Former IDF chief of staff Haim Bar-Lev ignored(!!!) warnings in 1972 that forts along the Sinai defense-line with Egypt could have been easily hit with 5,000 shells per hour. That’s according to classified material disclosed by the Defense Ministry on the eve of the 45th anniversary of the “Yom Kippur” War / “Πόλεμος Της Εξιλεώσεως”. Those forts were later named after him.

The warnings came on May 29, 1972, from IDF Operations Command Maj.-Gen. Yisrael Tal, who said that, “every one of the forts on the [Suez] Canal, as far as potential from the enemy, could be hit easily with 5,000 shells per hour” by Egyptian forces.

He continued to say that, “it is not just a question about a given fort being destroyed. Rather, even if the fort is not destroyed, the people [soldiers] there will never fight again – because of the shock, the gas” and other harm from the attack.

“We have not risked exploring this [scenario], and we cannot wait until the first test and only afterward evacuate the forts… my point of reference for nixing the forts is that it is an awful trap… And it can happen in one hour. And if it happens in one day to four or five forts, it would be a national disaster,” he added.
Tal’s opposition and that of then-Maj.-Gen. Ariel Sharon to the Bar Lev line, which served as the heart of Israel’s defense strategy against Egypt, had been known before the latest disclosures. At the time, both men were overruled anyway.

This is the first time that the Defense Ministry publicized portions of the May 29, 1972 and October 5, 1973 classified IDF High Command meetings. It is also the first commentary on Tal’s alternative strategy document and critique of the Bar Lev line from 1970.

Tal and Sharon’s warnings were eventually far more accurate than Bar Lev and the majority IDF High Command’s estimate that the defense line would hold long enough for them to have 24 to 48 hours to reinforce the line with reserves.

Investing so much faith in the Bar Lev defense line has been retrospectively uniformly judged a devastating intelligence failure, which led to the Egyptian rout of Israeli forces in the early days of the war.

Regarding Tal’s 1970 alternative strategy document, he said that the Suez Canal should be patrolled day and night by two brigades of troop carriers and tanks in regular movement.

However, he rejected leaving command centers or extensive defense positions that would be stagnant in any area that might be within the range of Egypt’s artillery. Tal also held that the defense line of immovable forts should be defended more modestly.

IDF intelligence chief Eli Zeira was quoted talking about suspicious USSR troop movements during an October 5, 1973 IDF High Command meeting. In addition to updating the IDF High Command on aggressive military drills and troop movements by Egypt and Syria since September 5, 1973, he said that “the Russians have sent 11 transport aircrafts to Egypt and Syria.”

Elaborating, he said that it was unclear what the purpose of these transport planes were, but that it seemed to be an effort “to remove Russian personnel from those states. If so, the question is why and we have no clear explanation as to why.”

He added that, “most of the Soviet naval vessels have left Alexandria. This is also a very very rare thing.”

But at the end of the day, Zeira said that “all of these things do not change IDF intelligence’s basic estimate that the chances of Egypt and Syria initiating a war is still very low…even lower than low.”

Zeira has been criticized for ignoring troop movement signs (Russian evacuations could have signaled that they wanted their forces out of the area before an impending war) and other possible warnings of war.

Finally, IDF Logistics Command Maj. Gen. Nehemiah Kayin warned the meeting that there were insufficient food provisions for IDF forces in the event of a war.

Then-IDF chief-of-staff David Elazar (who had replaced Bar-Lev) responded, “If there are not enough war rations, then they will fast. At the end of the day, it is Yom Kippur. We fast.”

Also on Monday, the National Archives disclosed an actual Mossad cable from the then-Mossad Director Zvi Zamir to then Prime Minister Golda Meir suggesting that she weigh leaking to the media that Israel knew Egypt was about to start a war.

Zamir’s idea was that possibly leaking this to the media before the war started might give Egypt pause and avert the impending war that he had been told about by top secret Israeli spy Ashraf Marwan – the son-in-law of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

2.DEFENSE MINISTRY RELEASES SATELLITE IMAGES OF STRATEGIC SITES IN SYRIA

Israel marks 30 years since launch of first satellite Ofek 1 in space.

BY ANNA AHRONHEIM

SEPTEMBER 17, 2018 

Israel’s Defense Ministry released satellite pictures on Monday of strategic sites in Syria, including the Presidential Palace and Damascus International Airport in what could be seen as a tactic threat to its northern neighbor.

The satellite images included a very clear and detailed image of Presidential Palace in Damascus, a Syrian regime military site with a number of tanks visible, as well as Damascus International Airport, which, according to foreign reports was struck by a number of missiles launched by the IDF on Saturday night.

The images were taken by Israel’s Ofek 11, which was launched in September 2016. Described by officials as the country’s most sophisticated spy satellite, it believed to be used to keep tabs on Iran and other regional adversaries.

Israel has repeatedly warned that it would work to prevent Iranian entrenchment in Syria. In early September, Israel announced that it had carried out more than 200 air strikes in the past year and a half against Iranian targets in Syria, mainly targeted at advanced weapons systems and infrastructure belonging to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.

On Monday, the London-based “Syrian Observatory for Human Rights” stated that 113 Iranian and Shi’ite militia members have been killed in the past two months in Israeli strikes on Syria.

The images were released by Defense Ministry and Israel Aerospace Industries to mark 30 years since the launch of Israel’s first satellite into space.

With the launch of Ofek 1 from Palmahim Airbase in central Israel on September 19, 1988 at 11:32 a.m., the Jewish state became the eighth country in the world to launch an object into orbit.

“Within a short period of time, we built a purely ‘blue-and-white’ space industry with outstanding capabilities and achievements. Only few nations across the world can boast comparable accomplishments,” said Brig.-Gen. (res.) Amnon Harari, head of space programs, directorate of defense R&D, for the Defense Ministry.

Built primarily for communication transmission tests, it proved Israel’s independent capabilities in space, read a statement released by the Defense Ministry.

“Under a heavy veil of secrecy, Israel developed unique satellite capabilities in order to preserve its qualitative edge and intelligence superiority in the region,” the ministry said.

Israel’s defense establishment has gleaned intelligence from dozens of its predecessors – an estimated 64,000 minutes of footage each year.

Crediting the necessity to develop small, lightweight satellites due to Israel’s geographical location, the country’s space program not only “[provides] amazing quality images for the security of the State of Israel,” but is a “major engine and technological catalyst” for the economy, said Boaz Levy, IAI’s vice president and director of the missile and space division.

“Thanks to an organized program in the field of observation satellites, under the direction of the Ministry of Defense, and together with the best minds (στην Ελλάδα τα δυνατότερα μυαλά, ανά τομέα, τα ΜΙΣΟΥΝ και ΤΑ… ΣΚΟΤΩΝΟΥΝ!..) of the State of Israel, we are succeeding time and again in achieving exceptional technological achievements,” he was quoted as saying.

According to Harari, in the 30 years since the launch of Ofek 1, Israel has sent 24 satellites – communications satellites, observation satellites, nano-satellites – into space. In addition to the security component of Israel’s space industry, the satellites have played an important role in the economy, the technological and scientific education, to small and start-up companies, and more.

“This is not a one-time feat, but a strategic national endeavor,” Harari said. “Israel’s independent satellite capabilities provide it with a significant edge in addressing the various threats. The quality of the images generated by the different satellites is excellent, and they provide us with invaluable intelligence information, proving that the sky is not the limit.”

3.