prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend upon its ability to adopt a new framework for its domestic and foreign affairs.

2

This epoch is characterized by several traits which we can already diagnose, and which symbolize a genuine revolution in our present lifestyle. The dominant process is the breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook as the major cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of Western civilization since the Renaissance. The political, social and economic views which have emanated from this foundation have been based on several “truths” which are presently disappearing–for example, the view that man as an individual is the center of the universe and everything exists in order to fulfill his basic material needs. This position is being invalidated in the present when it has become clear that the amount of resources in the cosmos does not meet Man’s requirements, his economic needs or his demographic constraints. In a world in which there are four billion human beings and economic and energy resources which do not grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main requirement of Western Society,¹ i.e., the wish and aspiration for boundless consumption. The view that ethics plays no part in determining the direction Man takes, but rather his material needs do–that view is becoming prevalent today as we see a world in which nearly all values are disappearing. We are losing the ability to assess the simplest things, especially when they concern the simple question of what is Good and what is Evil.

3

The vision of man’s limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in the face of the sad facts of life, when we witness the break-up of world order around us. The view which promises liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in light of the sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives under totalitarian regimes. The views concerning equality and social justice have been transformed by socialism and especially by Communism into a laughing stock. There is no argument as to the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear that they have not been put into practice properly and the majority of mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom and the opportunity for equality and justice. In this nuclear world in which we are (still) living in relative peace for thirty years, the concept of peace and coexistence among nations has no meaning when a superpower like the USSR holds a military and political doctrine of the sort it has: that not only is a nuclear war possible and necessary in order to achieve the ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to survive after it, not to speak of the fact that one can be victorious in it.²

4

The essential concepts of human society, especially those of the West, are undergoing a change due to political, military and economic transformations. Thus, the nuclear and conventional might of the USSR has transformed the epoch that has just ended into the last respite before the great saga that will demolish a large part of our world in a multi-dimensional global war, in comparison with which the past world wars will have been mere child’s play. The power of nuclear as well as of conventional weapons, their quantity, their precision and quality will turn most of our world upside down within a few years, and we must align ourselves so as to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main threat to our existence and that of the Western world.³ The war over resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the Third World, are transforming the world we know, given that one of the major aims of the USSR is to defeat the West by gaining control over the gigantic resources in the Persian Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in which the majority of world minerals are located. We can imagine the dimensions of the global confrontation which will face us in the future.

5

The Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans and mineral rich areas of the Third World. That together with the present Soviet nuclear doctrine which holds that it is possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear war, in the course of which the West’s military might well be destroyed and its inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-Leninism, is the main danger to world peace and to our own existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have transformed Clausewitz’ dictum into “War is the continuation of policy in nuclear means,” and made it the motto which guides all their policies. Already today they are busy carrying out their aims in our region and throughout the world, and the need to face them becomes the major element in our country’s security policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World. That is our major foreign challenge.⁴

6

The Arab Moslem world, therefore, is not the major strategic problem which we shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact that it carries the main threat against Israel, due to its growing military might. This world, with its ethnic minorities, its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly selfdestructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and now also in Syria, is unable to deal successfully with its fundamental problems and does not therefore constitute a real threat against the State of Israel in the long run, but only in the short run where its immediate military power has great import. In the long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present framework in the areas around us without having to go through genuine revolutionary changes. The Moslem Arab World is built like a temporary house of cards put together by foreigners (France and Britain in the Nineteen Twenties), without the wishes and desires of the inhabitants having been taken into account. It was arbitrarily divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of minorites and ethnic groups which are hostile to one another, so that every Arab Moslem state nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within, and in some a civil war is already raging.⁵ Most of the Arabs, 118 million out of 170 million, live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million today).

7

Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is already a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains between the two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam endangers the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars which are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country which is sparsely populated and which cannot become a powerful nation. That is why he has been attempting unifications in the past with states that are more genuine, like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in the Arab Moslem world today is built upon four groups hostile to each other, an Arab Moslem Sunni minority which rules over a majority of non-Arab Africans, Pagans, and Christians. In Egypt there is a Sunni Moslem majority facing a large minority of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt: some 7 million of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a state of their own, something like a “second” Christian Lebanon in Egypt.

8

All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up and riddled with inner conflict even more than those of the Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no different from Lebanon except in the strong military regime which rules it. But the real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni majority and the Shi’ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of the population) testifies to the severity of the domestic trouble.

9

Iraq is, once again, no different in essence from its neighbors, although its majority is Shi’ite and the ruling minority Sunni. Sixty-five percent of the population has no say in politics, in which an elite of 20 percent holds the power. In addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the north, and if it weren’t for the strength of the ruling regime, the army and the oil revenues, Iraq’s future state would be no different than that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria today. The seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent today already, especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader whom the Shi’ites in Iraq view as their natural leader.

10

All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a delicate house of sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait, the Kuwaitis constitute only a quarter of the population. In Bahrain, the Shi’ites are the majority but are deprived of power. In the UAE, Shi’ites are once again the majority but the Sunnis are in power. The same is true of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the Marxist South Yemen there is a sizable Shi’ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half the population is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds power.

11

Jordan is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin minority, but most of the army and certainly the bureaucracy is now Palestinian. As a matter of fact Amman is as Palestinian as Nablus. All of these countries have powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there is a problem there too. The Syrian army today is mostly Sunni with an Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi’ite with Sunni commanders. This has great significance in the long run, and that is why it will not be possible to retain the loyalty of the army for a long time except where it comes to the only common denominator: The hostility towards Israel, and today even that is insufficient.

12

Alongside the Arabs, split as they are, the other Moslem states share a similar predicament. Half of Iran’s population is comprised of a Persian speaking group and the other half of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey’s population comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and two large minorities, 12 million Shi’ite Alawis and 6 million Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5 million Shi’ites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni Pakistan there are 15 million Shi’ites who endanger the existence of that state.

13

This national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco to India and from Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of stability and a rapid degeneration in the entire region. When this picture is added to the economic one, we see how the entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to withstand its severe problems.

14

In this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a huge mass of poor people. Most of the Arabs have an average yearly income of 300 dollars. That is the situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries except for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy is falling to pieces. It is a state in which there is no centralized power, but only 5 de facto sovereign authorities (Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians and under the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct Syrian conquest, in the center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the south and up to the Litani river a mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO and Major Haddad’s state of Christians and half a million Shi’ites). Syria is in an even graver situation and even the assistance she will obtain in the future after the unification with Libya will not be sufficient for dealing with the basic problems of existence and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is in the worst situation: Millions are on the verge of hunger, half the labor force is unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most densely populated area of the world. Except for the army, there is not a single department operating efficiently and the state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends entirely on American foreign assistance granted since the peace.⁶

15

In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the largest accumulation of money and oil in the world, but those enjoying it are tiny elites who lack a wide base of support and self-confidence, something that no army can guarantee.⁷ The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot defend the regime from real dangers at home or abroad, and what took place in Mecca in 1980 is only an example. A sad and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and creates challenges for it, problems, risks but also farreaching opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are that opportunities missed at that time will become achievable in the Eighties to an extent and along dimensions which we cannot even imagine today.

16

The “peace” policy and the return of territories, through a dependence upon the US, precludes the realization of the new option created for us. Since 1967, all the governments of Israel have tied our national aims down to narrow political needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive opinions at home which neutralized our capacities both at home and abroad. Failing to take steps towards the Arab population in the new territories, acquired in the course of a war forced upon us, is the major strategic error committed by Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have saved ourselves all the bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had given Jordan to the Palestinians who live west of the Jordan river. By doing that we would have neutralized the Palestinian problem which we nowadays face, and to which we have found solutions that are really no solutions at all, such as territorial compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the same thing.⁸ Today, we suddenly face immense opportunities for transforming the situation thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade, otherwise we shall not survive as a state.

17

In the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have to go through far-reaching changes in its political and economic regime domestically, along with radical changes in its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the global and regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez Canal oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which is geomorphologically identical to the rich oil-producing countries in the region, will result in an energy drain in the near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our present GNP as well as one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil.⁹ The search for raw materials in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the near future, serve to alter that state of affairs.

18

(Regaining) the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources is therefore a political priority which is obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements. The fault for that lies of course with the present Israeli government and the governments which paved the road to the policy of territorial compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians will not need to keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and to the USSR in order to gain support and military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only for a short while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without oil and the income from it, with the present enormous expenditure, we will not be able to get through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to act in order to return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai prior to Sadat’s visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in March 1979.¹⁰

19

Israel has two major routes through which to realize this purpose, one direct and the other indirect. The direct option is the less realistic one because of the nature of the regime and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to the war of 1973, his major achievement since he took power. Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short history. What is left therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its panArab policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and energy reserve for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it could be driven back to the post 1967 war situation in no more than one day.¹¹

20

The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was demolished back in 1956 and definitely did not survive 1967, but our policy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to turn the myth into “fact.” In reality, however, Egypt’s power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab World has gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is no longer the leading political power in the Arab World and is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign assistance the crisis will come tomorrow.¹² In the short run, due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until 1982, and that will not change the balance of power to its benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in its present domestic political picture, is already a corpse, all the more so if we take into account the growing Moslem-Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.

21

Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt falls apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant states will not continue to exist in their present form and will join the downfall and dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt alongside a number of weak states with very localized power and without a centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical development which was only set back by the peace agreement but which seems inevitable in the long run.¹³

22

The Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is in fact less complicated than the Eastern front, in which most of the events that make the headlines have been taking place recently. Lebanon’s total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unqiue areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel’s primary target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of those states serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so that there will be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach today.¹⁴

23

Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. Its dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi’ite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this polarization.¹⁵

24

The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to internal and external pressures, and the matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of whether its economic might based on oil remains intact or whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and breakdowns are a clear and natural development in light of the present political structure.¹⁶

25

Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real threat in the long run after its dissolution, the termination of the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.

26

There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present structure for a long time, and Israel’s policy, both in war and in peace, ought to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power to the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the river will also cause the termination of the problem of the territories densely populated with Arabs west of the Jordan. Whether in war or under conditions of peace, emigrationfrom the territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the river, and we ought to be active in order to accelerate this process in the nearest future. The autonomy plan ought also to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the territories for, given the plans of the PLO and those of the Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa’amr plan of September 1980, it is not possible to go on living in this country in the present situation without separating the two nations, the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of the river. Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the land only when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between the Jordan and the sea they will have neither existence nor security. A nation of their own and security will be theirs only in Jordan.¹⁷

27

Within Israel the distinction between the areas of ’67 and the territories beyond them, those of ’48, has always been meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any significance for us. The problem should be seen in its entirety without any divisions as of ’67. It should be clear, under any future political situation or mifitary constellation, that the solution of the problem of the indigenous Arabs will come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch which we shall soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with three fourths of the Jewish population on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.

28

Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our sole guarantee for national existence, and if we do not become the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the country and we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not theirs anyhow, and in which they were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country demographically, strategically and economically is the highest and most central aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is the national aim generated by the major strategic consideration which is settling the mountainous part of the country that is empty of Jews today.^l8

29

Realizing our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the realization of this internal strategic objective. The transformation of the political and economic structure, so as to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is the key to achieving the entire change. We need to change from a centralized economy in which the government is extensively involved, to an open and free market as well as to switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with our own hands, of a genuine productive economic infrastructure. If we are not able to make this change freely and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by world developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, and politics, and by our own growing isolation.^l9

30

From a military and strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S. is unable to withstand the global pressures of the USSR throughout the world, and Israel must therefore stand alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance, military or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no compromises.²⁰ Rapid changes in the world will also bring about a change in the condition of world Jewry to which Israel will become not only a last resort but the only existential option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews, and the communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to exist in the present form in the future.²¹

31

Our existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no force that could remove us from here either forcefully or by treachery (Sadat’s method). Despite the difficulties of the mistaken “peace” policy and the problem of the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these problems in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

1

Three important points have to be clarified in order to be able to understand the significant possibilities of realization of this Zionist plan for the Middle East, and also why it had to be published.

2

The Military Background of The Plan

The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above, but on the many occasions where something very like it is being “explained” in closed meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment, this point is clarified. It is assumed that the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide territories as discussed above. In fact, even in times of intense Palestinian “unrest” on the West Bank, the forces of the Israeli Army are stretched out too much. The answer to that is the method of ruling by means of “Haddad forces” or of “Village Associations” (also known as “Village Leagues”): local forces under “leaders” completely dissociated from the population, not having even any feudal or party structure (such as the Phalangists have, for example). The “states” proposed by Yinon are “Haddadland” and “Village Associations,” and their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar. In addition, Israeli military superiority in such a situation will be much greater than it is even now, so that any movement of revolt will be “punished” either by mass humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment and obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now (June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan, as explained orally, calls for the establishment of Israeli garrisons in focal places between the mini states, equipped with the necessary mobile destructive forces. In fact, we have seen something like this in Haddadland and we will almost certainly soon see the first example of this system functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.

3

It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan too, depend also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided than they are now, and on the lack of any truly progressive mass movement among them. It may be that those two conditions will be removed only when the plan will be well advanced, with consequences which can not be foreseen.

4

Why it is necessary to publish this in Israel?

The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish society: A very great measure of freedom and democracy, specially for Jews, combined with expansionism and racist discrimination. In such a situation the Israeli-Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin’s speeches) has to be persuaded. The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but a time comes in which it becomes inconvenient. Written material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid “persuaders” and “explainers” (for example medium-rank officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then “learn it,” more or less, and preach to others. It should be remarked that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties, has always functioned in this way. I myself well remember how (before I was “in opposition”) the necessity of war with was explained to me and others a year before the 1956 war, and the necessity of conquering “the rest of Western Palestine when we will have the opportunity” was explained in the years 1965-67.

5

Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the publication of such plans? Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the principled opposition inside Israel is very weak (a situation which may change as a consequence of the war on Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the Palestinians, and the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so far quite incapable of a detailed and rational analysis of Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on the average, no better than the rest. In such a situation, even those who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli expansionism (which are real enough) are doing this not because of factual and detailed knowledge, but because of belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in the non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset of the Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another example is the persistent, and completely false declarations, which were made by some of the most important Arab leaders, that the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken from the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The Israeli specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay no attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the Lebanon war has proved them right. So why should they not continue with their old methods of persuading other Israelis?

6

In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least until now. The more or less serious commentators take their information about Israel, and much of their opinions about it, from two sources. The first is from articles in the “liberal” American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers of Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli state, practice loyally what Stalin used to call “the constructive criticism.” (In fact those among them who claim also to be “AntiStalinist” are in reality more Stalinist than Stalin, with Israel being their god which has not yet failed). In the framework of such critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has always “good intentions” and only “makes mistakes,” and therefore such a plan would not be a matter for discussion–exactly as the Biblical genocides committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation exists in which Israel is really a “closed society” to the rest of the world, because the world wants to close its eyes, the publication and even the beginning of the realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible.

Israel Shahak

June 17, 1982 Jerusalem

About the Translator

Israel Shahak is a professor of organic chemistly at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. He published The Shahak Papers, collections of key articles from the Hebrew press, and is the author of numerous articles and books, among them Non-Jew in the Jewish State. His latest book is Israel’s Global Role: Weapons for Repression, published by the AAUG in 1982. Israel Shahak: (1933-2001)

Notes

10. American Universities Field Staff. Report No.33, 1979. According to this research, the population of the world will be 6 billion in the year 2000. Today’s world population can be broken down as follows: China, 958 million; India, 635 million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218 million Indonesia, 140 million; Brazil and Japan, 110 million each. According to the figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in 2000, 50 cities with a population of over 5 million each. The population ofthp;Third World will then be 80% of the world population. According to Justin Blackwelder, U.S. Census Office chief, the world population will not reach 6 billion because of hunger.
11. Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized by two American Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, Ca., Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the Soviet Union tens and hundreds of articles and books are published each year which detail the Soviet doctrine for nuclear war and there is a great deal of documentation translated into English and published by the U.S. Air Force,including USAF: Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet View, Moscow, 1972; USAF: The Armed Forces of the Soviet State. Moscow, 1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The basic Soviet approach to the matter is presented in the book by Marshal Sokolovski published in 1962 in Moscow: Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and Concepts(New York, Praeger, 1963).
12. A picture of Soviet intentions in various areas of the world can be drawn from the book by Douglas and Hoeber, For additional material see: Michael Morgan, “USSR’s Minerals as Strategic Weapon in the Future,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.
13. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea Power and the State, London, 1979. Morgan, cit. General George S. Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States For Fiscal Year 1979, p. 103; National Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel Mineral Policy, (Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton, The New York Times, (9/15/79); Time, 9/21/80.
14. Elie Kedourie, “The End of the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No.4, 1968.
15. Al-Thawra, Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram,12/30/79, Al Ba’ath, Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are 20 years old and younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs under 15 are unemployed, 33% live in urban areas, Oded Yinon, “Egypt’s Population Problem,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 15, Spring 1980.
16. Kanovsky, “Arab Haves and Have Nots,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, No.1, Fall 1976, Al Ba’ath, Syria, 5/6/79.
17. In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that the Israeli government is in fact responsible for the design of American policy in the Middle East, after June ’67, because of its own indecisiveness as to the future of the territories and the inconsistency in its positions since it established the background for Resolution 242 and certainly twelve years later for the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty with Egypt. According to Rabin, on June 19, 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol in which he did not mention anything about withdrawal from the new territories but exactly on the same day the government resolved to return territories in exchange for peace. After the Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its position but contrary to its decision of June 19, did not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the U.S. continued to support 242 in the Security Council on the basis of its earlier understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories. At that point it was already too late to change the U.S. position and Israel’s policy. From here the way was opened to peace agreements on the basis of 242 as was later agreed upon in Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma’ariv 1979) pp. 226-227.
18. Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof. Moshe Arens argued in an interview (Ma ‘ariv,10/3/80) that the Israeli government failed to prepare an economic plan before the Camp David agreements and was itself surprised by the cost of the agreements, although already during the negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price and the serious error involved in not having prepared the economic grounds for peace. The former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated that if it were not for the withdrawal from the oil fields, Israel would have a positive balance of payments (9/17/80). That same person said two years earlier that the government of Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around his neck. He was referring to the Camp David agreements (Ha’aretz, 11/3/78). In the course of the whole peace negotiations neither an expert nor an economics advisor was consulted, and the Prime Minister himself, who lacks knowledge and expertise in economics, in a mistaken initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a loan rather than a grant, due to his wish to maintain our respect and the respect of the U.S. towards us. See Ha’aretz1/5/79. Jerusalem Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior consultant in the Treasury, strongly criticized the conduct of the negotiations; Ha’aretz, 5/5/79. Ma’ariv, 9/7/79. As to matters concerning the oil fields and Israel’s energy crisis, see the interview with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a government advisor on these matters, Ma’arive Weekly, 12/12/78. The Energy Minister, who personally signed the Camp David agreements and the evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since emphasized the seriousness of our condition from the point of view of oil supplies more than once…see Yediot Ahronot, 7/20/79. Energy Minister Modai even admitted that the government did not consult him at all on the subject of oil during the Camp David and Blair House negotiations. Ha’aretz, 8/22/79.
19. Many sources report on the growth of the armaments budget in Egypt and on intentions to give the army preference in a peace epoch budget over domestic needs for which a peace was allegedly obtained. See former Prime Minister Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77, Treasury Minister Abd El Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78, and the paper Al Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the military budget will receive first priority, despite the peace. This is what former Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil has stated in his cabinet’s programmatic document which was presented to Parliament, 11/25/78. See English translation, ICA, FBIS, Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10. According to these sources, Egypt’s military budget increased by 10% between fiscal 1977 and 1978, and the process still goes on. A Saudi source divulged that the Egyptians plan to increase their militmy budget by 100% in the next two years; Ha’aretz, 2/12/79 and Jerusalem Post, 1/14/79.
20. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on Egypt’s ability to reconstruct its economy by 1982. See Economic Intelligence Unit, 1978 Supplement, “The Arab Republic of Egypt”; E. Kanovsky, “Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East,” Occasional Papers, The Shiloah Institution, June 1977; Kanovsky, “The Egyptian Economy Since the Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors,” Occasional Papers, June 1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank, as reported in Times, London, 1/24/78.
21. See the comparison made by the researeh of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and research camed out in the Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University, as well as the research by the British scientist, Denis Champlin, Military Review, Nov. 1979, ISS: The Military Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security Arrangements in Sinai…by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The Military Balance and the Military Options after the Peace Treaty with Egypt, by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y. Raviv, No.4, Dec. 1978, as well as many press reports including El Hawadeth, London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi, Paris, 12/14/79.
22. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the relations between Copts and Moslems see the series of articles published in the Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas, 9/15/80. The English author Irene Beeson reports on the rift between Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian, London, 6/24/80, and Desmond Stewart, Middle East Internmational, London 6/6/80. For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, Guardian, London, 12/24/79; The Christian Science Monitor 12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour, London, 10/15/79; El Kefah El Arabi, 10/15/79.
23. Arab Press Service, Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New Republic, 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by Ha’aretz, 3/21/80, and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist, 3/22/80; Robert Fisk, Times, London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth Jones, Sunday Times, 3/30/80.
24. P. Peroncell Hugoz, Le Monde, Paris 4/28/80; Dr. Abbas Kelidar, Middle East Review, Summer 1979; Conflict Studies, ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der Zeit, (Ha’aretz, 9/21/79) Economist Foreign Report, 10/10/79, Afro-Asian Affairs, London, July 1979.
25. Arnold Hottinger, “The Rich Arab States in Trouble,” The New York Review of Books, 5/15/80; Arab Press Service, Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; S. News and World Report, 11/5/79 as well as El Ahram, 11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, Paris 9/7/79; El Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly Review, IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.
26. As for Jordan’s policies and problems see El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof. Elie Kedouri, Ma’ariv 6/8/79; Prof. Tanter, Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem Post, 5/31/79; El Watan El Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas, 11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the Fatah Fourth Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The Shefa’amr program of the Israeli Arabs was published in Ha’aretz, 9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80. For facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see Amos Ben Vered, Ha’aretz, 2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel, Ma’ariv 1/12/80. As to the PLO’s position towards Israel see Shlomo Gazit, Monthly Review; July 1980; Hani El Hasan in an interview, Al Rai Al’Am, Kuwait 4/15/80; Avi Plaskov, “The Palestinian Problem,” Survival, ISS, London Jan. Feb. 78; David Gutrnann, “The Palestinian Myth,” Commentary, Oct. 75; Bernard Lewis, “The Palestinians and the PLO,” Commentary 75; Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80; Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1980.
27. Yuval Neeman, “Samaria–The Basis for Israel’s Security,” Ma’arakhot 272-273, May/June 1980; Ya’akov Hasdai, “Peace, the Way and the Right to Know,” Dvar Hashavua, 2/23/80. Aharon Yariv, “Strategic Depth–An Israeli Perspective,” Ma’arakhot 270-271, October 1979; Yitzhak Rabin, “Israel’s Defense Problems in the Eighties,” Ma’arakhot October 1979.
28. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime’s Pliers (Shikmona, 1974); Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel, Truth Versus Legend (Reshafim, 1981).
29. Henry Kissinger, “The Lessons of the Past,” The Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur Ross, “OPEC’s Challenge to the West,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1980; Walter Levy, “Oil and the Decline of the West,”

Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980; Special Report–“Our Armed Forees-Ready or Not?” U.S. News and World Report 10/10/77; Stanley Hoffman, “Reflections on the Present Danger,” The New York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80; Leopold Lavedez “The illusions of SALT” Commentary Sept. 79; Norman Podhoretz, “The Present Danger,” Commentary March 1980; Robert Tucker, “Oil and American Power Six Years Later,” Commentary Sept. 1979; Norman Podhoretz, “The Abandonment of Israel,” Commentary July 1976; Elie Kedourie, “Misreading the Middle East,” Commentary July 1979.

    30. According to figures published by Ya’akov Karoz, Yediot Ahronot, 10/17/80, the sum total of anti-Semitic incidents recorded in the world in 1979 was double the amount recorded in 1978. In Germany, France, and Britain the number of anti-Semitic incidents was many times greater in that year. In the U.S. as well there has been a sharp increase in anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that article. For the new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon, “The New Anti-Semitism,” The New Republic, 9/18/1976; Barbara Tuchman, “They poisoned the Wells,” Newsweek 2/3/75.

9. ΔΙΑΒΑΣΤΕ ΤΩΡΑ ΠΑΡΑΚΑΤΩ, ΜΕΡΙΚΕΣ ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΕΙΣ ΠΟΥ ΔΙΝΑΜΕ ΤΟ… ΜΑΚΡΙΝΟ 2017 ΣΕ ΦΙΛΟΥΣ ΜΑΣ (ΑΠΟ ΠΑΛΑΙΟ ΑΡΘΡΟ ΜΑΣ), ΚΑΙ ΚΡΙΝΕΤΕ ΕΣΕΙΣ ΤΊ ΑΠ’ ΟΛΑ ΑΥΤΑ ΕΧΟΥΝ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΜΕΧΡΙ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ Ή ΟΧΙ!..

Φίλοι μου!

Οι απαντήσεις απευθύνονται, ασφαλώς σε όσους ρώτησαν, αλλά κυρίως σε όσους βλέπουν τί γράφουμε και μας μελετούν ανελλιπώς από τότε που… “ανοίξαμε” (Νοε 2015), ενώ παράλληλα διαθέτουν και συνδυαστική σκέψη! (Μερικές φορές απαιτείται και… ανάποδη σκέψη)!

Α.

Τα απόρρητα έγγραφα της CIA για Κύπρο και Αιγαίο

Στόχοι το Καστελόριζο και η Κύπρος σε πιθανή ήττα των Τούρκων στο Αιγαίο

19 ΙΑΝΟΥΑΡΙΟΥ 2017

Ένα τεράστιο όγκο εγγράφων που έχουν να κάνουν με την Τουρκία και κατ΄ επέκταση με τα ελληνοτουρκικά αποδέσμευσε η CIA! Πρόκειται για “θησαυρό πληροφοριών” σχετικά με το τί πίστευε στη δεκαετία του 1980 η Ουάσινγκτον για τις ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις, την ισορροπία στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων στην περιοχή και τα αποτελέσματα ενδεχόμενης στρατιωτικής σύγκρουσης των δύο χωρών στο Αιγαίο, στη Θράκη, και στην Κύπρο.

Πόλεμο και μάλιστα με βαρύτατες απώλειες και για τις δύο πλευρές προέβλεπε η CIA, ενώ αναλυτική είναι και η έκθεση για την Κύπρο, που υπερτερεί η Τουρκία και ποιά θα είναι τα αποτελέσματα.

Απόλυτο πλεονέκτημα Άγκυρας στην Κύπρο

Στα αποχαρακτηρισμένα –και ως εκ τούτου ελεύθερα προς αποδέσμευση– έγγραφα της CIA, περιλαμβάνονται αρκετά που αφορούν το περιβάλλον στις σχέσεις Ελλάδας-Τουρκίας, μετά την κρίση του Μαρτίου του 1987, η οποία έφερε τις δύο χώρες στο κατώφλι της πολεμικής σύγκρουσης στο Αιγαίο.

Το ωκεανογραφικό ερευνητικό σκάφος της Τουρκίας «Σισμίκ», πρώην «Χόρα».

Σε αναφορά της 16ης Οκτωβρίου 1987, ο ταγματάρχης Χάρι Ντινέλα, αξιωματικός της Στρατιωτικής Υπηρεσίας Πληροφοριών και Αναλύσεων Απειλών (USAITAC), περιγράφει σε ένα λεπτομερές, μέχρι σήμερα απόρρητο έγγραφο, μια εικόνα σχεδόν απόλυτης στρατιωτικής ισορροπίας στο Αιγαίο και, παράλληλα, το απόλυτο πολιτικό και στρατιωτικό πλεονέκτημα της Αγκυρας στην Κύπρο.

Στην περίπτωση της Κύπρου και ενός πιθανού μετώπου, σημειώνονται τα εξής:

Πρώτον, η Ελλάδα δεν θα μπορέσει να υπερασπιστεί τη Νότια Κύπρο αν σημειωθεί μια αποφασιστική τουρκική επίθεση, εκτός αν(!) ανοίξει μέτωπα στη Θράκη και στο Αιγαίο.

Δεύτερον, σε περίπτωση πολέμου στην Κύπρο οι απώλειες και στις δυο πλευρές κυρίως όμως στο νότιο τμήμα, θα είναι υψηλές σε στρατό και πολίτες ενώ θα χαθούν και περιουσίες. Στο τέλος η Τουρκία «θα υπερισχύσει».

Τρίτον, ελληνοτουρκική σύγκρουση στο Αιγαίο θα οδηγήσει πιθανότατα σε προώθηση Τούρκων στην Κύπρο, ιδιαίτερα αν η Τουρκία υποστεί βαριές απώλειες στο Αρχιπέλαγος.

Τέταρτον, το επίπεδο των τουρκικών στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων στην Κύπρο αποτελεί έναν παράγοντα που καθιστά την Κύπρο πιο μετριοπαθή έναντι μιας πιθανής ελληνοτουρκικής Σύγκρουσης στο Αιγαίο.

Δεν θα μπορέσει ν’ ακολουθήσει η Ελλάδα

Στα έγγραφα τονίζεται επίσης, το 1987, πως τα επόμενα χρόνια η στρατιωτική υπεροχή θα γείρει υπέρ της Τουρκίας καθώς η Ελλάδα δεν θα μπορέσει να ακολουθήσει τον εξοπλιστικό αγώνα. Θεωρείτο δε πως μέχρι τα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 1990, η Τουρκία θα είχε διπλάσια ή και περισσότερα F16 από την Ελλάδα ενώ εκσυγχρόνιζε το στόλο της με πλοία.

Μάλιστα τότε οι Αμερικανοί θεωρούσαν πως ήταν η Ελλάδα εκείνη που θα ξεκινούσε πιθανότατα τις εχθροπραξίες.Σημειωνόταν όμως πως όσο η Τουρκία δυναμώνει την επόμενη δεκαετία, η πιθανότητα της Ελλάδας να ξεκινήσει εχθροπραξίες, θα μειωθεί.

Οι ΗΠΑ εξέταζαν εναλλακτικές εγκαταστάσεις για τις βάσεις

Ίσως η πλέον ενδεικτική επίδειξη πυγμής, με χαρακτηριστικά ακραίου επικοινωνιακού και πολιτικού εντυπωσιασμού, του Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου της πρώτης περιόδου, ήταν η διαχείριση των διαπραγματεύσεων για τις αμερικανικές βάσεις στην Ελλάδα.

Σε έγγραφό του της 10ης Μαΐου 1983, ο Μίλτον Κόβνερ, υπεύθυνος της Υπηρεσίας για τη Δυτική Ευρώπη, αναφέρει, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι οι πρώιμες ενδείξεις πως οι ΗΠΑ εξετάζουν το ενδεχόμενο «εναλλακτικών εγκαταστάσεων» εκτός Ελλάδας, «ιδιαίτερα στην Τουρκία, απλώς θα οδηγούσε στην επιδείνωση της κατάστασης και θα προσέθετε περισσότερη υποστήριξη στην κυβέρνηση στην υποτιθέμενη υπεράσπιση των ελληνικών εθνικών συμφερόντων».

Σημείωση:

Στο “youtube” μπορείτε να βρείτε και το πλήρες αμερικανικό κείμενο 37 σελίδων!

Επίσης, ο φίλος που ρώτησε για την Λήμνο και το “γιατί” άρχισαν και πάλι να “γαυγίζουν” οι Τούρκοι γι’ αυτήν, μπορεί να βρεί στο “youtube” το αποδεσμευμένο αμερικανικό κείμενο (1987), που αναφέρεται στο θέμα!..

Β.

Αλβανία: Πόσοι Αλβανοί τζιχαντιστές του “ISIS” είναι αιχμάλωτοι στη Συρία

23 Απριλίου 2019

Η Αλβανία είναι μία από τις βαλκανικές χώρες που τροφοδότησε με τζιχαντιστές την οργάνωση Ισλαμικό Κράτος.

Ορισμένοι από αυτούς, που έμειναν μέχρι τέλους να πολεμήσουν, πιάστηκαν αιχμάλωτοι από τις υπό κουρδική διοίκηση “Συριακές Δημοκρατικές Δυνάμεις” (SDF).

Δύο κυριακάτικες αλβανικές εφημερίδες, οι shqiptarja.com και «ΝΤΙΤΑ», αναφέρονται στο θέμα των Αλβανών πολιτών, κυρίως γυναικόπαιδων που βρίσκονται στον καταυλισμό Αλ Χολ στην Ανατολική Συρία, που ελέγχεται από τις δυνάμεις των Κούρδων.

Ανάμεσα στα περισσότερα από 70 χιλιάδες άτομα του καταυλισμού αυτού, σημειώνουν οι εφημερίδες, βρίσκονται και πενήντα (50) Αλβανοί πολίτες.

Πρόκειται κυρίως για γυναίκες και παιδιά, οι σύζυγοι και οι πατεράδες των οποίων πολέμησαν στο πλευρό των δυνάμεων του Ισλαμικού Κράτους στη Συρία και το Ιράκ.

Εκτός αυτών, σημειώνουν οι ίδιες εφημερίδες, στον καταυλισμό βρίσκονται και Αλβανοί από το Κόσοβο και τη Βόρεια Μακεδονία.

Το Σάββατο, σημειώνουν οι εφημερίδες, μετά από προσπάθειες της κυβέρνησης του Κοσόβου και των Αμερικανών, επέστρεψαν στην Πρίστινα από τη Συρία 110 πολίτες του Κοσόβου, από τους οποίους οι 4 συνελήφθησαν ως τρομοκράτες.

Μέχρι τώρα, γράφουν οι εφημερίδες, οι αλβανικές Αρχές δεν έχουν κάνει σχεδόν τίποτα για τον επαναπατρισμό των Αλβανών πολιτών, γυναίκες και παιδιά, από το Αλ Χολ της Συρίας.

Το αλβανικό κράτος, σημειώνει η εφημερίδα, δε φοβάται τα παιδιά, φοβάται όμως τις γυναίκες.

Διότι ορισμένες από αυτές είναι γαλουχημένες με εξτρεμιστικές ιδέες και αποτελούν εν δυνάμει κίνδυνο για την Αλβανία.

Μέχρι τώρα, σημειώνει η εφημερίδα, επέστρεψαν εθελοντικά από τη Συρία, 27 Αλβανοί πολίτες που πολέμησαν στο πλευρό του Ισλαμικού Κράτους.

Παραμένουν ακόμα εκεί άλλοι 31 ενώ 14 Αλβανοί που πήγαν στη Συρία, έχουν σκοτωθεί.

Τέλος, οι εφημερίδες αναφέρουν και το παράδειγμα του Αλβανού επιχειρηματία Γκιετάν Ντρεγκιώνη ο οποίος, αφού βρήκε τα δυο ανίψια του που είναι στον καταυλισμό Αλ Χολ, προσπάθησε να τα φέρει πίσω στην Αλβανία, προσφέροντας εκατό χιλιάδες ευρώ σε Τούρκους λαθρεμπόρους αλλά δεν τα κατάφερε.

Πόσοι πήγαν στη Συρία

Το 2013 μια ομάδα 52 Σλάβων μουσουλμάνων της Βοσνίας (Βοσνιακοί) πήγαν στη Συρία. Σκοτώθηκαν δύο και 32 επέστρεψαν.

Έως τον Απρίλιο του 2015, 232 Αλβανοί Κοσοβάροι είχαν πάει στη Συρία. Οι περισσότεροι εντάχθηκαν στο Ισλαμικό Κράτος.

Έως τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2014, 48 Αλβανοί -από διάφορες χώρες των Βαλκανίων- είχαν σκοτωθεί στη Συρία και στο Ιράκ.

Έως τον Μάρτιο του 2016 περίπου 60 Κοσοβάροι τζιχαντιστές είχαν σκοτωθεί σε μάχες.

Έως τον Μάρτιο του 2016 η αλβανική κυβέρνηση υπολόγιζε ότι περισσότεροι από 100 Αλβανοί είχαν ενταχθεί στο Ισλαμικό Κράτος στη Συρία και το Ιράκ. 18 είχαν σκοτωθεί και 12 τραυματιστεί.

Αλβανοί από τη Βόρεια Μακεδονία έσπευσαν επίσης στο Ισλαμικό Κράτος. Έως το 2014 γνωρίζαμε ότι έξι από αυτούς σκοτώθηκαν.

Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria

APRIL 2015, VOLUME 8, ISSUE 4

Authors:

ADRIAN SHTUNI

Extensive research suggests that about 500 ethnic Albanians from the Western Balkans have traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012, predominantly joining the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN).¹ For the most part these fighters are the product of a well-integrated regional network of extremist entities painstakingly expanded across the region over the past two decades. Recent counterterrorism operations in Albania and Kosovo have shed some light on the structure and inner workings of this network. These efforts by local law enforcement agencies have revealed that the web of extremist actors primarily comprises a new generation of local fundamentalist clerics trained in the Middle East and closely affiliated with a number of foreign-funded Islamic charities and cultural associations.

This article examines the presence of ethnic Albanian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq and provides an analysis of their backgrounds, affiliations, and activities. The data reveal that the age groups most vulnerable to recruitment are different among the countries examined—Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia—despite broad ethno-linguistic and cultural similarities.The study concludes that if they are to be effective, counter-narrative campaigns and government responses must take into account evolving trends of radicalization, and that they should be fine-tuned to target the age groups most vulnerable to being swept up into violent extremism.

Historical Conditions

The Western Balkans are home to the largest indigenous Muslim population in Europe and a long standing tradition of moderate Islam that dates back to the Ottoman conquest of the peninsula in the 15th century. There are important distinctions, however, among the different countries of the region. Islam lost significant ground in Albania during the communist era. Albania’s long-time dictator Enver Hoxha went so far as to declare his country to be the first atheist state in the world, and all religion was banned between 1967 and 1990.²The fall of communism in the early 1990s, however, created significant volatility, both political and ideological.

The vacuum attracted pan-nationalist movements and Islamist revivalists across the Balkans, including some 20 Arab Islamic foundations, which established a strong presence in Albania.³ These foundations financed the building of hundreds of mosques and awarded educational scholarships to thousands of malleable young Muslim Albanians. Many of these young men who took up these opportunities returned home from their studies in Arab and Asian religious institutions with a strong sense of spiritual identity and an eagerness to promote a puritanical form of Islam.⁴ The impoverished Albanian government, thanks to combination of lax law enforcement oversight and a desperate need for foreign aid and investment, paid scant attention to some of the more dubious dealings by some of the charities until in June 1998. In that month, law enforcement agencies raided the offices of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society and four sites linked to other charities, arresting four foreign terrorist operatives in their employ.⁵ The raids broke up a cell of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad⁶ terrorist organization and reportedly foiled a bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tirana.⁷ Nevertheless, almost a quarter century of forced atheism had made Albanian society comparatively less susceptible to radical Islam.

In contrast, ethnic Albanians who lived in the territories of the former Yugoslavia as an ethnic and religious minority struggling for civil rights embraced Islam. It was not simply a dogma for them, but it was also part of a pragmatic strategy intended to secure ethnic and territorial preservation. Yugoslavia’s decade-long violent dissolution intensified ethno-religious cleavages, creating a more welcoming environment for a militant strain of Islam. As the 1998–1999 Kosovo war came to an end, and almost a decade after infiltrating Albania, dozens of foreign faith-based charities—particularly Saudi-funded groups—set up shop in Kosovo. Besides providing humanitarian aid and building schools and community centers, they also erected significant numbers of Wahhabi mosques and madrassas,⁸ the financing of which was opaque.

The Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC), whose activities have been linked to al-Qa’ida operatives,⁹ reportedly built 98 primary and secondary schools in rural Kosovo after the war. The most promising students were enrolled in 30 Koranic schools sponsored by the Islamic Endowment Foundation, an SJRC entity.¹⁰ In a massive construction boom, more than 100 unlicensed mosques sprouted across Europe’s poorest country within ten years. ¹¹ Kosovo covers just 4,212 square miles.

The development of an extensive religious infrastructure required a significant increase in the number of qualified clerics. Agencies and groups such as The World Assembly of Muslim Youth made available hundreds of scholarships to Middle Eastern Islamic education institutions.¹² The returning graduates, often sporting the Salafis’ trademark long beard with the clean-shaven upper lip, created a steady supply of hard-line clerics for the growing network of mosques and madrassas across Kosovo. Tellingly, eight of the 11 Kosovo imams arrested between August and September 2014 on charges of preaching extremism and helping to recruit jihadists were relatively young and educated in the Middle East.¹³

Genci (Abdurrahim) Balla, a 35-year-old imam educated in Saudi Arabia, is typical of those caught up in the operation. He was arrested in April 2014 in Albania on suspicion of leading a recruitment ring authorities believe to have sent dozens of fighters to Syria.¹⁴ These imams were closely affiliated with a chain of 14 Islamic charities and cultural associations whose leaders were also educated in the Middle East and which the authorities in Kosovo shut down recently because of their alleged ties to Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁵

The Scale of the Problem

There were only a small number of ethnic Albanian individuals involved in jihadist activity prior to the Syrian conflict.¹⁶ The evidence now suggest that the number of ethnic Albanians who have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq as of early March 2015 is about 500.Among the data points that are publicly available, Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Affairs in a late February 2015 interview stated that the number of foreign fighters from Kosovo stands at “about 300.”¹⁷ The latest available estimates for Albanian citizens range from 90 to 148.¹⁸ By comparison, published estimates of Macedonian fighters—just 12—are very low, and other evidence seems to suggest a higher number may be more accurate.The similar number of reported casualties among jihadists from Albania (12) and ethnic Albanian jihadists from Macedonia (14) would indicate that the total number of ethnic Albanian fighters from Macedonia is about 100. This estimate is further supported by the reported death rate of around 10 percent among German,¹⁹ Belgian,²⁰ Dutch,²¹ and Bosnian²² jihadists. Only one ethnic Albanian jihadist from Serbia has been reported dead so far.

The data also reveals that relative to its population of 1.8 million, Kosovo is arguably the largest source of European jihadists in Syria and Iraq. With a rate of over 16 fighters per 100,000 nationals, Kosovo’s recruitment rate is more than eight times that of France, Europe’s largest overall source of jihadists in Syria and Iraq.²³ Kosovo’s per capita rate of recruitment exceeds by about 60 percent even that of a failed state like Libya.²⁴

There are several likely factors for this development. Geographic proximity, lack of visa restrictions, and low transportation costs make the trip to Syria logistically easy. Yet the confluence of particular sociopolitical, economic, and demographic factors may help explain Kosovo Albanians’ disproportionate rate of radicalization. With 44 percent of the population aged below 25, Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe.²⁵ There is also a surplus of young men, with a ratio of 1.1 male(s) per female. This youth bulge makes the country more susceptible to radicalization and social unrest, especially when combined with rapid urbanization and poor economic conditions.²⁶ In fact Kosovo has the lowest Human Development Index in Europe and the lowest per capita income in the Balkans.²⁷ Also, as of 2013, Kosovo’s unemployment rate for the 15–24 age group was 56 percent.²⁸ A number of studies demonstrate a significant association between high youth unemployment and the incidence of terrorism in Europe.²⁹ Furthermore, according to United National Development Programme (UNDP), 62 percent of Kosovo’s adult population has low levels of education.³⁰ Ignorance and lack of proper educational opportunities often make people more vulnerable to ideological indoctrination and radicalization.³¹ In Kosovo, this vulnerability is exacerbated by significant ethnic polarization and the recent traumatic ethno-sectarian conflict that had sharp religious undertones.

Who are the Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters?

The author researched, examined, and categorized publicly available data related to ethnic Albanian foreign fighters and their known associates published between November 2012 and early March 2015 by media outlets, released by regional governments, or posted on social media. The resulting dataset compiled for the purposes of this study contains information on 211 ethnic Albanian men who have either fought in Syria and/or Iraq at some point between 2012 and 2015 or have been arrested and are being investigated for recruiting fighters or attempting to join terrorist groups. This number does not include the dozens of women, children, and other family members who have accompanied them.

According to official sources, at least 13 Albanian nationals have traveled to Syria with their wives and 31 children.³² Another report claims that about 20 Kosovo Albanian families have “made hijrah”³³ to live and fight in the region and that one of these families—composed of three brothers, two wives, and five children— traveled to Syria as late as September 2014.³⁴ Bearing in mind the patriarchal family structure common among ethnic Albanians, particularly in Kosovo, it would be reasonable to assume that more than 100 ethnic Albanian relatives of jihadists have made the trip, some of whom may have received military training and eventually participated in armed operations.

Of the 211 men in the data set, at least 152 of these men from Albania (70), Kosovo (64), Macedonia (17), and Serbia (1) have fought in Syria and/or Iraq in the past three to four years. Of those 152 men, 49 were reportedly killed in action: 12 from Albania, 22 from Kosovo, 14 from Macedonia, and one from Serbia. The first local media report of an ethnic Albanian casualty came in early November 2012 regarding Naman Demolli, a 35-year-old Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) veteran and a staunch activist for a radical Islamic movement turned political party in Kosovo.³⁵ The presence of at least two groups of ethnic Albanians fighting in Syria was also recorded in November 2012.³⁶

The deadliest year was 2014 with at least 29 reported deaths. The deadliest month was September 2014 with ten reported deaths mostly the result of U.S.-led airstrikes targeting Islamic State strongholds. January 2014 was the second deadliest with five reported deaths, mainly linked to intensified clashes between the Islamic State and JN. Media reports on at least three, and possibly as many as six, Kosovo Albanian youths traveling to Syria in early January 2015 attest to the continued flow of fighters despite the punitive measures taken by local governments to curb the phenomenon.³⁷

At least ten of the fighters identified in the dataset belong to the ethnic Albanian diaspora in Western Europe and possibly had dual nationality, specifically five originating from Macedonia, and five originating from Kosovo. Their last reported residences were in Germany, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. Other fighters or would-be fighters arrested before they could travel to Syria or Iraq are known to have resided at some point in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt.

Two main clusters of fighters that stand out are those with previous military experience (14) and those with previous formal religious training (ten). At least 14 of the fighters from the dataset have previous guerilla warfare experience or formal military training. There were ten KLA and/or National Liberation Army veterans from the armed conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia in late 1990s and the beginning of 2000s and four former Albanian Army Commandos in the data set.³⁸ Media reports suggest they traveled to the conflict zone in groups and that the number of KLA veterans who have already fought in Syria may be even higher. One press article from mid-2013 quotes a KLA veteran as stating that he was planning to join the war in Syria “with about a dozen war comrades.”³⁹

Meanwhile, the pool of imams and madrassa students involved either directly or indirectly in this armed conflict increases from ten to 23 when including the 13 imams arrested in Kosovo and Albania for inspiring or recruiting jihadists.⁴⁰ Albanian authorities reportedly possess strong evidence that a ring operated by two imams in the suburbs of Tirana is responsible for recruiting 70 fighters.⁴¹

Not surprisingly, due to a tradition of close-knit families among ethnic Albanians, a third cluster of fighters is connected to each other mainly through kinship ties. There are at least eight cases in which a small group of fighters related to each other (e.g., brother or cousins) traveled to the Middle East, for a total of 20 known fighters. In five of these cases, the fighters originate from Kosovo. This is in line with a similar trend observed among fighters from other countries such as France and the United Kingdom.⁴²

What Age Groups are Most Susceptible to Recruitment for Violent Jihad?

Of the 152 ethnic Albanian foreign fighters identified by name or by pseudonym in the media, the data set contains demographic data for 88 fighters. Based on this information the ethnic Albanian fighters range in age from 17–70 and they are on average 30-years-old. The data suggests that the age group most susceptible to recruitment for violent jihad among ethnic Albanians is 21–25 years old.

While the individuals in this data set share similar ethnic and linguistic backgrounds and are clustered together on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, they originate from three different socio-economic and political environments. Ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia have more points of commonality due to their common Yugoslav past than they share with Albanian nationals. In order to detect potential variances between fighters, the data was segmented by country of origin: Albania (23), Kosovo (49), Macedonia (15), and Serbia (1). Though the sample sizes of fighters originating from each country are not equal, they represent comparable ratios relative to the number of estimated fighters per country, 16, 16, and 15 percent respectively.

The data segmentation reveals distinctly different patterns of recruitment among this pool of foreign fighters. While the age group most susceptible to recruitment is the same among ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia (21–25) that changes by a decade in the case of Albania (31–35). This variance is largely reflected in the fighters’ average age by country of origin as follows: Albania 35.6, Kosovo 28, and Macedonia 25.8. These differences, which are somewhat explained by Kosovo’s younger median population age and other drivers of radicalization listed above, could also be influenced by the demographics of the most radical, charismatic, and successful recruiters in each country. In Kosovo this includes a 25-year-old Islamic State commander named Lavdrim Muhaxheri, who until recently ran an Islamic cultural association. His counterpart in Albania was, until his arrest, the 35-year-old Imam Genci Balla.Another potential causal factor worth exploring may be the fact that Kosovo society experienced the growth of Middle Eastern charities with extremist links well after Albania did—post-1999 in Kosovo compared to post-1990 in Albania.

Conclusion

The unprecedented proportion of ethnic Albanians being drawn to violent extremist organizations testifies that militant Islamist narratives have struck a chord. This preliminary study based on a detailed, yet partial footprint of the ethnic Albanian foreign fighters, identified two distinct age groups particularly susceptible to recruitment into violent extremism. While the typical foreign fighter from Albania is a male between 31 and 35 years old, the typical ethnic Albanian foreign fighter from Kosovo and Macedonia is a male between 21 and 25 years old. The data indicate that country-specific dynamics, despite all the many ethno-linguistic and cultural similarities among ethnic Albanians in the Balkans, may have had a more determining role in their path to radicalization.

A more granular understanding of the complex radicalization environment and recruitment patterns identified in this study would allow for a more informed counter-radicalization strategy and effective counter-narrative campaigns targeting the most susceptible age groups. Moreover, these counter-radicalization efforts would benefit from frequent monitoring and assessment of evolving radicalization patterns in the region. Ultimately, the long-term success of these efforts will be determined by the ability to adjust to and anticipate radicalization trends.

Adrian Shtuni is a Washington, D.C.-based foreign policy and security analyst with a regional focus on the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. He holds a M.Sc. in Foreign Service with a concentration in International Relations and Security from Georgetown University, and consults for think tanks and academic institutions on issues of radicalization and violent extremism.

[1]This estimate is based on data provided by multiple specialized reports tracking the flow of foreign fighters to Syria, hundreds of articles from regional media outlets reporting on this issue, and social media inquiries between November 2012 and early March 2015.

[2] Finngeir Hiorth, “Albania: An Atheistic State?,” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe (10:5), Article 3, 1990.

[3] Miranda Vickers, “Islam in Albania,” Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, March 1, 2008.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Probes Blasts’ Possible Mideast Ties.” The Washington Post, August 12, 1998.

[6] The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an al-Qa’ida affiliate established in the 1970s responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and for targeting U.S. and Israeli facilities in a number of countries.

[7] John Kifner, “Police Seek Suspects Tied To Terrorism In Albania.” The New York Times. August 21, 1998.

[8] David Gardner, “Saudis Have Lost the Right to Take Sunni Leadership,” Financial Times, January 1, 2014.

[9] “Written Testimony Of Jean-Charles Brisard, International Expert On Terrorism Financing Lead Investigator 911 Lawsuit, CEO JCB Consulting International–Before The Committee On Banking, Housing And Urban Affairs United States Senate.” October 22, 2003.

[10] “Political Islam Among the Albanians: Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans?” KIPRED, June 1, 2005.

[11] “Kosova Mbyll Sytë Para Xhamive Ilegale,” (Kosovo turns a blind eye towards illegal mosques), Balkan Insight, January 12, 2012.

[12] William Finnegan, “The Countdown,” The New Yorker, October 15, 2007.

[13] Fatos Bytyci, “Imam Arrested in Kosovo on Suspicion of Recruiting Islamist Fighters,” Reuters, August, 2014 14, and Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo Imams Arrested in Push to Stop Fighters Going to Syria, Iraq,” Reuters, September 17, 2014. 2015 .

[14] Nikoleta Kovaci, “Lufta Në Siri, Zbulohet Celula Terroriste Në Tiranë” (War in Syria: Terrorist Cell Identified in Tirana, Shekulli Mobile, February 1, 2014 .

[15] Fatos Bytyci, “Indebted to America, Kosovo Struggles to Curb Islamist Recruits,” Reuters, October 14, 2014 and “Mbyllet OJQ-ja e imamit qe eshte e lidhur me ‘Vellazerine Myslimane’” (Shut down the imam’s NGO with links to ‘Muslim Brotherhood’), Portali Telegrafi, September 22, 2014.

[16] Timothy Holman, “Foreign Fighters from the Western Balkans in Syria,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY, June 30, 2014 .

[17] “Intervistë me Skender Hysenin, Ministrër i Brendshëm i Kosovës” (Interview with Skender Hyseni, Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Affairs). VOA. February 20, 2015.

[18] Peter R Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” ICSR, 26 January, 2015 and “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” The Washington Post, January 27, 2015.

[19] Daniel H. Heinke, and Jan Raudszus, “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY. January 20, 2015.

[20] Christian Levaux, “Belgian Police Kill Two in Raid on Suspected Islamists,” Reuters. January 15, 2015.

[21] Samar Batrawi and Ilona Chmoun, “Dutch Foreign Fighters Continue to Travel to Syria, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY, July, 20 2014.

[22] Rusmir Smajilhodzic, “Bosnia Arrests 16 Would-be Fighters, Balkans Move Against Jihadists,” Agence France Presse, September 3, 2014.

[23] “France to Get Better Weapons, Hire More Intelligence Agents to Fight Homegrown Terror,” CBS News, January 21, 2015.

[24] Ibid., Neumann.

[25] “The World Factbook: Kosovo,” Central Intelligence Agency and “Kosovo Population and Housing Census 2011,” UNSTATS. November 1, 2012 .

[26] Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs. January 1, 2012 .

[27] “Kosovo Human Development Report 2012: Private Sector and Employment,” UNDP November 2012 .

[28] “Workforce Survey Results,” Kosovo Statistics Agency 2014.

[29] “Global Terrorism Index 2012: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism for the Last Decade” Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012.

[30] “Kosovo Human Development Report 2012: Private Sector and Employment,” UNDP. 2012 .

[31] Omer Taspınar, “Fighting Radicalism, Not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes Of An International Actor Redefined,” SAIS Review XXIX, no. 2 (2009), pp. 75–86.

[32] Aleksandra Bogdani, and Flamur Bezaj, “Dhjetra Fëmijë Shqiptarë, “pengje” Te Xhihadisteve Ne Siri (Tens of Albanian kids, “hostages” of Jihadis in Syria),” Reporter.al, December 16, 2014.

[33] Hijrah refers to Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to Medina to escape persecution, but in this context is used simply as migrate.

[34] Besiana Xharra and Anita Kadriu, “Familja Dhjetanëtarëshe Në ISIS. (Ten-member (Albanian) Family with ISIS.).” Zeri, January 25, 2015 .

[35] “Vritet Ish-ushtari I UCK-se Ne Siri Gjate Sulmeve Kunder Asadit (Former KLA Soldier Killed in Syria during Raids against Assad).” Shqiptarja.com, November 14, 2012.

[36] “Grupe Shqiptarësh Në Luftë Kundër Assadit (Albanian Groups in War against Assad),” Portali Telegrafi, November 14, 2012 .

[37] “Dy Nga Tre Gjilanasit Qe Shkuan Ne Siri Nuk Kishin Pasaporta; E Paraqarte Si Dolen” (Two of the Three People from Gjilan That Travelled to Syria Did Not Have Passports; Unclear How They Managed to Travel), KOHA. January 20, 2015 .

[38] “Katër Komando Të Zall Herrit Shkuan Për Të Luftuar Në Siri. Dy U Vranë” (Four Commandos from Zall Herr Went to Fight in Syria: Two Now Dead), Gazeta Tema, March 21, 2014.

[39] Ismet Hajdari, “Unknown to Their Families, Balkan Former Guerrillas Join Rebels,” The Daily Star Newspaper, August 8, 2013.

[40] Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo Imams Arrested in Push to Stop Fighters Going to Syria, Iraq,” Reuters, September 17, 2014.

[41] “Tetë Në Pranga, Rekrutonin Luftëtarë Besimtarë Shqiptarë Për Të Luftuar Në Siri” (Eight Arrested for Recruiting Albanians to Fight in Syria), Gazeta SHQIP, March 12, 2014.

[42] “French Brothers Seek Jihad in Syria,” BBC News, August 20, 2013, and Chris Pleasance, “Last Surviving Brother of Trio of British Extremists Who Left Britain to Fight in Syria Says He Will Not Return to UK until All Muslim Lands Are ‘liberated’,” Mail Online, November 15, 2014.

ΓΙΑ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΕΙΤΕ ΤΩΡΑ ΤΟΥΣ… ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΣ 30.000 ΤΖΙΧΑΝΤΙΣΤΕΣ, ΟΠΩΣ ΕΧΕΙ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΗΣΕΙ Ο ΡΑΜΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΡΤΕ, ΣΤΗΝ Β. ΗΠΕΙΡΟ!.. ΣΤΟΧΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΕΛΒΑΣΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΩ -ΟΠΩΣ ΠΑΕΙ- ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΕΝΑ ΜΙΚΡΟ ΑΛΒΑΝΙΚΟ, ΑΝ ΟΧΙ… ΙΡΑΝ, ΕΝΑ ΜΙΚΡΟ ΑΛΒΑΝΙΚΟ “ΙΣΛΑΜΙΚΟ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ”, ΤΟΥ ΟΠΟΙΟΥ -ΥΠΟΤΙΘΕΤΑΙ- ΟΤΙ ΘΑ ΕΠΙΔΙΩΧΘΕΙ Η ΕΚΔΥΤΙΚΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ, ΜΕ ΚΑΘΟΔΗΓΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΔΥΣΗΣ, ΠΑΡΑΛΛΗΛΩΣ ΑΣΦΑΛΩΣ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΑΦΕΛΛΗΝΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΕΡΙΟΧΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΟΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ ΠΡΟΟΠΤΙΚΑ Η ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΙΑ ΣΥΝΘΗΚΩΝ ΑΠΕΙΛΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΗΠΕΙΡΟΥ, ΟΠΩΣ ΕΧΕΙ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ Η ΓΕΩΓΡΑΦΙΑ!..

3. Οι Αλβανοί φέρεται να έχουν καταστρέψει 16,7 τόνους “χημικών όπλων”, από το 2014, αν δεν σφάλλω, με επίσημη αναφορά της διεθνούς “OPCW”!

Παρ’ όλα αυτά εμείς ξέρουμε πως “Χ.Ο.” είχαν μεταφερθεί από την περιοχή της Κορυτσάς [προορίζονταν, επί Κομμουνιστικού καθεστώτος, για περίπτωση ελληνικής… εισβολής (sic) ], στο Ζάαλ-χέρ / Τίρανα, όπου και οι Α/ΕΔ και η Α/Μ/Κ ΤΑΞ, κλπ. Τί αέρια; Υποχλωρίτης και Δικλορετάν.

Στην Αλβανία, αν δεν απατώμαι, εργοστάσιο χημικών “όπλων” είχαμε στο Σπίζιτ, αλλά γενικώς “Χ.Ο.” είχαν εντοπισθεί και σε αριθμό Στρατοπέδων, όπως πχ στην περιοχή του χωριού Κάφε Μόλε, κλπ. Ο Αλία είχε προμηθευτεί από την Κίνα τοξικά αέρια, όπως και από Λίβανο και Β. Κορέα.

Τέλος, εργοστάσια κατασκευής / παραγωγής όπλων και κυρίως “ΚΑΛΑΣΝΙΚΩΦ” είχαμε και έχουμε στο Γκραμς, ανάμεσα στο Δυρράχιο και στο Λούσνιε, και στο Πολιτσάτι, κοντά στο Βεράτι.

4. 4. Η ΜΙΤ έχει διεισδύσει βαθιά σε όλες τις Κουρδικές Οργανώσεις – Στρατόπεδα στην Μ. Ανατολή και στην Ευρώπη (και στην Ελλάδα), και φυσικά και στην ΝΑ – Α. Τουρκία, προσπαθώντας να εισχωρήσει στον… εγκέφαλο του ΡΚΚ και στα ηγετικά στελέχη του, σ’ αυτά της… “κόκκινης λίστας” του Τ/ΥΠΕΣ!

Κύριο όπλο αυτής της διεισδύσεως της ΜΙΤ είναι πρωτίστως το ΧΡΗΜΑ και ανταλλάγματα στους “στοχευθέντες” για πληροφοριοδότες την ίδια τους την ζωή, εντός ή εκτός Τουρκίας, όπως και αυτής των οικογενειών τους!..

Έχουμε γράψει πχ για την ΜΙΤ στα Εξάρχεια και το “πώς” παρίσταται εκεί!.. Βρες και διάβασέ μας! Η ΜΙΤ στην Ελλάδα χρησιμοποιεί κυρίως Αλβανούς για τις “δουλειές” της και ακολούθως… Μ. Ανατολίτες!..

Η ΜΙΤ με Αλβανο-Αλβανούς (demek Έλληνες πια) και Β. Ηπειρώτες Έλληνες, που τους “κρατάει” το Α/Κράτος (τους ίδιους ή τις οικογένειές τους στην Αλβανία), έχει διεισδύσει στην ΕΥΠ και κυρίως στις επικοινωνίες της! (Ό,τι έκαναν οι Τ/ΜΥ με πολλούς ομογενείς μας από την Πόλη ή την Σμύρνη, μέχρι κυρίως και την 10ετία του 1990! ΕΚΒΙΑΣΜΟ! Τον είχαν νοιώσει στο πετσί τους αρκετές οικογένειες ομογενών μας, που είχαν εξαναγκαστεί να έλθουν στην Ελλάδα)!..

Γι’ αυτό και έγραψα ως ΑΡΙΣΤΗ την ολική μετακίνηση των “Ηλεκτρονικών Πληροφοριών” της υπόψη Υπηρεσίας, στο ΥΠΑΜ και συγκεκριμένα στο ΓΕΕΘΑ! Κατάλαβες; Παλαιότερα, θυμίζω, η ΜΙΤ είχε μέσω των μεταφραστών κυρίως και δασκάλων τουρκικής γλώσσης, πρόσβαση στην ε/Κ-Β και σε βουλευτές του ε/Κοινοβουλίου! Ακόμα και στο ΓΕΕΘΑ, όπου υπεράνω υποψίας ομογενείς παρουσίαζαν – πρότειναν διάφορα προγράμματα, κυκλοφορούντες ελεύθεροι μέσα στους διαδρόμους των ε/Επιτελείων!.. Τέλος, η ΜΙΤ “έπαιξε” πολύ τους Ε-Τ γάμους τις 3 τελευταίες 10ετίες!

Διάβασε φιλαράκο και… διαβάστε: Τουρκάλες παντρεμένες με Έλληνες και με διαμονή πχ στο Ηράκλειο της Κρήτης*, ώστε να παρακολουθούν διακριτικά τους S-300, με μια σειρά από τρόπους, στα Χανιά (όπου και οι Η.Π.Α.) και τώρα “φουλ” στην Α. Κρήτη, όπου θα έχουμε την Ι/Βάση Ραντάρ, και Νως της Α. Κρήτης τις πρώτες γεωτρητικές έρευνες, “καθ’ α ΡΤΕ έφα”!.. Ακόμα Τουρκάλες ή Αλβανο-Αλβανίδες (ούτε καν Β. Ηπειρώτισσες και… παπάρια), παντρεμένες με Ε/Αξκους – Υπξκους, που υπηρέτησαν στις “Πληροφορίες”! Μιλάμε για το(!!!) ε/Χειμαδιό!..

* Όταν έλεγε κάποιος σε ανώτατους Αξκούς στο ΓΕΕΘΑ, και δη στους “τουρίστες” και του ελέγχοντος τις Πληροφορίες… πατριωτικού (ο τίτλος του / η πινακίδα του) “Κυκλώματος” Αξκούς, για την Κρήτη και την σημασία της για τους Τούρκους, (πχ ότι ένας εκ των 2 συνθηματικών ονομασιών κατά τις τ/ασκήσεις “ΕΦΕΣΣΟΣ”, αφορούσε την Κρήτη και γιατί άραγε ή ότι οι Τούρκοι, εκ των πραγμάτων, θα ενδιαφερθούν για την Κρήτη, ώστε να δώσουν ΖΧ στους… πιεσμένους της… “ΤΔΒΚ” (sic), αν δει κανείς τον Χάρτη, αυτοί, στην καλύτερη των περιπτώσεων, μπορεί εντέχνως να τον έστελναν να κάνει από 5, έως 10 φορές το Επιτελείο πάνω -κάτω, με τα πόδια, και στην χειρότερη, εντέχνως πάλι, να τον παρουσίαζαν από… υπερβολικό (γραφικό), έως… ανόητο, όντας οι ίδιοι άσχετοι πλήρως με το αντικείμενο Τουρκία, αυτοί περίπου που ανερχόμενοι μετά στην Ιεραρχία, έλεγαν, απαντώντας σε κάποιους, “τον βάλαμε εκεί (στις Πληροφορίες) για να μην μας ενοχλεί”!.. Την ίδια στιγμή, οι Τούρκοι, αντίστοιχοι των Πληροφοριών, τηρούσαν το ΠΡΩΣΣΙΚΟ ΑΞΙΩΜΑ ότι “ΑΞΚΟΣ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ… ΠΙΣΤΟΛΙ – ΚΥΑΛΙΑ – ΧΑΡΤΗΣ”, με ό,τι αυτό με την σειρά του… σημαίνει! (Το “Πατριώτης” δεν το γράφω για τους Τούρκους, διότι όλοι των “Πληροφοριών” τους, διαχρονικά, ήσαν και είναι πρωτίστως ΠΑΤΡΙΩΤΕΣ)!..

5. Οι ΤΕΔ επισπεύδουν τις φετινές κρίσεις*, διότι μέσα στον Αύγουστο εκτιμούν ότι θα είναι σε θέση να επιτεθούν στην Σύρτη, αλλά και διότι με τους Έλληνες, “ποτέ δεν μπορεί να ξέρεις”, ειδικά αν είσαι Τούρκος!..

Στην Λιβύη του Σάρατς οι εκπαιδευτές του… Στρατού του, δεν είναι Τούρκοι, αλλά Τζιχαντιστές, έμμισθοι των ΤΕΔ και της ΜΙΤ, αναλόγως! (Τ/Κράτος). Τ/Τ είναι μόνον η ειδική “Ομάδα Συντονιστών” και αριθμός εξειδικευμένων στρατιωτικών, όπως πχ “Ειδικών Δυνάμεων” [πρέπει να είναι ένα Τάγμα ΒΒ(-)], “Πρακτόρων”, κλπ!

Οι ΤΕΔ μετέφεραν, επίσης, στη Λιβύη του Σάρατς, [χωρίς να υπάρχει ΚΑΝΕΝΑ ΝΑΤΟ, ΚΑΝΕΝΟΣ ΣΤΟΛΤΕΝΜΠΕΡΓΚ, και ΚΑΜΙΑΣ ΚΑΣ… ΙΝΟΥΣ ΑΦΕΝΤΟΥΛΗ (ναι, το “ταποματσό” αυτό ανθελληνικό πρακτόρι, με το ΝΑΠΟΛΕΟΝΤΕΙΟ ΣΥΜΠΛΕΓΜΑ), (ίσως θυμάστε που τα είχαμε ψάλλει στον Κο ΓΓ, ο οποίος έκανε και κάνει τα στραβά μάτια για τους Τούρκους… Τζιχαντιστές στην Σαρατσο-Λιβύη)], τα πολύκαννα ρουκετοβόλα (στη… “Δημοτική”) Τ-122 “ΣΑΓΓΑΡΕΙΟΣ” (για τους… Αιγυπτίους, σε περίπτωση που εισβάλλουν, αν οι ΤΕΔ ουσιαστικά, με την όποια εθνοτική τους σύνθεση, επιτεθούν στην στρατηγικότατη Σύρτη / οι Αιγύπτιοι έπρεπε ήδη να είχαν εισβάλλει, αν πραγματικά δεν θέλουν Τούρκους και “Αδελφούς Μπυσουλμάνους” στα Δυτικά τους), αλλά και μόλις το Σάββατο, με ταχύπλοα… “Ψαροκάϊκα” (sic) Δρία SAT – SAS, του ΤΠΝ! (Διαβάστε τις αποστολές τους, στο… “Youtube”)!..

* Σε ό,τι αφορά τους Γκιουλενιστές, μέχρι τώρα έχει διωχθεί από τις ΤΕΔ (στην χειρότερη των περιπτώσεων), περισσότερο από το 1/6 αυτών! Αν δεχθούμε ότι οι ΤΕΔ είναι συνολικά πχ 600.000, έχει αποστρατευτεί ένα ποσοτό μεγαλύτερο των 100.000 στελεχών*! Αν δούμε ότι οι ΤΕΔ εγγίζουν και τις 800.000 συνολικά, τότε το 1/6 γίνεται 1/8, αριθμός που και πάλι παραμένει υψηλός!..

* Αν μετά και αμέσως από το “Κίνημα” του 2016 εκδιώχθηκαν των ΤΕΔ, 20.000 άτομα, όπως τα Τ/ΜΜΕ αναφέρουν, τότε μέσα σε 4 χρόνια θα έχουν “φύγει” σίγουρα 100.000 άτομα, το ελάχιστον! Οι “ΑΓΓΕΛΟΙ” είναι σε θέση να ξέρουν πως ο αριθμός των εκδιωχθέντων εγγίζει τα 150.000 άτομα, εκτός αυτών που παρακολουθούνται ακόμα από την ΜΙΤ, ως ύποπτοι Γκιουλνειστές!..

Οι Τ/Γκιουλενιστές πιλότοι που ακούτε να έχουν αιτηθεί την επαναφορά τους στην ΤΠΑ, είναι κυρίως “ασπάλακες” (λέγονται και “Όφεις Ασφαλείας”), οι οποίοι βοήθησαν στην αποκάλυψη του “Κινήματος” του 2016 και ακολούθως στην χειραγώγησή του, η οποία στόχευε κυρίως στην ηρωοποίηση του ΡΤΕ, στην ισχυροποίησή του στην τ/εξουσία, στην θυματοποίηση της Τουρκίας προς τον “Διεθνή Παράγοντα” γενικώς και στους “Δυτικούς” ειδικώς, κλπ, κλπ, κλπ, είτε “ανανήψαντες”, εξ αιτίας μιας σειράς λόγων!..

Έχει ενδιαφέρον η παρατήρηση ότι οι Γκιουλενιστές γιατροί, έδιναν χάπια πιέσεως στους πιλότους, ώστε μετά να τους δίνουν πιστοποιητικά ατομικής… “μη διαθεσιμότητος”!.. Καταλάβατε!..

Ένας Ε-Τ πόλεμος, μάλλον πλέον δεν θα είναι Ε-Τ, αλλά Ε-Τουρκο-Πακιστανικός (τους μισθοφόρους Τζιχαντιστές, κυρίως Ιρακινούς πρώην Σανταμικούς, δεν τους συνυπολογίζω), καθώς Πακιστανοί υπάρχουν στην ΤΠΑ, [ως πιλότοι, αλλά και ως ΚΥΡΙΟΙ χειριστές κυρίως “SIHA” και μετά και “ΙΗΑ”, (οι Πακιστανοί έκαναν… “μάγκισες” τις ΤΕΔ και τα κουμπάρια του ΡΤΕ, τους Μπαϊρακτάρ και ουσιαστικά αυτούς έπρεπε να συγχαρεί ο Άγγλος ΥΠΑΜ πρόσφατα, όταν συνεχάρη τους Τούρκους, λέγοντας πως “αν τα μισά απ’ αυτά που λέγονται για τα siha, κλπ, είναι αλήθεια, τότε οι Τούρκοι άλλαξαν το παιχνίδι στην Λιβύη”) / τα όσα κάνουν οι Τούρκοι στην Λιβύη έχουν την απόλυτη έγκριση των Άγγλων και της ΕΕ, πλην των Ελλάδος – Γαλλίας, η κάθε μια για τους λόγους της], αλλά και στο ΤΠΝ, όπου επανειλημμένως “έπαιξαν” εναλλάξ, σε ασκήσεις, τους ρόλους του αμυνομένου και του επιτιθεμένου, ενώ πιθανώς Πακιστανικά πλοία να βρεθούν την κρίσιμη στιγμή, σε κρίσιμα / στρατηγικά, από ναυτικής σημασίας, σημεία!.. Καταλαβαίνετε!..

6. 6. Οι Η.Π.Α. των “Ρεπουμπλικανών” και του Τραμπ, δεν θέλουν τον Ρ-Γ αγωγό “ΝΟΡΝΤ-ΣΤΡΙΜ”*, αφού προκρίνουν τον “ΙΣΤ-ΜΕΝΤ”, που επιθυμούν τα 2/3 των Ισραηλινών, πλην των ακραίων αριστερών και κάποιων που από πίσω τους είναι οι “Διεθνείς Εβραίοι”, Η.Π.Α. και ΕΕ, οι οποίοι είναι πλειοψηφικά αντίθετοι του ενεργειακού Ι/Οράματος, προς Ευρώπη – Δύση και προς Ανατολή (Κ. – Α. Ασία, Ν. Καύκασο, κλπ)! Αυτός είναι ένας ακόμα λόγος διαμάχης της ΕΕ και ειδικά της Γερμανίας της Μέρκελ των Ρότσιλντ, μετά τα δεκάδες δις $ Η.Π.Α. που έχασαν, στα χρόνια του ΤΡΑΜΠ, οι “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΤΕΣ” “ΔΙΕΘΝΕΙΣ ΕΒΡΑΙΟΙ”, που κυβερνούν την ΕΕ και οι ιδρυτές του σύγχρονου Κομμουνισμού, του Καπιταλιστικού Κομμουνισμού των “ΕΛΙΤ” των Κινεζικών “Πολιτμπιρό”, συνεργάτες τους Κινέζοι, κατά τον πόλεμο “ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΤΡΙΩΤΙΣΜΟΣ” – “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ”!

* Γι’ αυτό εξηγούσαμε και αναλύαμε εδώ, ότι οι Ρώσοι είναι Νο”1″ εχθρός του Ισραήλ!..  / Θυμίζω ακόμα ότι η Ρ/”ΓΚΑΖΠΡΟΜ”, στην οποία εργαζόταν και ένας τέως Α/ΓΕΣ, (ο Έλληνας στρατιωτικός… “Πορνοστάρ”, όπως κάποιοι τον αποκαλούσαν παλιά), έχει έλθει σε συμφωνία με την Κίνα, από το 2014!..

Έτσι, οι “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΤΕΣ” και οι Κινέζοι, που είδαν -επιπροσθέτως- πλην της τεράστιας ζημίας που υπέστησαν παγκοσμίως, την ανεργία, με την πολιτική Τραμπ, να κατεβαίνει στις Η.Π.Α. στο 3%-5%, σε συνεννόηση “απελευθέρωσαν” τον υπαρκτό ιό (“COVID-19”) από τα Κινεζικά κομμουνιστικά εργαστήρια της Γιουχάν, με το σύνθημα “ΤΩΡΑ ή ΠΟΤΕ” ΚΑΙ ΜΕ ΕΝΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΟΝΑΔΙΚΟ ΣΤΟΧΟ ΚΑΙ ΣΚΟΠΟ, ΝΑ ΑΝΑΤΡΕΨΟΥΝ ΤΟΝ ΤΡΑΜΠ ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΑΝΑΚΤΗΣΟΥΝ ΤΙΣ Η.Π.Α. ΚΑΙ ΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟ ΙΣΧΥ, ΑΦΟΥ ΘΑ ΞΑΝΑΑΛΩΣΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΜΚΚΑ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΠΙΤΑΛΙΣΜΟΥ!..

Έτσι εκεί που οι Η.Π.Α. είχαν ανεργία άντε 5%, έχουν σήμερα ανέργους περί τα 40.000.000 άτομα! Ο “ΚΟΒΙΝΤ-19” ήταν η ΚΥΡΙΑ ΑΝΤΙΔΡΑΣΗ της “ΣΥΜΜΑΧΙΑΣ” “ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΕΒΡΑΙΩΝ” / “ΠΑΓΚΟΜΣΙΟΠΟΙΗΤΩΝ” με τους ΚΙΝΕΖΟΥΣ “ΕΛΙΤΟΚΑΠΙΤΑΛΟΚΟΜΜΟΥΝΙΣΤΕΣ” και… “πιάσε λύκο και καβάλα”!..

Όλα τα υπόλοιπα που είδαμε και ακούσαμε είναι ιεραρχικώς στον σχεδιασμό της Συμμαχίας αυτής “δεύτερα” και “τρίτα”!.. (Όπως πχ είναι η δολοφονία του Μαύρου ναρκομανή πορνοστάρ, η εμφάνιση του φαινομένου των… “ΣΟΡΟΣ-ΕΞΑΡΧΕΙΩΝ” και στις Η.Π.Α. / Σιάτλ, η εμφάνιση των “ΑΝΤΙΦΑ”, που γεννήθηκαν στην “CIA” του “ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΥ” Κλίντον, κλπ, κλπ, κλπ και “απλώθηκαν”, βάσει του κειμένου σχεδιασμού και στην Ευρώπη, η καθημερινή κατασυκοφάντηση παγκοσμίως του ΤΡΑΜΠ, δια των ΜΜΕ / στην Ελλάδα αυτή γίνεται, ακόμα και σε βάρος των ε/εθνικών συμφερόντων, κάτι που είναι απολύτως φο-βε-ρό, κλπ, κλπ, κλπ! Μέχρι και ο Αφτιάς το “τσίμπησε” και σου λέει δεν γλείφω και εγώ λίγο την “Παγκοσμιοποίηση” βρίζοντας εντέχνως τον Τραμπ, μπας και γίνω βουλευτής του Κ. Κ. Μητσοτάκη);

7. 7. Ναι! Μια ήττα του ΤΡΑΜΠ, θα σημάνει την τελική επικράτηση της “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΥ ΔΙΚΤΑΤΟΡΙΑΣ” των “ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΕΒΡΑΙΩΝ”, όπως και ο ίδιος ο Α/Πρόεδρος το είχε τονίσει σ΄εκείνη την ιστορική του τελευταία ομιλία στον Ο.Η.Ε., στα τέλη του 2019!..
8. 8. Ναι, συμφωνώ! Γι’ αυτό έβαλαν το ΡΑΜΟΛΙ Μπάϊντεν (ΤΟΝ “ΚΟΙΜΙΣΜΕΝΟ ΤΖΟ”, όπως τον λέει ορθά ο Τραμπ / ο… Τάκης θα τον έλεγε, όπως τους ΜΠΑΟΥΚ-τζήδες, “Όρθιο Γελάδι”… ) υποψήφιο Πρόεδρο, με τους “ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ”, ώστε αν κερδίσουν αυτοί, όπως ελπίζει και διακαώς θέλει η “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ”, να μην έχουν αντιδράσεις από τους λαούς και συγκεκριμένα από τον Πρόεδρο της θεωρητικά ισχυρότερης στον Πλανήτη χώρας – υπερδύναμης, για να μπορέσουν έτσι “ΝΑ ΠΑΡΟΥΝ ΠΙΣΩ ΤΑ ΟΣΑ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΑ ΕΧΑΣΑΝ ΕΠΙ ΤΡΑΜΠ”!..
9. 9. Τί σημαίνει “ΞΕΨΥΧΟΝ ΘΗΡΙΟ”; Φαντάσου ένα πολυλαβωμένο θηρίο (πχ ένα λιοντάρι, αλλά και οποιοδήποτε άλλο ζώο… ), να έχει εγκλωβιστεί κάπου! Τί κάνει; Στην  προσπάθειά του να ξεφύγει, κτυπά επιτιθέμενο, ασύμμετρα, ήτοι μια εδώ και μια εκεί, ανάλογα απ’ όπου νοιώθει ότι απειλείται κάθε φορά, ενώ πάντα δείχνει τα… δόντια του και δοκιμάζει στο μέγιστο την… φωνή του!

Αυτό δεν κάνει σήμερα η Τουρκία;

Μια κτυπά στη Συρία, μια τους Κούρδους μέσα στην Τουρκία, μια στην Κύπρο, μια στην Ελλάδα, μια στην Λιβύη, μια στο Β. Ιράκ, τους Ιρακινούς και μια τους Κούρδους εκεί (οι ΤΕΔ ΙΣΧΥΡΙΖΟΝΤΑΙ “ΣΗΜΕΡΑ” ΟΤΙ ΤΟ “ΡΚΚ” ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΣΕ ΘΕΣΗ ΠΙΑ ΝΑ ΔΙΕΞΑΓΑΓΕΙ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΙΣ), τώρα και τους Αρμένηδες, σε λίγο ίσως και τους Αιγυπτίους σε… ουδέτερο έδαφος (Λιβύη), κλπ, κλπ, κλπ!.. Ευρίσκεται σε κατάσταση “ΑΜΥΝΗΣ” και προ του θανάτου της (ΔΙΑΛΥΣΗ) και δρα ασύμμετρα στο Πεδίο, για να ξεφύγει και “ει δυνατόν” να κατασπαράξει και κάποιον απ’ τους επίδοξους… φονιάδες της, κλπ!..  Είναι θέμα χρόνου* ο θάνατος του παγιδευμένου ζώου!..

Γι’ αυτό ο ΡΤΕ έχει μιλήσει, λίγο μετά το “Κίνημα”, για 2ο Τ/”ΑΓΩΝΑ ΑΝΕΞΑΡΤΗΣΙΑΣ”!.. ΟΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΙ ΝΟΙΩΘΟΥΝ ], ΟΠΩΣ ΤΗ  ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟ 1919-1922!..

Γι’ αυτό και ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΤΑΙ Η ΕΛΛΑΣ (ΚΑΙ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ Η ΣΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ ΧΡΕΟΚΟΠΗΜΕΝΟ-ΥΠΟΘΗΚΕΜΕΝΗ ΕΛΛΑΣ), ΝΑ ΜΗΝ ΠΡΟΒΑΙΝΕΙ ΣΕ ΒΕΒΙΑΣΜΕΝΕΣ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΙΣ, ΑΛΛΑ ΠΑΡΑΜΕΝΟΥΣΑ ΣΟΒΑΡΗ, ΝΑ ΔΡΑ ΜΕ ΠΟΛΛΗ ΠΕΡΙΣΚΕΨΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ “ΤΗΝ ΚΡΙΣΙΜΗ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ”, ΟΤΑΝ ΤΟ ΑΠΟΚΑΜΩΜΕΝΟ ΘΗΡΙΟ ΘΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΕΙΞΕΙ ΤΟ “ΔΟΞΑ ΠΑΤΡΙ” ΤΟΥ ή ΠΙΘΑΝΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ… “ΙΝΙΑΚΟ” ΤΟΥ!..

* Η ΔΙΑΤΑΧΘΕΙΣΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΝ “ΝΕΟ-ΤΣΑΡΟ” ΠΟΥΤΙΝ (ΨΗΦΙΣΤΗΚΕ ΝΟΜΙΖΩ ΣΤΗΝ Ρ/ΔΟΥΜΑ ΝΑ ΠΑΡΑΜΕΙΝΕΙ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΣ, ΑΝ ΤΟ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ Ο ΘΕΟΣ, ΜΕΧΡΙ ΤΟ 2035), ΠΡΟΣΦΑΤΗ Ρ/ΑΣΚΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ 150.000 ΑΝΔΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΩΝ, ΔΕ ΕΓΙΝΕ ΤΥΧΑΙΑ!

ΑΝ ΠΡΟΣΕΞΕΙΣ ΦΙΛΕ, ΟΛΕΣ ΟΙ ΧΩΡΕΣ – ΔΡΩΝΤΕΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΠΕΡΙΟΧΗ ΜΑΣ, “ΚΥΝΗΓΟΥΝ” ΣΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΑ ΦΑΣΗ ΤΟΝ… ΧΡΟΝΟ!.. ΠΛΗΝ ΤΩΝ ΡΩΣΩΝ ΠΧ Η Τ/ΒΟΥΛΗ ΕΝΕΚΡΙΝΕ “ΠΡΟΧΘΕΣ” ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ… ΕΠΙΜΗΚΥΝΣΗ – ΕΠΕΚΤΑΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΤΕΔ, “ΤΗ ΑΙΤΗΣΕΙ” ΤΟΥΣ, ΟΙ ΚΡΙΣΕΙΣ ΕΠΙΣΠΕΥΔΟΝΤΑΙ, ΚΛΠ!

10. 10. Ορθότατα η Ελλάς διεμβόλισε το ΚΩΜΙΚΟ(!!!) “Τ-Λ Μνημόνιο”! ΑΟΖ όμως με την “Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία”, γιατί ακόμα δεν ανακήρυξε; Η Τουρκία έχει ξεκινήσει τον εναντίον μας πόλεμο, όπως το έχουμε εδώ εξηγήσει αναλυτικά!..

Η επέκταση στα 12 ΝΜ ΘΑ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ Τ/ΕΠΙΘΕΣΗ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΜΑΣ!.. ΤΟ “ΓΙΑΤΙ”, ΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΕΧΟΥΜΕ ΓΡΑΨΕΙ, ΣΚΕΨΟΥ ΤΟ ΜΟΝΟΣ ΣΟΥ ΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΦΟΡΑ!.. … ΚΟΥΡΑΣΤΗΚΑ!..

11. ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΕ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΕΞΗΣ: ΚΡΥΦΟ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΣΤΙΣ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΟΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΑΛΛΟ! ΓΙ’ ΑΥΤΟ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΕΡΑΣΤΙΑ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑ ΤΟ ΠόΤΕ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΕΙΣΑΙ, (ΚΥΡΙΩΣ ΩΣ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ ΕΝΝΟΩ, ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΩΣ ΑΤΟΜΟ), ΤΟ ΠΟύ ΘΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ Τί!..

ΑΥΤΟ ΒΕΒΑΙΩΣ ΦΙΛΑΡΑΚΙ ΔΕΝ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ ΟΤΙ ΓΙΑ Ο,ΤΙ ΞΕΡΟΥΜΕ “ΒΓΑΖΟΥΜΕ… ΤΕΛΑΛΗ” ή… “ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ”!.. Διάλεξε και… πάρε!..

12. 12. Ρωτάμε! Η ΕΥΠ διαθέτει σήμερα… Βασίληδες ΣΟΥΦΛΕΣ; Μήπως θα τις χρειαστούν άραγε, σε άλλο επίπεδο και για άλλους λόγους;
13. 13. Ναι, συμφωνώ! Είναι τραγικά αστείο! Ο Καλίν απάντησε στον Ποντίφηκα για την Αγία Σοφία, προσπαθώντας να απαλύνει τον πόνο του!.. Αχαχαχαχαχαχαχαχα!.. Και το γλυκό έδεσε με τις ακολουθήσασες δηλώσεις του… Τ/Υπ. Τουρισμού”, ο οποίος αναφέρθηκε στην λεηλασία του Ναού από την Δύση και στην προστασία του από τους Οθωμανούς παλιότερα και τώρα Τούρκους απογόνους τους Ισλαμιστές! Αχαχαχαχαχαχαχαχα!

Ω! Της Ξεφτίλας” Σεβαστέ Πάπα ΡΩΜΗΣ!.. Κατάντησες “Η ΧΛΕΥΗ ΤΩΝ ΗΤΤΗΜΕΝΩΝ”, όπως έλεγε κάποτε ο ΜΕΓΑΣ ΠΑΤΡΙΩΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΟΛΑΤΡΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ! (Ο παππούς του “ΓΑΠ”)!..

14. 14. Εσύ γιατί λες να έχουν σταλεί τώρα “JÖH” στην Ποντική;
15. Ναι! Ο Σαλβίνι τάχθηκε υπέρ μας, στο θέμα της Αγίας Σοφίας, για την οποία δεν θα επαναλάβουμε τον λόγο που οι Τούρκοι την έκαναν και πάλι Τζαμί!..

Γ. ΓΡΑΦΑΜΕ ΕΠΙΣΗΣ ΕΔΩ!

Αλβανία: Πόσοι Αλβανοί τζιχαντιστές του “ISIS” είναι αιχμάλωτοι στη Συρία

23 Απριλίου 2019

Η Αλβανία είναι μία από τις βαλκανικές χώρες που τροφοδότησε με τζιχαντιστές την οργάνωση Ισλαμικό Κράτος.

Ορισμένοι από αυτούς, που έμειναν μέχρι τέλους να πολεμήσουν, πιάστηκαν αιχμάλωτοι από τις υπό κουρδική διοίκηση “Συριακές Δημοκρατικές Δυνάμεις” (SDF).

Δύο κυριακάτικες αλβανικές εφημερίδες, οι shqiptarja.com και «ΝΤΙΤΑ», αναφέρονται στο θέμα των Αλβανών πολιτών, κυρίως γυναικόπαιδων που βρίσκονται στον καταυλισμό Αλ Χολ στην Ανατολική Συρία, που ελέγχεται από τις δυνάμεις των Κούρδων.

Ανάμεσα στα περισσότερα από 70 χιλιάδες άτομα του καταυλισμού αυτού, σημειώνουν οι εφημερίδες, βρίσκονται και πενήντα (50) Αλβανοί πολίτες.

Πρόκειται κυρίως για γυναίκες και παιδιά, οι σύζυγοι και οι πατεράδες των οποίων πολέμησαν στο πλευρό των δυνάμεων του Ισλαμικού Κράτους στη Συρία και το Ιράκ.

Εκτός αυτών, σημειώνουν οι ίδιες εφημερίδες, στον καταυλισμό βρίσκονται και Αλβανοί από το Κόσοβο και τη Βόρεια Μακεδονία.

Το Σάββατο, σημειώνουν οι εφημερίδες, μετά από προσπάθειες της κυβέρνησης του Κοσόβου και των Αμερικανών, επέστρεψαν στην Πρίστινα από τη Συρία 110 πολίτες του Κοσόβου, από τους οποίους οι 4 συνελήφθησαν ως τρομοκράτες.

Μέχρι τώρα, γράφουν οι εφημερίδες, οι αλβανικές Αρχές δεν έχουν κάνει σχεδόν τίποτα για τον επαναπατρισμό των Αλβανών πολιτών, γυναίκες και παιδιά, από το Αλ Χολ της Συρίας.

Το αλβανικό κράτος, σημειώνει η εφημερίδα, δε φοβάται τα παιδιά, φοβάται όμως τις γυναίκες.

Διότι ορισμένες από αυτές είναι γαλουχημένες με εξτρεμιστικές ιδέες και αποτελούν εν δυνάμει κίνδυνο για την Αλβανία.

Μέχρι τώρα, σημειώνει η εφημερίδα, επέστρεψαν εθελοντικά από τη Συρία, 27 Αλβανοί πολίτες που πολέμησαν στο πλευρό του Ισλαμικού Κράτους.

Παραμένουν ακόμα εκεί άλλοι 31 ενώ 14 Αλβανοί που πήγαν στη Συρία, έχουν σκοτωθεί.

Τέλος, οι εφημερίδες αναφέρουν και το παράδειγμα του Αλβανού επιχειρηματία Γκιετάν Ντρεγκιώνη ο οποίος, αφού βρήκε τα δυο ανίψια του που είναι στον καταυλισμό Αλ Χολ, προσπάθησε να τα φέρει πίσω στην Αλβανία, προσφέροντας εκατό χιλιάδες ευρώ σε Τούρκους λαθρεμπόρους αλλά δεν τα κατάφερε.

Πόσοι πήγαν στη Συρία

Το 2013 μια ομάδα 52 Σλάβων μουσουλμάνων της Βοσνίας (Βοσνιακοί) πήγαν στη Συρία. Σκοτώθηκαν δύο και 32 επέστρεψαν.

Έως τον Απρίλιο του 2015, 232 Αλβανοί Κοσοβάροι είχαν πάει στη Συρία. Οι περισσότεροι εντάχθηκαν στο Ισλαμικό Κράτος.

Έως τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2014, 48 Αλβανοί -από διάφορες χώρες των Βαλκανίων- είχαν σκοτωθεί στη Συρία και στο Ιράκ.

Έως τον Μάρτιο του 2016 περίπου 60 Κοσοβάροι τζιχαντιστές είχαν σκοτωθεί σε μάχες.

Έως τον Μάρτιο του 2016 η αλβανική κυβέρνηση υπολόγιζε ότι περισσότεροι από 100 Αλβανοί είχαν ενταχθεί στο Ισλαμικό Κράτος στη Συρία και το Ιράκ. 18 είχαν σκοτωθεί και 12 τραυματιστεί.

Αλβανοί από τη Βόρεια Μακεδονία έσπευσαν επίσης στο Ισλαμικό Κράτος. Έως το 2014 γνωρίζαμε ότι έξι από αυτούς σκοτώθηκαν.

Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria

APRIL 2015, VOLUME 8, ISSUE 4

Authors:

ADRIAN SHTUNI

Extensive research suggests that about 500 ethnic Albanians from the Western Balkans have traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012, predominantly joining the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN).¹ For the most part these fighters are the product of a well-integrated regional network of extremist entities painstakingly expanded across the region over the past two decades. Recent counterterrorism operations in Albania and Kosovo have shed some light on the structure and inner workings of this network. These efforts by local law enforcement agencies have revealed that the web of extremist actors primarily comprises a new generation of local fundamentalist clerics trained in the Middle East and closely affiliated with a number of foreign-funded Islamic charities and cultural associations.

This article examines the presence of ethnic Albanian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq and provides an analysis of their backgrounds, affiliations, and activities. The data reveal that the age groups most vulnerable to recruitment are different among the countries examined—Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia—despite broad ethno-linguistic and cultural similarities.The study concludes that if they are to be effective, counter-narrative campaigns and government responses must take into account evolving trends of radicalization, and that they should be fine-tuned to target the age groups most vulnerable to being swept up into violent extremism.

Historical Conditions

The Western Balkans are home to the largest indigenous Muslim population in Europe and a long standing tradition of moderate Islam that dates back to the Ottoman conquest of the peninsula in the 15th century. There are important distinctions, however, among the different countries of the region. Islam lost significant ground in Albania during the communist era. Albania’s long-time dictator Enver Hoxha went so far as to declare his country to be the first atheist state in the world, and all religion was banned between 1967 and 1990.²The fall of communism in the early 1990s, however, created significant volatility, both political and ideological.

The vacuum attracted pan-nationalist movements and Islamist revivalists across the Balkans, including some 20 Arab Islamic foundations, which established a strong presence in Albania.³ These foundations financed the building of hundreds of mosques and awarded educational scholarships to thousands of malleable young Muslim Albanians. Many of these young men who took up these opportunities returned home from their studies in Arab and Asian religious institutions with a strong sense of spiritual identity and an eagerness to promote a puritanical form of Islam.⁴ The impoverished Albanian government, thanks to combination of lax law enforcement oversight and a desperate need for foreign aid and investment, paid scant attention to some of the more dubious dealings by some of the charities until in June 1998. In that month, law enforcement agencies raided the offices of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society and four sites linked to other charities, arresting four foreign terrorist operatives in their employ.⁵ The raids broke up a cell of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad⁶ terrorist organization and reportedly foiled a bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tirana.⁷ Nevertheless, almost a quarter century of forced atheism had made Albanian society comparatively less susceptible to radical Islam.

In contrast, ethnic Albanians who lived in the territories of the former Yugoslavia as an ethnic and religious minority struggling for civil rights embraced Islam. It was not simply a dogma for them, but it was also part of a pragmatic strategy intended to secure ethnic and territorial preservation. Yugoslavia’s decade-long violent dissolution intensified ethno-religious cleavages, creating a more welcoming environment for a militant strain of Islam. As the 1998–1999 Kosovo war came to an end, and almost a decade after infiltrating Albania, dozens of foreign faith-based charities—particularly Saudi-funded groups—set up shop in Kosovo. Besides providing humanitarian aid and building schools and community centers, they also erected significant numbers of Wahhabi mosques and madrassas,⁸ the financing of which was opaque.

The Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC), whose activities have been linked to al-Qa’ida operatives,⁹ reportedly built 98 primary and secondary schools in rural Kosovo after the war. The most promising students were enrolled in 30 Koranic schools sponsored by the Islamic Endowment Foundation, an SJRC entity.¹⁰ In a massive construction boom, more than 100 unlicensed mosques sprouted across Europe’s poorest country within ten years. ¹¹ Kosovo covers just 4,212 square miles.

The development of an extensive religious infrastructure required a significant increase in the number of qualified clerics. Agencies and groups such as The World Assembly of Muslim Youth made available hundreds of scholarships to Middle Eastern Islamic education institutions.¹² The returning graduates, often sporting the Salafis’ trademark long beard with the clean-shaven upper lip, created a steady supply of hard-line clerics for the growing network of mosques and madrassas across Kosovo. Tellingly, eight of the 11 Kosovo imams arrested between August and September 2014 on charges of preaching extremism and helping to recruit jihadists were relatively young and educated in the Middle East.¹³

Genci (Abdurrahim) Balla, a 35-year-old imam educated in Saudi Arabia, is typical of those caught up in the operation. He was arrested in April 2014 in Albania on suspicion of leading a recruitment ring authorities believe to have sent dozens of fighters to Syria.¹⁴ These imams were closely affiliated with a chain of 14 Islamic charities and cultural associations whose leaders were also educated in the Middle East and which the authorities in Kosovo shut down recently because of their alleged ties to Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁵

The Scale of the Problem

There were only a small number of ethnic Albanian individuals involved in jihadist activity prior to the Syrian conflict.¹⁶ The evidence now suggest that the number of ethnic Albanians who have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq as of early March 2015 is about 500.Among the data points that are publicly available, Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Affairs in a late February 2015 interview stated that the number of foreign fighters from Kosovo stands at “about 300.”¹⁷ The latest available estimates for Albanian citizens range from 90 to 148.¹⁸ By comparison, published estimates of Macedonian fighters—just 12—are very low, and other evidence seems to suggest a higher number may be more accurate.The similar number of reported casualties among jihadists from Albania (12) and ethnic Albanian jihadists from Macedonia (14) would indicate that the total number of ethnic Albanian fighters from Macedonia is about 100. This estimate is further supported by the reported death rate of around 10 percent among German,¹⁹ Belgian,²⁰ Dutch,²¹ and Bosnian²² jihadists. Only one ethnic Albanian jihadist from Serbia has been reported dead so far.

The data also reveals that relative to its population of 1.8 million, Kosovo is arguably the largest source of European jihadists in Syria and Iraq. With a rate of over 16 fighters per 100,000 nationals, Kosovo’s recruitment rate is more than eight times that of France, Europe’s largest overall source of jihadists in Syria and Iraq.²³ Kosovo’s per capita rate of recruitment exceeds by about 60 percent even that of a failed state like Libya.²⁴

There are several likely factors for this development. Geographic proximity, lack of visa restrictions, and low transportation costs make the trip to Syria logistically easy. Yet the confluence of particular sociopolitical, economic, and demographic factors may help explain Kosovo Albanians’ disproportionate rate of radicalization. With 44 percent of the population aged below 25, Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe.²⁵ There is also a surplus of young men, with a ratio of 1.1 male(s) per female. This youth bulge makes the country more susceptible to radicalization and social unrest, especially when combined with rapid urbanization and poor economic conditions.²⁶ In fact Kosovo has the lowest Human Development Index in Europe and the lowest per capita income in the Balkans.²⁷ Also, as of 2013, Kosovo’s unemployment rate for the 15–24 age group was 56 percent.²⁸ A number of studies demonstrate a significant association between high youth unemployment and the incidence of terrorism in Europe.²⁹ Furthermore, according to United National Development Programme (UNDP), 62 percent of Kosovo’s adult population has low levels of education.³⁰ Ignorance and lack of proper educational opportunities often make people more vulnerable to ideological indoctrination and radicalization.³¹ In Kosovo, this vulnerability is exacerbated by significant ethnic polarization and the recent traumatic ethno-sectarian conflict that had sharp religious undertones.

Who are the Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters?

The author researched, examined, and categorized publicly available data related to ethnic Albanian foreign fighters and their known associates published between November 2012 and early March 2015 by media outlets, released by regional governments, or posted on social media. The resulting dataset compiled for the purposes of this study contains information on 211 ethnic Albanian men who have either fought in Syria and/or Iraq at some point between 2012 and 2015 or have been arrested and are being investigated for recruiting fighters or attempting to join terrorist groups. This number does not include the dozens of women, children, and other family members who have accompanied them.

According to official sources, at least 13 Albanian nationals have traveled to Syria with their wives and 31 children.³² Another report claims that about 20 Kosovo Albanian families have “made hijrah”³³ to live and fight in the region and that one of these families—composed of three brothers, two wives, and five children— traveled to Syria as late as September 2014.³⁴ Bearing in mind the patriarchal family structure common among ethnic Albanians, particularly in Kosovo, it would be reasonable to assume that more than 100 ethnic Albanian relatives of jihadists have made the trip, some of whom may have received military training and eventually participated in armed operations.

Of the 211 men in the data set, at least 152 of these men from Albania (70), Kosovo (64), Macedonia (17), and Serbia (1) have fought in Syria and/or Iraq in the past three to four years. Of those 152 men, 49 were reportedly killed in action: 12 from Albania, 22 from Kosovo, 14 from Macedonia, and one from Serbia. The first local media report of an ethnic Albanian casualty came in early November 2012 regarding Naman Demolli, a 35-year-old Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) veteran and a staunch activist for a radical Islamic movement turned political party in Kosovo.³⁵ The presence of at least two groups of ethnic Albanians fighting in Syria was also recorded in November 2012.³⁶

The deadliest year was 2014 with at least 29 reported deaths. The deadliest month was September 2014 with ten reported deaths mostly the result of U.S.-led airstrikes targeting Islamic State strongholds. January 2014 was the second deadliest with five reported deaths, mainly linked to intensified clashes between the Islamic State and JN. Media reports on at least three, and possibly as many as six, Kosovo Albanian youths traveling to Syria in early January 2015 attest to the continued flow of fighters despite the punitive measures taken by local governments to curb the phenomenon.³⁷

At least ten of the fighters identified in the dataset belong to the ethnic Albanian diaspora in Western Europe and possibly had dual nationality, specifically five originating from Macedonia, and five originating from Kosovo. Their last reported residences were in Germany, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. Other fighters or would-be fighters arrested before they could travel to Syria or Iraq are known to have resided at some point in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt.

Two main clusters of fighters that stand out are those with previous military experience (14) and those with previous formal religious training (ten). At least 14 of the fighters from the dataset have previous guerilla warfare experience or formal military training. There were ten KLA and/or National Liberation Army veterans from the armed conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia in late 1990s and the beginning of 2000s and four former Albanian Army Commandos in the data set.³⁸ Media reports suggest they traveled to the conflict zone in groups and that the number of KLA veterans who have already fought in Syria may be even higher. One press article from mid-2013 quotes a KLA veteran as stating that he was planning to join the war in Syria “with about a dozen war comrades.”³⁹

Meanwhile, the pool of imams and madrassa students involved either directly or indirectly in this armed conflict increases from ten to 23 when including the 13 imams arrested in Kosovo and Albania for inspiring or recruiting jihadists.⁴⁰ Albanian authorities reportedly possess strong evidence that a ring operated by two imams in the suburbs of Tirana is responsible for recruiting 70 fighters.⁴¹

Not surprisingly, due to a tradition of close-knit families among ethnic Albanians, a third cluster of fighters is connected to each other mainly through kinship ties. There are at least eight cases in which a small group of fighters related to each other (e.g., brother or cousins) traveled to the Middle East, for a total of 20 known fighters. In five of these cases, the fighters originate from Kosovo. This is in line with a similar trend observed among fighters from other countries such as France and the United Kingdom.⁴²

What Age Groups are Most Susceptible to Recruitment for Violent Jihad?

Of the 152 ethnic Albanian foreign fighters identified by name or by pseudonym in the media, the data set contains demographic data for 88 fighters. Based on this information the ethnic Albanian fighters range in age from 17–70 and they are on average 30-years-old. The data suggests that the age group most susceptible to recruitment for violent jihad among ethnic Albanians is 21–25 years old.

While the individuals in this data set share similar ethnic and linguistic backgrounds and are clustered together on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, they originate from three different socio-economic and political environments. Ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia have more points of commonality due to their common Yugoslav past than they share with Albanian nationals. In order to detect potential variances between fighters, the data was segmented by country of origin: Albania (23), Kosovo (49), Macedonia (15), and Serbia (1). Though the sample sizes of fighters originating from each country are not equal, they represent comparable ratios relative to the number of estimated fighters per country, 16, 16, and 15 percent respectively.

The data segmentation reveals distinctly different patterns of recruitment among this pool of foreign fighters. While the age group most susceptible to recruitment is the same among ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia (21–25) that changes by a decade in the case of Albania (31–35). This variance is largely reflected in the fighters’ average age by country of origin as follows: Albania 35.6, Kosovo 28, and Macedonia 25.8. These differences, which are somewhat explained by Kosovo’s younger median population age and other drivers of radicalization listed above, could also be influenced by the demographics of the most radical, charismatic, and successful recruiters in each country. In Kosovo this includes a 25-year-old Islamic State commander named Lavdrim Muhaxheri, who until recently ran an Islamic cultural association. His counterpart in Albania was, until his arrest, the 35-year-old Imam Genci Balla.Another potential causal factor worth exploring may be the fact that Kosovo society experienced the growth of Middle Eastern charities with extremist links well after Albania did—post-1999 in Kosovo compared to post-1990 in Albania.

Conclusion

The unprecedented proportion of ethnic Albanians being drawn to violent extremist organizations testifies that militant Islamist narratives have struck a chord. This preliminary study based on a detailed, yet partial footprint of the ethnic Albanian foreign fighters, identified two distinct age groups particularly susceptible to recruitment into violent extremism. While the typical foreign fighter from Albania is a male between 31 and 35 years old, the typical ethnic Albanian foreign fighter from Kosovo and Macedonia is a male between 21 and 25 years old. The data indicate that country-specific dynamics, despite all the many ethno-linguistic and cultural similarities among ethnic Albanians in the Balkans, may have had a more determining role in their path to radicalization.

A more granular understanding of the complex radicalization environment and recruitment patterns identified in this study would allow for a more informed counter-radicalization strategy and effective counter-narrative campaigns targeting the most susceptible age groups. Moreover, these counter-radicalization efforts would benefit from frequent monitoring and assessment of evolving radicalization patterns in the region. Ultimately, the long-term success of these efforts will be determined by the ability to adjust to and anticipate radicalization trends.

Adrian Shtuni is a Washington, D.C.-based foreign policy and security analyst with a regional focus on the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. He holds a M.Sc. in Foreign Service with a concentration in International Relations and Security from Georgetown University, and consults for think tanks and academic institutions on issues of radicalization and violent extremism.

[1]This estimate is based on data provided by multiple specialized reports tracking the flow of foreign fighters to Syria, hundreds of articles from regional media outlets reporting on this issue, and social media inquiries between November 2012 and early March 2015.

[2] Finngeir Hiorth, “Albania: An Atheistic State?,” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe (10:5), Article 3, 1990.

[3] Miranda Vickers, “Islam in Albania,” Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, March 1, 2008.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Probes Blasts’ Possible Mideast Ties.” The Washington Post, August 12, 1998.

[6] The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an al-Qa’ida affiliate established in the 1970s responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and for targeting U.S. and Israeli facilities in a number of countries.

[7] John Kifner, “Police Seek Suspects Tied To Terrorism In Albania.” The New York Times. August 21, 1998.

[8] David Gardner, “Saudis Have Lost the Right to Take Sunni Leadership,” Financial Times, January 1, 2014.

[9] “Written Testimony Of Jean-Charles Brisard, International Expert On Terrorism Financing Lead Investigator 911 Lawsuit, CEO JCB Consulting International–Before The Committee On Banking, Housing And Urban Affairs United States Senate.” October 22, 2003.

[10] “Political Islam Among the Albanians: Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans?” KIPRED, June 1, 2005.

[11] “Kosova Mbyll Sytë Para Xhamive Ilegale,” (Kosovo turns a blind eye towards illegal mosques), Balkan Insight, January 12, 2012.

[12] William Finnegan, “The Countdown,” The New Yorker, October 15, 2007.

[13] Fatos Bytyci, “Imam Arrested in Kosovo on Suspicion of Recruiting Islamist Fighters,” Reuters, August, 2014 14, and Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo Imams Arrested in Push to Stop Fighters Going to Syria, Iraq,” Reuters, September 17, 2014. 2015 .

[14] Nikoleta Kovaci, “Lufta Në Siri, Zbulohet Celula Terroriste Në Tiranë” (War in Syria: Terrorist Cell Identified in Tirana, Shekulli Mobile, February 1, 2014 .

[15] Fatos Bytyci, “Indebted to America, Kosovo Struggles to Curb Islamist Recruits,” Reuters, October 14, 2014 and “Mbyllet OJQ-ja e imamit qe eshte e lidhur me ‘Vellazerine Myslimane’” (Shut down the imam’s NGO with links to ‘Muslim Brotherhood’), Portali Telegrafi, September 22, 2014.

[16] Timothy Holman, “Foreign Fighters from the Western Balkans in Syria,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY, June 30, 2014 .

[17] “Intervistë me Skender Hysenin, Ministrër i Brendshëm i Kosovës” (Interview with Skender Hyseni, Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Affairs). VOA. February 20, 2015.

[18] Peter R Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” ICSR, 26 January, 2015 and “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” The Washington Post, January 27, 2015.

[19] Daniel H. Heinke, and Jan Raudszus, “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY. January 20, 2015.

[20] Christian Levaux, “Belgian Police Kill Two in Raid on Suspected Islamists,” Reuters. January 15, 2015.

[21] Samar Batrawi and Ilona Chmoun, “Dutch Foreign Fighters Continue to Travel to Syria, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY, July, 20 2014.

[22] Rusmir Smajilhodzic, “Bosnia Arrests 16 Would-be Fighters, Balkans Move Against Jihadists,” Agence France Presse, September 3, 2014.

[23] “France to Get Better Weapons, Hire More Intelligence Agents to Fight Homegrown Terror,” CBS News, January 21, 2015.

[24] Ibid., Neumann.

[25] “The World Factbook: Kosovo,” Central Intelligence Agency and “Kosovo Population and Housing Census 2011,” UNSTATS. November 1, 2012 .

[26] Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs. January 1, 2012 .

[27] “Kosovo Human Development Report 2012: Private Sector and Employment,” UNDP November 2012 .

[28] “Workforce Survey Results,” Kosovo Statistics Agency 2014.

[29] “Global Terrorism Index 2012: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism for the Last Decade” Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012.

[30] “Kosovo Human Development Report 2012: Private Sector and Employment,” UNDP. 2012 .

[31] Omer Taspınar, “Fighting Radicalism, Not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes Of An International Actor Redefined,” SAIS Review XXIX, no. 2 (2009), pp. 75–86.

[32] Aleksandra Bogdani, and Flamur Bezaj, “Dhjetra Fëmijë Shqiptarë, “pengje” Te Xhihadisteve Ne Siri (Tens of Albanian kids, “hostages” of Jihadis in Syria),” Reporter.al, December 16, 2014.

[33] Hijrah refers to Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to Medina to escape persecution, but in this context is used simply as migrate.

[34] Besiana Xharra and Anita Kadriu, “Familja Dhjetanëtarëshe Në ISIS. (Ten-member (Albanian) Family with ISIS.).” Zeri, January 25, 2015 .

[35] “Vritet Ish-ushtari I UCK-se Ne Siri Gjate Sulmeve Kunder Asadit (Former KLA Soldier Killed in Syria during Raids against Assad).” Shqiptarja.com, November 14, 2012.

[36] “Grupe Shqiptarësh Në Luftë Kundër Assadit (Albanian Groups in War against Assad),” Portali Telegrafi, November 14, 2012 .

[37] “Dy Nga Tre Gjilanasit Qe Shkuan Ne Siri Nuk Kishin Pasaporta; E Paraqarte Si Dolen” (Two of the Three People from Gjilan That Travelled to Syria Did Not Have Passports; Unclear How They Managed to Travel), KOHA. January 20, 2015 .

[38] “Katër Komando Të Zall Herrit Shkuan Për Të Luftuar Në Siri. Dy U Vranë” (Four Commandos from Zall Herr Went to Fight in Syria: Two Now Dead), Gazeta Tema, March 21, 2014.

[39] Ismet Hajdari, “Unknown to Their Families, Balkan Former Guerrillas Join Rebels,” The Daily Star Newspaper, August 8, 2013.

[40] Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo Imams Arrested in Push to Stop Fighters Going to Syria, Iraq,” Reuters, September 17, 2014.

[41] “Tetë Në Pranga, Rekrutonin Luftëtarë Besimtarë Shqiptarë Për Të Luftuar Në Siri” (Eight Arrested for Recruiting Albanians to Fight in Syria), Gazeta SHQIP, March 12, 2014.

[42] “French Brothers Seek Jihad in Syria,” BBC News, August 20, 2013, and Chris Pleasance, “Last Surviving Brother of Trio of British Extremists Who Left Britain to Fight in Syria Says He Will Not Return to UK until All Muslim Lands Are ‘liberated’,” Mail Online, November 15, 2014.

ΓΙΑ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΕΙΤΕ ΤΩΡΑ ΤΟΥΣ… ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΣ 30.000 ΤΖΙΧΑΝΤΙΣΤΕΣ, ΟΠΩΣ ΕΧΕΙ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΗΣΕΙ Ο ΡΑΜΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΡΤΕ, ΣΤΗΝ Β. ΗΠΕΙΡΟ!.. ΣΤΟΧΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΕΛΒΑΣΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΩ -ΟΠΩΣ ΠΑΕΙ- ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΕΝΑ ΜΙΚΡΟ ΑΛΒΑΝΙΚΟ, ΑΝ ΟΧΙ… ΙΡΑΝ, ΕΝΑ ΜΙΚΡΟ ΑΛΒΑΝΙΚΟ “ΙΣΛΑΜΙΚΟ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ”, ΤΟΥ ΟΠΟΙΟΥ -ΥΠΟΤΙΘΕΤΑΙ- ΟΤΙ ΘΑ ΕΠΙΔΙΩΧΘΕΙ Η ΕΚΔΥΤΙΚΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ, ΜΕ ΚΑΘΟΔΗΓΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΔΥΣΗΣ, ΠΑΡΑΛΛΗΛΩΣ ΑΣΦΑΛΩΣ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΑΦΕΛΛΗΝΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΕΡΙΟΧΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΟΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ ΠΡΟΟΠΤΙΚΑ Η ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΙΑ ΣΥΝΘΗΚΩΝ ΑΠΕΙΛΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΗΠΕΙΡΟΥ, ΟΠΩΣ ΕΧΕΙ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ Η ΓΕΩΓΡΑΦΙΑ!..

3. Οι Αλβανοί φέρεται να έχουν καταστρέψει 16,7 τόνους “χημικών όπλων”, από το 2014, αν δεν σφάλλω, με επίσημη αναφορά της διεθνούς “OPCW”!

Παρ’ όλα αυτά εμείς ξέρουμε πως “Χ.Ο.” είχαν μεταφερθεί από την περιοχή της Κορυτσάς [προορίζονταν, επί Κομμουνιστικού καθεστώτος, για περίπτωση ελληνικής… εισβολής (sic) ], στο Ζάαλ-χέρ / Τίρανα, όπου και οι Α/ΕΔ και η Α/Μ/Κ ΤΑΞ, κλπ. Τί αέρια; Υποχλωρίτης και Δικλορετάν.

Στην Αλβανία, αν δεν απατώμαι, εργοστάσιο χημικών “όπλων” είχαμε στο Σπίζιτ, αλλά γενικώς “Χ.Ο.” είχαν εντοπισθεί και σε αριθμό Στρατοπέδων, όπως πχ στην περιοχή του χωριού Κάφε Μόλε, κλπ. Ο Αλία είχε προμηθευτεί από την Κίνα τοξικά αέρια, όπως και από Λίβανο και Β. Κορέα.

Τέλος, εργοστάσια κατασκευής / παραγωγής όπλων και κυρίως “ΚΑΛΑΣΝΙΚΩΦ” είχαμε και έχουμε στο Γκραμς, ανάμεσα στο Δυρράχιο και στο Λούσνιε, και στο Πολιτσάτι, κοντά στο Βεράτι.

4. 4. Η ΜΙΤ έχει διεισδύσει βαθιά σε όλες τις Κουρδικές Οργανώσεις – Στρατόπεδα στην Μ. Ανατολή και στην Ευρώπη (και στην Ελλάδα), και φυσικά και στην ΝΑ – Α. Τουρκία, προσπαθώντας να εισχωρήσει στον… εγκέφαλο του ΡΚΚ και στα ηγετικά στελέχη του, σ’ αυτά της… “κόκκινης λίστας” του Τ/ΥΠΕΣ!

Κύριο όπλο αυτής της διεισδύσεως της ΜΙΤ είναι πρωτίστως το ΧΡΗΜΑ και ανταλλάγματα στους “στοχευθέντες” για πληροφοριοδότες την ίδια τους την ζωή, εντός ή εκτός Τουρκίας, όπως και αυτής των οικογενειών τους!..

Έχουμε γράψει πχ για την ΜΙΤ στα Εξάρχεια και το “πώς” παρίσταται εκεί!.. Βρες και διάβασέ μας! Η ΜΙΤ στην Ελλάδα χρησιμοποιεί κυρίως Αλβανούς για τις “δουλειές” της και ακολούθως… Μ. Ανατολίτες!..

Η ΜΙΤ με Αλβανο-Αλβανούς (demek Έλληνες πια) και Β. Ηπειρώτες Έλληνες, που τους “κρατάει” το Α/Κράτος (τους ίδιους ή τις οικογένειές τους στην Αλβανία), έχει διεισδύσει στην ΕΥΠ και κυρίως στις επικοινωνίες της! (Ό,τι έκαναν οι Τ/ΜΥ με πολλούς ομογενείς μας από την Πόλη ή την Σμύρνη, μέχρι κυρίως και την 10ετία του 1990! ΕΚΒΙΑΣΜΟ! Τον είχαν νοιώσει στο πετσί τους αρκετές οικογένειες ομογενών μας, που είχαν εξαναγκαστεί να έλθουν στην Ελλάδα)!..

Γι’ αυτό και έγραψα ως ΑΡΙΣΤΗ την ολική μετακίνηση των “Ηλεκτρονικών Πληροφοριών” της υπόψη Υπηρεσίας, στο ΥΠΑΜ και συγκεκριμένα στο ΓΕΕΘΑ! Κατάλαβες; Παλαιότερα, θυμίζω, η ΜΙΤ είχε μέσω των μεταφραστών κυρίως και δασκάλων τουρκικής γλώσσης, πρόσβαση στην ε/Κ-Β και σε βουλευτές του ε/Κοινοβουλίου! Ακόμα και στο ΓΕΕΘΑ, όπου υπεράνω υποψίας ομογενείς παρουσίαζαν – πρότειναν διάφορα προγράμματα, κυκλοφορούντες ελεύθεροι μέσα στους διαδρόμους των ε/Επιτελείων!.. Τέλος, η ΜΙΤ “έπαιξε” πολύ τους Ε-Τ γάμους τις 3 τελευταίες 10ετίες!

Διάβασε φιλαράκο και… διαβάστε: Τουρκάλες παντρεμένες με Έλληνες και με διαμονή πχ στο Ηράκλειο της Κρήτης*, ώστε να παρακολουθούν διακριτικά τους S-300, με μια σειρά από τρόπους, στα Χανιά (όπου και οι Η.Π.Α.) και τώρα “φουλ” στην Α. Κρήτη, όπου θα έχουμε την Ι/Βάση Ραντάρ, και Νως της Α. Κρήτης τις πρώτες γεωτρητικές έρευνες, “καθ’ α ΡΤΕ έφα”!.. Ακόμα Τουρκάλες ή Αλβανο-Αλβανίδες (ούτε καν Β. Ηπειρώτισσες και… παπάρια), παντρεμένες με Ε/Αξκους – Υπξκους, που υπηρέτησαν στις “Πληροφορίες”! Μιλάμε για το(!!!) ε/Χειμαδιό!..

* Όταν έλεγε κάποιος σε ανώτατους Αξκούς στο ΓΕΕΘΑ, και δη στους “τουρίστες” και του ελέγχοντος τις Πληροφορίες… πατριωτικού (ο τίτλος του / η πινακίδα του) “Κυκλώματος” Αξκούς, για την Κρήτη και την σημασία της για τους Τούρκους, (πχ ότι ένας εκ των 2 συνθηματικών ονομασιών κατά τις τ/ασκήσεις “ΕΦΕΣΣΟΣ”, αφορούσε την Κρήτη και γιατί άραγε ή ότι οι Τούρκοι, εκ των πραγμάτων, θα ενδιαφερθούν για την Κρήτη, ώστε να δώσουν ΖΧ στους… πιεσμένους της… “ΤΔΒΚ” (sic), αν δει κανείς τον Χάρτη, αυτοί, στην καλύτερη των περιπτώσεων, μπορεί εντέχνως να τον έστελναν να κάνει από 5, έως 10 φορές το Επιτελείο πάνω -κάτω, με τα πόδια, και στην χειρότερη, εντέχνως πάλι, να τον παρουσίαζαν από… υπερβολικό (γραφικό), έως… ανόητο, όντας οι ίδιοι άσχετοι πλήρως με το αντικείμενο Τουρκία, αυτοί περίπου που ανερχόμενοι μετά στην Ιεραρχία, έλεγαν, απαντώντας σε κάποιους, “τον βάλαμε εκεί (στις Πληροφορίες) για να μην μας ενοχλεί”!.. Την ίδια στιγμή, οι Τούρκοι, αντίστοιχοι των Πληροφοριών, τηρούσαν το ΠΡΩΣΣΙΚΟ ΑΞΙΩΜΑ ότι “ΑΞΚΟΣ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ… ΠΙΣΤΟΛΙ – ΚΥΑΛΙΑ – ΧΑΡΤΗΣ”, με ό,τι αυτό με την σειρά του… σημαίνει! (Το “Πατριώτης” δεν το γράφω για τους Τούρκους, διότι όλοι των “Πληροφοριών” τους, διαχρονικά, ήσαν και είναι πρωτίστως ΠΑΤΡΙΩΤΕΣ)!..

5. Οι ΤΕΔ επισπεύδουν τις φετινές κρίσεις*, διότι μέσα στον Αύγουστο εκτιμούν ότι θα είναι σε θέση να επιτεθούν στην Σύρτη, αλλά και διότι με τους Έλληνες, “ποτέ δεν μπορεί να ξέρεις”, ειδικά αν είσαι Τούρκος!..

Στην Λιβύη του Σάρατς οι εκπαιδευτές του… Στρατού του, δεν είναι Τούρκοι, αλλά Τζιχαντιστές, έμμισθοι των ΤΕΔ και της ΜΙΤ, αναλόγως! (Τ/Κράτος). Τ/Τ είναι μόνον η ειδική “Ομάδα Συντονιστών” και αριθμός εξειδικευμένων στρατιωτικών, όπως πχ “Ειδικών Δυνάμεων” [πρέπει να είναι ένα Τάγμα ΒΒ(-)], “Πρακτόρων”, κλπ!

Οι ΤΕΔ μετέφεραν, επίσης, στη Λιβύη του Σάρατς, [χωρίς να υπάρχει ΚΑΝΕΝΑ ΝΑΤΟ, ΚΑΝΕΝΟΣ ΣΤΟΛΤΕΝΜΠΕΡΓΚ, και ΚΑΜΙΑΣ ΚΑΣ… ΙΝΟΥΣ ΑΦΕΝΤΟΥΛΗ (ναι, το “ταποματσό” αυτό ανθελληνικό πρακτόρι, με το ΝΑΠΟΛΕΟΝΤΕΙΟ ΣΥΜΠΛΕΓΜΑ), (ίσως θυμάστε που τα είχαμε ψάλλει στον Κο ΓΓ, ο οποίος έκανε και κάνει τα στραβά μάτια για τους Τούρκους… Τζιχαντιστές στην Σαρατσο-Λιβύη)], τα πολύκαννα ρουκετοβόλα (στη… “Δημοτική”) Τ-122 “ΣΑΓΓΑΡΕΙΟΣ” (για τους… Αιγυπτίους, σε περίπτωση που εισβάλλουν, αν οι ΤΕΔ ουσιαστικά, με την όποια εθνοτική τους σύνθεση, επιτεθούν στην στρατηγικότατη Σύρτη / οι Αιγύπτιοι έπρεπε ήδη να είχαν εισβάλλει, αν πραγματικά δεν θέλουν Τούρκους και “Αδελφούς Μπυσουλμάνους” στα Δυτικά τους), αλλά και μόλις το Σάββατο, με ταχύπλοα… “Ψαροκάϊκα” (sic) Δρία SAT – SAS, του ΤΠΝ! (Διαβάστε τις αποστολές τους, στο… “Youtube”)!..

* Σε ό,τι αφορά τους Γκιουλενιστές, μέχρι τώρα έχει διωχθεί από τις ΤΕΔ (στην χειρότερη των περιπτώσεων), περισσότερο από το 1/6 αυτών! Αν δεχθούμε ότι οι ΤΕΔ είναι συνολικά πχ 600.000, έχει αποστρατευτεί ένα ποσοτό μεγαλύτερο των 100.000 στελεχών*! Αν δούμε ότι οι ΤΕΔ εγγίζουν και τις 800.000 συνολικά, τότε το 1/6 γίνεται 1/8, αριθμός που και πάλι παραμένει υψηλός!..

* Αν μετά και αμέσως από το “Κίνημα” του 2016 εκδιώχθηκαν των ΤΕΔ, 20.000 άτομα, όπως τα Τ/ΜΜΕ αναφέρουν, τότε μέσα σε 4 χρόνια θα έχουν “φύγει” σίγουρα 100.000 άτομα, το ελάχιστον! Οι “ΑΓΓΕΛΟΙ” είναι σε θέση να ξέρουν πως ο αριθμός των εκδιωχθέντων εγγίζει τα 150.000 άτομα, εκτός αυτών που παρακολουθούνται ακόμα από την ΜΙΤ, ως ύποπτοι Γκιουλνειστές!..

Οι Τ/Γκιουλενιστές πιλότοι που ακούτε να έχουν αιτηθεί την επαναφορά τους στην ΤΠΑ, είναι κυρίως “ασπάλακες” (λέγονται και “Όφεις Ασφαλείας”), οι οποίοι βοήθησαν στην αποκάλυψη του “Κινήματος” του 2016 και ακολούθως στην χειραγώγησή του, η οποία στόχευε κυρίως στην ηρωοποίηση του ΡΤΕ, στην ισχυροποίησή του στην τ/εξουσία, στην θυματοποίηση της Τουρκίας προς τον “Διεθνή Παράγοντα” γενικώς και στους “Δυτικούς” ειδικώς, κλπ, κλπ, κλπ, είτε “ανανήψαντες”, εξ αιτίας μιας σειράς λόγων!..

Έχει ενδιαφέρον η παρατήρηση ότι οι Γκιουλενιστές γιατροί, έδιναν χάπια πιέσεως στους πιλότους, ώστε μετά να τους δίνουν πιστοποιητικά ατομικής… “μη διαθεσιμότητος”!.. Καταλάβατε!..

Ένας Ε-Τ πόλεμος, μάλλον πλέον δεν θα είναι Ε-Τ, αλλά Ε-Τουρκο-Πακιστανικός (τους μισθοφόρους Τζιχαντιστές, κυρίως Ιρακινούς πρώην Σανταμικούς, δεν τους συνυπολογίζω), καθώς Πακιστανοί υπάρχουν στην ΤΠΑ, [ως πιλότοι, αλλά και ως ΚΥΡΙΟΙ χειριστές κυρίως “SIHA” και μετά και “ΙΗΑ”, (οι Πακιστανοί έκαναν… “μάγκισες” τις ΤΕΔ και τα κουμπάρια του ΡΤΕ, τους Μπαϊρακτάρ και ουσιαστικά αυτούς έπρεπε να συγχαρεί ο Άγγλος ΥΠΑΜ πρόσφατα, όταν συνεχάρη τους Τούρκους, λέγοντας πως “αν τα μισά απ’ αυτά που λέγονται για τα siha, κλπ, είναι αλήθεια, τότε οι Τούρκοι άλλαξαν το παιχνίδι στην Λιβύη”) / τα όσα κάνουν οι Τούρκοι στην Λιβύη έχουν την απόλυτη έγκριση των Άγγλων και της ΕΕ, πλην των Ελλάδος – Γαλλίας, η κάθε μια για τους λόγους της], αλλά και στο ΤΠΝ, όπου επανειλημμένως “έπαιξαν” εναλλάξ, σε ασκήσεις, τους ρόλους του αμυνομένου και του επιτιθεμένου, ενώ πιθανώς Πακιστανικά πλοία να βρεθούν την κρίσιμη στιγμή, σε κρίσιμα / στρατηγικά, από ναυτικής σημασίας, σημεία!.. Καταλαβαίνετε!..

6. 6. Οι Η.Π.Α. των “Ρεπουμπλικανών” και του Τραμπ, δεν θέλουν τον Ρ-Γ αγωγό “ΝΟΡΝΤ-ΣΤΡΙΜ”*, αφού προκρίνουν τον “ΙΣΤ-ΜΕΝΤ”, που επιθυμούν τα 2/3 των Ισραηλινών, πλην των ακραίων αριστερών και κάποιων που από πίσω τους είναι οι “Διεθνείς Εβραίοι”, Η.Π.Α. και ΕΕ, οι οποίοι είναι πλειοψηφικά αντίθετοι του ενεργειακού Ι/Οράματος, προς Ευρώπη – Δύση και προς Ανατολή (Κ. – Α. Ασία, Ν. Καύκασο, κλπ)! Αυτός είναι ένας ακόμα λόγος διαμάχης της ΕΕ και ειδικά της Γερμανίας της Μέρκελ των Ρότσιλντ, μετά τα δεκάδες δις $ Η.Π.Α. που έχασαν, στα χρόνια του ΤΡΑΜΠ, οι “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΤΕΣ” “ΔΙΕΘΝΕΙΣ ΕΒΡΑΙΟΙ”, που κυβερνούν την ΕΕ και οι ιδρυτές του σύγχρονου Κομμουνισμού, του Καπιταλιστικού Κομμουνισμού των “ΕΛΙΤ” των Κινεζικών “Πολιτμπιρό”, συνεργάτες τους Κινέζοι, κατά τον πόλεμο “ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΤΡΙΩΤΙΣΜΟΣ” – “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ”!

* Γι’ αυτό εξηγούσαμε και αναλύαμε εδώ, ότι οι Ρώσοι είναι Νο”1″ εχθρός του Ισραήλ!..  / Θυμίζω ακόμα ότι η Ρ/”ΓΚΑΖΠΡΟΜ”, στην οποία εργαζόταν και ένας τέως Α/ΓΕΣ, (ο Έλληνας στρατιωτικός… “Πορνοστάρ”, όπως κάποιοι τον αποκαλούσαν παλιά), έχει έλθει σε συμφωνία με την Κίνα, από το 2014!..

Έτσι, οι “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΤΕΣ” και οι Κινέζοι, που είδαν -επιπροσθέτως- πλην της τεράστιας ζημίας που υπέστησαν παγκοσμίως, την ανεργία, με την πολιτική Τραμπ, να κατεβαίνει στις Η.Π.Α. στο 3%-5%, σε συνεννόηση “απελευθέρωσαν” τον υπαρκτό ιό (“COVID-19”) από τα Κινεζικά κομμουνιστικά εργαστήρια της Γιουχάν, με το σύνθημα “ΤΩΡΑ ή ΠΟΤΕ” ΚΑΙ ΜΕ ΕΝΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΟΝΑΔΙΚΟ ΣΤΟΧΟ ΚΑΙ ΣΚΟΠΟ, ΝΑ ΑΝΑΤΡΕΨΟΥΝ ΤΟΝ ΤΡΑΜΠ ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΑΝΑΚΤΗΣΟΥΝ ΤΙΣ Η.Π.Α. ΚΑΙ ΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟ ΙΣΧΥ, ΑΦΟΥ ΘΑ ΞΑΝΑΑΛΩΣΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΜΚΚΑ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΠΙΤΑΛΙΣΜΟΥ!..

Έτσι εκεί που οι Η.Π.Α. είχαν ανεργία άντε 5%, έχουν σήμερα ανέργους περί τα 40.000.000 άτομα! Ο “ΚΟΒΙΝΤ-19” ήταν η ΚΥΡΙΑ ΑΝΤΙΔΡΑΣΗ της “ΣΥΜΜΑΧΙΑΣ” “ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΕΒΡΑΙΩΝ” / “ΠΑΓΚΟΜΣΙΟΠΟΙΗΤΩΝ” με τους ΚΙΝΕΖΟΥΣ “ΕΛΙΤΟΚΑΠΙΤΑΛΟΚΟΜΜΟΥΝΙΣΤΕΣ” και… “πιάσε λύκο και καβάλα”!..

Όλα τα υπόλοιπα που είδαμε και ακούσαμε είναι ιεραρχικώς στον σχεδιασμό της Συμμαχίας αυτής “δεύτερα” και “τρίτα”!.. (Όπως πχ είναι η δολοφονία του Μαύρου ναρκομανή πορνοστάρ, η εμφάνιση του φαινομένου των… “ΣΟΡΟΣ-ΕΞΑΡΧΕΙΩΝ” και στις Η.Π.Α. / Σιάτλ, η εμφάνιση των “ΑΝΤΙΦΑ”, που γεννήθηκαν στην “CIA” του “ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΥ” Κλίντον, κλπ, κλπ, κλπ και “απλώθηκαν”, βάσει του κειμένου σχεδιασμού και στην Ευρώπη, η καθημερινή κατασυκοφάντηση παγκοσμίως του ΤΡΑΜΠ, δια των ΜΜΕ / στην Ελλάδα αυτή γίνεται, ακόμα και σε βάρος των ε/εθνικών συμφερόντων, κάτι που είναι απολύτως φο-βε-ρό, κλπ, κλπ, κλπ! Μέχρι και ο Αφτιάς το “τσίμπησε” και σου λέει δεν γλείφω και εγώ λίγο την “Παγκοσμιοποίηση” βρίζοντας εντέχνως τον Τραμπ, μπας και γίνω βουλευτής του Κ. Κ. Μητσοτάκη);

7. 7. Ναι! Μια ήττα του ΤΡΑΜΠ, θα σημάνει την τελική επικράτηση της “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΥ ΔΙΚΤΑΤΟΡΙΑΣ” των “ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΕΒΡΑΙΩΝ”, όπως και ο ίδιος ο Α/Πρόεδρος το είχε τονίσει σ΄εκείνη την ιστορική του τελευταία ομιλία στον Ο.Η.Ε., στα τέλη του 2019!..
8. 8. Ναι, συμφωνώ! Γι’ αυτό έβαλαν το ΡΑΜΟΛΙ Μπάϊντεν (ΤΟΝ “ΚΟΙΜΙΣΜΕΝΟ ΤΖΟ”, όπως τον λέει ορθά ο Τραμπ / ο… Τάκης θα τον έλεγε, όπως τους ΜΠΑΟΥΚ-τζήδες, “Όρθιο Γελάδι”… ) υποψήφιο Πρόεδρο, με τους “ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ”, ώστε αν κερδίσουν αυτοί, όπως ελπίζει και διακαώς θέλει η “ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ”, να μην έχουν αντιδράσεις από τους λαούς και συγκεκριμένα από τον Πρόεδρο της θεωρητικά ισχυρότερης στον Πλανήτη χώρας – υπερδύναμης, για να μπορέσουν έτσι “ΝΑ ΠΑΡΟΥΝ ΠΙΣΩ ΤΑ ΟΣΑ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΑ ΕΧΑΣΑΝ ΕΠΙ ΤΡΑΜΠ”!..
9. 9. Τί σημαίνει “ΞΕΨΥΧΟΝ ΘΗΡΙΟ”; Φαντάσου ένα πολυλαβωμένο θηρίο (πχ ένα λιοντάρι, αλλά και οποιοδήποτε άλλο ζώο… ), να έχει εγκλωβιστεί κάπου! Τί κάνει; Στην  προσπάθειά του να ξεφύγει, κτυπά επιτιθέμενο, ασύμμετρα, ήτοι μια εδώ και μια εκεί, ανάλογα απ’ όπου νοιώθει ότι απειλείται κάθε φορά, ενώ πάντα δείχνει τα… δόντια του και δοκιμάζει στο μέγιστο την… φωνή του!

Αυτό δεν κάνει σήμερα η Τουρκία;

Μια κτυπά στη Συρία, μια τους Κούρδους μέσα στην Τουρκία, μια στην Κύπρο, μια στην Ελλάδα, μια στην Λιβύη, μια στο Β. Ιράκ, τους Ιρακινούς και μια τους Κούρδους εκεί (οι ΤΕΔ ΙΣΧΥΡΙΖΟΝΤΑΙ “ΣΗΜΕΡΑ” ΟΤΙ ΤΟ “ΡΚΚ” ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΣΕ ΘΕΣΗ ΠΙΑ ΝΑ ΔΙΕΞΑΓΑΓΕΙ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΙΣ), τώρα και τους Αρμένηδες, σε λίγο ίσως και τους Αιγυπτίους σε… ουδέτερο έδαφος (Λιβύη), κλπ, κλπ, κλπ!.. Ευρίσκεται σε κατάσταση “ΑΜΥΝΗΣ” και προ του θανάτου της (ΔΙΑΛΥΣΗ) και δρα ασύμμετρα στο Πεδίο, για να ξεφύγει και “ει δυνατόν” να κατασπαράξει και κάποιον απ’ τους επίδοξους… φονιάδες της, κλπ!..  Είναι θέμα χρόνου* ο θάνατος του παγιδευμένου ζώου!..

Γι’ αυτό ο ΡΤΕ έχει μιλήσει, λίγο μετά το “Κίνημα”, για 2ο Τ/”ΑΓΩΝΑ ΑΝΕΞΑΡΤΗΣΙΑΣ”!.. ΟΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΙ ΝΟΙΩΘΟΥΝ ], ΟΠΩΣ ΤΗ  ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟ 1919-1922!..

Γι’ αυτό και ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΤΑΙ Η ΕΛΛΑΣ (ΚΑΙ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ Η ΣΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ ΧΡΕΟΚΟΠΗΜΕΝΟ-ΥΠΟΘΗΚΕΜΕΝΗ ΕΛΛΑΣ), ΝΑ ΜΗΝ ΠΡΟΒΑΙΝΕΙ ΣΕ ΒΕΒΙΑΣΜΕΝΕΣ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΙΣ, ΑΛΛΑ ΠΑΡΑΜΕΝΟΥΣΑ ΣΟΒΑΡΗ, ΝΑ ΔΡΑ ΜΕ ΠΟΛΛΗ ΠΕΡΙΣΚΕΨΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ “ΤΗΝ ΚΡΙΣΙΜΗ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ”, ΟΤΑΝ ΤΟ ΑΠΟΚΑΜΩΜΕΝΟ ΘΗΡΙΟ ΘΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΕΙΞΕΙ ΤΟ “ΔΟΞΑ ΠΑΤΡΙ” ΤΟΥ ή ΠΙΘΑΝΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ… “ΙΝΙΑΚΟ” ΤΟΥ!..

* Η ΔΙΑΤΑΧΘΕΙΣΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΝ “ΝΕΟ-ΤΣΑΡΟ” ΠΟΥΤΙΝ (ΨΗΦΙΣΤΗΚΕ ΝΟΜΙΖΩ ΣΤΗΝ Ρ/ΔΟΥΜΑ ΝΑ ΠΑΡΑΜΕΙΝΕΙ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΣ, ΑΝ ΤΟ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ Ο ΘΕΟΣ, ΜΕΧΡΙ ΤΟ 2035), ΠΡΟΣΦΑΤΗ Ρ/ΑΣΚΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ 150.000 ΑΝΔΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΩΝ, ΔΕ ΕΓΙΝΕ ΤΥΧΑΙΑ!

ΑΝ ΠΡΟΣΕΞΕΙΣ ΦΙΛΕ, ΟΛΕΣ ΟΙ ΧΩΡΕΣ – ΔΡΩΝΤΕΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΠΕΡΙΟΧΗ ΜΑΣ, “ΚΥΝΗΓΟΥΝ” ΣΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΑ ΦΑΣΗ ΤΟΝ… ΧΡΟΝΟ!.. ΠΛΗΝ ΤΩΝ ΡΩΣΩΝ ΠΧ Η Τ/ΒΟΥΛΗ ΕΝΕΚΡΙΝΕ “ΠΡΟΧΘΕΣ” ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ… ΕΠΙΜΗΚΥΝΣΗ – ΕΠΕΚΤΑΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΤΕΔ, “ΤΗ ΑΙΤΗΣΕΙ” ΤΟΥΣ, ΟΙ ΚΡΙΣΕΙΣ ΕΠΙΣΠΕΥΔΟΝΤΑΙ, ΚΛΠ!

10. 10. Ορθότατα η Ελλάς διεμβόλισε το ΚΩΜΙΚΟ(!!!) “Τ-Λ Μνημόνιο”! ΑΟΖ όμως με την “Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία”, γιατί ακόμα δεν ανακήρυξε; Η Τουρκία έχει ξεκινήσει τον εναντίον μας πόλεμο, όπως το έχουμε εδώ εξηγήσει αναλυτικά!..

Η επέκταση στα 12 ΝΜ ΘΑ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ Τ/ΕΠΙΘΕΣΗ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΜΑΣ!.. ΤΟ “ΓΙΑΤΙ”, ΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΕΧΟΥΜΕ ΓΡΑΨΕΙ, ΣΚΕΨΟΥ ΤΟ ΜΟΝΟΣ ΣΟΥ ΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΦΟΡΑ!.. … ΚΟΥΡΑΣΤΗΚΑ!..

11. ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΕ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΕΞΗΣ: ΚΡΥΦΟ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΣΤΙΣ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΟΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΑΛΛΟ! ΓΙ’ ΑΥΤΟ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΕΡΑΣΤΙΑ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑ ΤΟ ΠόΤΕ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΕΙΣΑΙ, (ΚΥΡΙΩΣ ΩΣ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ ΕΝΝΟΩ, ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΩΣ ΑΤΟΜΟ), ΤΟ ΠΟύ ΘΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ Τί!..

ΑΥΤΟ ΒΕΒΑΙΩΣ ΦΙΛΑΡΑΚΙ ΔΕΝ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ ΟΤΙ ΓΙΑ Ο,ΤΙ ΞΕΡΟΥΜΕ “ΒΓΑΖΟΥΜΕ… ΤΕΛΑΛΗ” ή… “ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ”!.. Διάλεξε και… πάρε!..

12. 12. Ρωτάμε! Η ΕΥΠ διαθέτει σήμερα… Βασίληδες ΣΟΥΦΛΕΣ; Μήπως θα τις χρειαστούν άραγε, σε άλλο επίπεδο και για άλλους λόγους;
13. 13. Ναι, συμφωνώ! Είναι τραγικά αστείο! Ο Καλίν απάντησε στον Ποντίφηκα για την Αγία Σοφία, προσπαθώντας να απαλύνει τον πόνο του!.. Αχαχαχαχαχαχαχαχα!.. Και το γλυκό έδεσε με τις ακολουθήσασες δηλώσεις του… Τ/Υπ. Τουρισμού”, ο οποίος αναφέρθηκε στην λεηλασία του Ναού από την Δύση και στην προστασία του από τους Οθωμανούς παλιότερα και τώρα Τούρκους απογόνους τους Ισλαμιστές! Αχαχαχαχαχαχαχαχα!

Ω! Της Ξεφτίλας” Σεβαστέ Πάπα ΡΩΜΗΣ!.. Κατάντησες “Η ΧΛΕΥΗ ΤΩΝ ΗΤΤΗΜΕΝΩΝ”, όπως έλεγε κάποτε ο ΜΕΓΑΣ ΠΑΤΡΙΩΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΟΛΑΤΡΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ! (Ο παππούς του “ΓΑΠ”)!..

14. 14. Εσύ γιατί λες να έχουν σταλεί τώρα “JÖH” στην Ποντική;
15. Ναι! Ο Σαλβίνι τάχθηκε υπέρ μας, στο θέμα της Αγίας Σοφίας, για την οποία δεν θα επαναλάβω ξανά τον λόγο που οι Τούρκοι την έκαναν και πάλι Τζαμί!..
16. 16. Δεν πρέπει να δένουμε και πάντα… “κορδόνι” το γεγονός ότι οι Τούρκοι κάνουν πάντα ό,τι λένε, διότι μπορεί καμιά φορά να πουν επίτηδες και να μη κάνουν, όντας κατ’ εξοχήν δόλιοι, και έτσι να μας… απογοητεύσουν ή αλλιώς, να μας εκπλήξουν δυσάρεστα!.. Εδώ έγκειται και η επικινδυνότητα της συγκεκριμένης, εκ μέρους μας, για τους Τούρκους, διαπιστώσεως. Μην γίνουμε δηλαδή σαν τον γάτο τον… Σιλβέστερ, που περίμενε να περάσει το ποντίκι από μπροστά του, όπως του είχε πει ότι θα κάνει, αλλά του “την έσκασε” και δεν πέρασε!..
17. 17. Ο Αντώνης ΒΛΑΧΟΥΤΣΙΚΟΣ, πατέρας του ήρωος των Ιμίων Παναγιώτη, είχε, λίγο πριν πεθάνει, δηλώσει (ε/φ “ΒΡΑΔΥΝΗ”):

“… Φυσικά και δεν ήταν ατύχημα. Υπάρχουν αδιάψευστα στοιχεία γι’ αυτό. Αυτό που έκαναν λέγεται εσχάτη προδοσία, γιατί ξέρουν ότι το Ε/Π χτυπήθηκε από το τ/πλοίο “ΓΙΑΒΟΥΖ” και πως όταν έφαγε την πρώτη σφαίρα ο άτυχος Καραθανάσης και έπεσε στην θάλασσα, τον άφησαν 3,5 ώρες να επιπλέει μισοπεθαμένος!.. … … Υπάρχουν 11 κασέτες πλοίων που έπλεαν στην περιοχή και επιβεβαιώνουν διάλογο μεταξύ του γιού μου και του καπετάνιου του τ/πλοίου. Τον καλεί ο Τούρκος, λίγα λεπτά πριν τον πυροβολήσουν, να προσγειωθούν και ο γιος μου του απαντάει “αυτά να τα πεις στους δικούς σου”. Έχουμε εισπράξει όλη την κακία, εγώ και ο άλλος μου ο γιός. Αντί να με αφήσουν στην ησυχία μου με πολεμάνε. Ο άλλος μου ο γιός έχει μείνει χωρίς δουλειά, ενώ το παληκάρι είναι γιατρός, γιατί δεν βάζει μια υπογραφή πρόσληψης ο υπουργός Υγείας, ο Κος Γείτονας… … …” (Σήμερα, ο συγκεκριμένος, εργάζεται ως Ιατρός στο “Τζάνειο”)!..

Σου θυμίζω, στο σημείο αυτό!

  α. Σε δεξίωση στην Γερουσία, για την μεταφορά ε/αρχαιοτήτων που βρέθηκαν στην  Ελλάδα και μεταφέρθηκαν στις Η.Π.Α. για έκθεση, είχε διαρρεύσει ότι τις επόμενες ώρες Κε… Κλίντον, “παλιο… παθέρνα”, οι Τούρκοι θα καταλάμβαναν ε/βραχονησίδα! Η ε/Κ-Β επομένως γνώριζε!..

  β. Ο Μπερνς, πρεσβευτής των Η.Π.Α. τότε στην Ελλάδα, (ο προσωπικός… εξευτελιστής του τότε Ε/ΥΠΕΞ Πάγκαλου), είχε, αμέσως μετά από το συμβάν στα Ίμια, δηλώσει: “Οι Η.Π.Α. δεν αναγνωρίζουν κυριαρχία στα Ίμια της Ελλάδος, όπως και σε κανένα από τα νησάκια του Αιγαίου”!..

  γ. Ο εκπρόσωπος του Α/ΥΠΕΞ είχε δηλώσει: “Η Τ-Α νότα Τύπου, η οποία αναφέρει πως η κυριότητα των Ιμίων θα κριθεί στην Χάγη*, είναι πλαστή”!.. Καταλάβατε!

* Η ΧΑΓΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΑ ΙΜΙΑ, ΔΕΝ ΘΑ ΣΗΜΑΝΕΙ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΔΙΧΟΤΟΜΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΓΑΙΟΥ, ΑΛΛΑ ΔΙΧΟΤΟΜΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ!..  (Η Χάγη, επρόκειτο για ιδέα του ανθέλληνα, θανόντος -από καρκίνο- πια, Α/ΥΠΕΞ και πολύ φίλου του Πάγκαλου, κατά δήλωση τότε του αρχηγού της Ομάδος των 53 του Σημιτικού ΠΑΣΟΚ, Ρίτσαρντ ΧΟΛΜΠΡΟΥΚ, των… “ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΩΝ”)!..

ΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΦΙΛΑΡΑΚΟ, ΤΑ ΕΙΧΕ ΣΧΕΔΙΑΣΕΙ Ο ΚΛΙΝΤΟΝ, ΤΩΝ “ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΩΝ”, ΜΕ ΤΗΝ “CIA” ΤΟΥ, Ο ΚΛΙΝΤΟΝ Ο ΜΑΚΕΛΛΑΡΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΒΑΛΚΑΝΙΩΝ, Ο ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ ΤΗΣ “ΔΙΕΘΝΟΥΣ ΕΞΟΥΣΙΑΣ”, Ο ΟΠΟΙΟΣ ΣΚΟΡΠΙΣΕ ΤΑ ΠΥΡΗΝΙΚΑ ΣΧΕΔΟΝ ΣΕ ΟΛΗ ΤΗΝ ΧΕΡΣΟΝΗΣΟ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΜΟΥ, ΟΠΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΕΧΟΥΜΕ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΞΗΓΗΣΕΙ ΕΔΩ, ΣΤΟ “ΣΑΪΤ” ΜΑΣ!.. (ΦΥΣΙΚΑ ΟΙ ΤΟΤΕ Ε. ΚΑΙ Τ. ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΤΕΣ ΗΣΑΝ ΕΝΗΜΕΡΩΜΕΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΙ ΣΕ Ο,ΤΙ ΕΠΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΗΣΕ, ΟΠΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΓΟΤΕΡΑ ΗΣΑΝ ΤΟ ΙΔΙΟ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΜΑΔΡΙΤΗ, ΜΕ ΤΟ ΕΛΣΙΝΚΙ, ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΑΔΟΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΟΤΖΑΛΑΝ ΣΤΟΥς ΤΟΥΡΚΟΥΣ, ΚΛΠ, ΚΛΠ, ΚΛΠ)!

18. 18. Ναι! Το 1ο Τάγμα της σημερινής Ταξ Π/Ν του ΤΠΝ [ουσιαστικά του σημερινού ΣΣ(-)] και αρχικώς Συντάγματος,  συνεκροτήθη το 1968 (30-08) στο Γκιουλτσούκ και το 2ο, το 1973 και πάλι εκεί. Πρώτος Δκτης ήταν ο G. ERKIN. Οι Π/Ν έκαναν εκπαίδευση έχοντας μόνον για εκπαίδευση ένα μεγάλο πλοίο. Το 3ο Τάγμα συνεκροτήθη για τις ανάγκες του 2ου “ΑΤΤΙΛΑ”, στις 01-08-1974. Οι Π/Ν επέστρεψαν στην Τουρκία το 1975.
19. 19. “ΕΝ ΟΨΕΙ” ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΩΝ ΚΥΠΡΟΥ, ΤΟΥΣ ΜΗΝΕΣ ΙΟΥΛΙΟ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΓΟΥΣΤΟ 1974!

ΑΙΩΝΙΑ ΤΙΜΗ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΞΑ ΣΕ ΟΣΟΥΣ ΑΓΝΟΥΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ (ΕΛΛΑΔΙΤΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΥΠΡΙΟΥΣ), ΠΟΛΕΜΗΣΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΕΣΑΝ ΤΟ 1974 (ΙΟΥΛΙΟ και ΑΥΓΟΥΣΤΟ) ΣΤΗΝ ΚΥΠΡΟ ΜΑΣ, ΕΜΠΡΟΣ ΣΤΙΣ ΤΕΔ, ΠΟΥ ΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΚΑΝΑΝ ΠΑΡΕΛΑΣΗ, ΑΦΟΥ ΟΛΑ ΗΣΑΝ “ΣΤΗΜΕΝΑ”, ΠΑΡΑΛΙΓΟ ΝΑ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΑΦΟΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΓΥΡΙΣΟΥΝ ΠΙΣΩ ΣΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΑΠΡΑΓΕΣ!..

ΑΙΩΝΙΑ ΝΤΡΟΠΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΝΕΙΔΟΣ, ΣΕ ΟΛΟΥΣ ΑΥΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΥ ΣΗΚΩΘΗΚΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΦΥΓΑΝ ΜΠΡΟΣΤΑ ΣΤΟΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΟ, ΞΕΡΟΝΤΑΣ ή ΑΝΤΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΟΤΙ ΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΗΣΑΝ ΠΡΟΔΟΜΕΝΑ, ΣΤΟ ΠΛΑΙΣΙΟ ΜΙΑΣ ΔΙΕΘΝΟΥΣ, ΠΡΩΤΟΦΑΝΟΥΣ ΣΕ ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ, ΠΡΟΔΟΣΙΑΣ, ΕΙΤΕ ΕΠΙΣΤΡΕΦΟΝΤΑΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ (ΟΣΟΙ ΗΣΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ), ΕΙΤΕ ΜΕΝΟΝΤΑΣ ΣΤΑ ΣΠΙΤΙΑ ΤΟΥΣ ή ΦΕΥΓΟΝΤΑΣ ΕΜΠΡΟΣ ΣΤΟΝ ΕΠΕΛΑΥΝΟΝΤΑ ΕΧΘΡΟ, ΟΣΟΙ ΗΣΑΝ ΚΥΠΡΙΟΙ!..

ΔΥΟ ΕΞ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΙΤΩΝ ΕΞΑΓΟΡΑΣΑΝ ΤΗΝ ΦΥΓΗ ΤΟΥΣ ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΑΡΓΟΤΕΡΑ ΑΡΧΗΓΟΙ ΓΕΕΘΑ, ΕΝΩ ΓΙΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟ 1974 ΧΡΟΝΙΑ ΜΕΤΕΒΑΙΝΑΝ ΣΤΙΣ ΔΕΞΙΩΣΕΙΣ, ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΠΑΝΑΦΟΡΑ ΤΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ, ΣΤΟ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΙΚΟ ΜΕΓΑΡΟ, ΟΙ ΑΡΧΗΓΟΙ ΤΩΝ 3 ΚΛΑΔΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΙΩΑΝΝΙΔΗ, ΟΙ ΟΠΟΊΟΙ ΗΣΑΝ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΕΙΠΩΤΗΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΤΡΑΓΩΔΙΑΣ!..

ΤΙΜΗ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΞΑ ΟΜΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΟΥΣ ΤΑΣΟ ΙΣΑΑΚ ΚΑΙ ΣΟΛΩΜΟ ΣΟΛΩΜΟΥ, ΟΙ ΟΠΟΙΟΙ ΔΟΛΟΦΟΝΗΘΗΚΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΤΙΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΕΣ “ΒΔΕΛΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΤΗΤΟΣ”, ΟΠΩΣ ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕ Ο ΣΟΠΕΝΧΑΟΥΕΡ ΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΥΣ, ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΙΜΙΑ, ΤΟ 1996, ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ, ΑΛΛΑ ΔΙΗΡΗΜΕΝΗ, ΓΙΑ ΛΙΓΟ ΑΚΟΜΑ, ΚΥΠΡΟ ΜΑΣ, ΕΠΕΙΔΗ ΗΘΕΛΑΝ “ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΗ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΠΑΤΡΙΔΑ – ΚΥΠΡΟ”!..

ΥΠΟΜΟΝΗ! ΛΙΓΟ ΕΜΕΙΝΕ ΑΚΟΜΑ ΚΑΙ Η ΚΥΠΡΟΣ ΘΑ ΛΕΥΤΕΡΩΘΕΙ ΟΡΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΝ Τ/ΖΥΓΟ ΚΑΙ ΕΤΣΙ ΘΑ ΑΝΑΠΑΥΘΟΥΝ ΟΡΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΟΛΕΣ ΟΙ ΨΥΧΕΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΔΙΚΟΧΑΜΕΝΩΝ -ΔΙΑΧΡΟΝΙΚΑ- ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ ΕΚΕΙ!..

20. Οριάνα ΦΑΛΑΤΣΙ (Θανούσα πλέον σύντροφος του Α. ΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΛΗ): “Ο ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ ΕΜΑΘΕ ΣΤΟΝ ΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΛΗ ΝΑ ΣΚΟΤΩΝΕΙ”!.. STOP!